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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Across many areas of modern life, “authority is increasingly expressed 
algorithmically.”1 War is no exception.
In this briefing report, we introduce a new concept—war algorithms—
that elevates algorithmically-derived “choices” and “decisions” to a, and 
perhaps the, central concern regarding technical autonomy in war. We 
thereby aim to shed light on and recast the discussion regarding “autonomous 
weapon systems.”
In introducing this concept, our foundational technological concern is 
the capability of a constructed system, without further human intervention, to 
help make and effectuate a “decision” or “choice” of a war algorithm. Distilled, 
the two core ingredients are an algorithm expressed in computer code and a 
suitably capable constructed system. Through that lens, we link international 
law and related accountability architectures to relevant technologies. We 
sketch a three-part (non-exhaustive) approach that highlights traditional 
and unconventional accountability avenues. By not limiting our inquiry 
only to weapon systems, we take an expansive view, showing how the broad 
concept of war algorithms might be susceptible to regulation—and how those 
algorithms might already fit within the existing regulatory system established 
by international law.
*     *     *
Warring parties have long expressed authority and power through algorithms. 
For decades, algorithms have helped weapons systems—first at sea and later 
on land—to identify and intercept inbound missiles. Today, military systems 
are increasingly capable of navigating novel environments and surveilling 
faraway populations, as well as identifying targets, estimating harm, and 
launching direct attacks—all with fewer humans at the switch. Indeed, in 
recent years, commercial and military developments in algorithmically-
derived autonomy have created diverse benefits for the armed forces in terms 
of “battlespace awareness,” protection, “force application,” and logistics. And 
those are by no means the exhaustive set of applications.
1.  Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control 
Money and Society 8 (2015), citing Clay Shirky, A Speculative Post on the Idea of 
Algorithmic Authority, Clay Shirky (November 15, 2009, 4:06 PM), http://www.shirky.com/
weblog/2009/11/a-speculative-post-on-the-idea-of-algorithmic-authority (referencing Shirky’s 
definition of “algorithmic authority” as “the decision to regard as authoritative an unmanaged 
process of extracting value from diverse, untrustworthy sources, without any human standing 
beside the result saying ‘Trust this because you trust me.’”). All further citations for sources 
underlying this Executive Summary are available in the full-text version of the briefing report.
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Much of the underlying technology—often developed initially in 
commercial or academic contexts—is susceptible to both military and non-
military use. Most of it is thus characterized as “dual-use,” a shorthand for 
being capable of serving a wide array of functions. Costs of the technology 
are dropping, often precipitously. And, once the technology exists, the 
assumption is usually that it can be utilized by a broad range of actors.
Driven in no small part by commercial interests, developers are 
advancing relevant technologies and technical architectures at a rapid 
pace. The potential for those advancements to cross a moral Rubicon is 
being raised more frequently in international forums and among technical 
communities, as well as in the popular press. 
Some of the most relevant advancements involve constructed systems 
through which huge amounts of data are quickly gathered and ensuing 
algorithmically-derived “choices” are effectuated. “Self-driving” or 
“autonomous” cars are one example. Ford, for instance, mounts four laser-
based sensors on the roof of its self-driving research car, and collectively 
those sensors “can capture 2.5 million 3-D points per second within a 200-
foot range.” Legal, ethical, political, and social commentators are casting 
attention on—and vetting proposed standards and frameworks to govern—
the life-and-death “choices” made by autonomous cars.
Among the other relevant advancements is the potential for learning 
algorithms and architectures to achieve more and more human-level 
performance in previously-intractable artificial-intelligence (AI) domains. 
For instance, a computer program recently achieved a feat previously 
thought to be at least a decade away: defeating a human professional 
player in a full-sized game of Go. In March 2016, in a five-game match, 
AlphaGo—a computer program using an AI technique known as “deep 
learning,” which “allows computers to extract patterns from masses of data 
with little human hand-holding”—won four games against Go expert Lee 
Sedol. Google, Amazon, and Baidu use the same AI technique or similar 
ones for such tasks as facial recognition and serving advertisements on 
websites. Following AlphaGo’s series of wins, computer programs have 
now outperformed humans at chess, backgammon, “Jeopardy!”, and Go.
Yet even among leading scientists, uncertainty prevails as to the 
technological limits. That uncertainty repels a consensus on the current 
capabilities, to say nothing of predictions of what might be likely 
developments in the near- and long-term (with those horizons defined 
variously).
The stakes are particularly high in the context of political violence 
that reaches the level of “armed conflict.” That is because international law 
HLS PILAC • AUG. 2016
iii
ExECuTIVE SuMMARy
admits of far more lawful death, destruction, and disruption in war than 
in peace. Even for responsible parties who are committed to the rule of 
law, the legal regime contemplates the deployment of lethal and destructive 
technologies on a wide scale. The use of advanced technologies—to say 
nothing of the failures, malfunctioning, hacking, or spoofing of those 
technologies—might therefore entail far more significant consequences in 
relation to war than to peace. We focus here largely on international law 
because it is the only normative regime that purports—in key respects but 
with important caveats—to be both universal and uniform. In this way, 
international law is different from the myriad domestic legal systems, 
administrative rules, or industry codes that govern the development and 
use of technology in all other spheres.
Of course, the development and use of advanced technologies in 
relation to war have long generated ethical, political, and legal debates. 
There is nothing new about the general desire and the need to discern 
whether the use of an emerging technological capability would comport 
with or violate the law. Today, however, emergent technologies sharpen—
and, to a certain extent, recast—that enduring endeavor. A key reason is 
that those technologies are seen as presenting an inflection point at which 
human judgment might be “replaced” by algorithmically-derived “choices.” 
To unpack and understand the implications of that framing requires, 
among other things, technical comprehension, ethical awareness, and legal 
knowledge. Understandably if unfortunately, competence across those 
diverse domains has so far proven difficult to achieve for the vast majority 
of states, practitioners, and commentators.
Largely, the discourse to date has revolved around a concept that so 
far lacks a definitional consensus: “autonomous weapon systems” (AWS). 
Current conceptions of AWS range enormously. On one end of the spectrum, 
an AWS is an automated component of an existing weapon. On the other, 
it is a platform that is itself capable of sensing, learning, and launching 
resulting attacks. Irrespective of how it is defined in a particular instance, 
the AWS framing narrows the discourse to weapons, excluding the myriad 
other functions, however benevolent, that the underlying technologies 
might be capable of.
What autonomous weapons mean for legal responsibility and for 
broader accountability has generated one of the most heated recent debates 
about the law of war. A constellation of factors has shaped the discussion.
Perceptions of evolving security threats, geopolitical strategy, and 
accompanying developments in military doctrine have led governments 
to prioritize the use of unmanned and increasingly autonomous systems 
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(with “autonomous” defined variously) in order to gain and maintain a 
qualitative edge. By 2013, leadership in the U.S. Navy and Department of 
Defense (DoD) had identified autonomy in unmanned systems as a “high 
priority.” In March 2016, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense of 
the Netherlands affirmed their belief that “if the Dutch armed forces are to 
remain technologically advanced, autonomous weapons will have a role to 
play, now and in the future.” A growing number of states hold similar views.
At the same time, human-rights advocates and certain technology 
experts have catalyzed initiatives to promote a ban on “fully autonomous 
weapons” (which those advocates and experts also call “killer robots”). 
The primary concerns are couched in terms of delegating decisions about 
lethal force away from humans—thereby “dehumanizing” war—and, in the 
process, of making wars easier to prosecute. Following the release in 2012 
of a report by Human Rights Watch and the International Human Rights 
Clinic at Harvard Law School, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots was 
launched in April 2013 with an explicit goal of fostering a “pre-emptive 
ban on fully autonomous weapons.” The rationale is that such weapons will, 
pursuant to this view, never be capable of comporting with international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and are therefore per se illegal. In July 2015, 
thousands of prominent AI and robotics experts, as well as other scientists, 
endorsed an “Open Letter” on autonomous weapons, arguing that “[t]he 
key question for humanity today is whether to start a global AI arms race 
or to prevent it from starting.” Those endorsing the letter “believe that AI 
has great potential to benefit humanity in many ways, and that the goal 
of the field should be to do so.” But, they cautioned, “[s]tarting a military 
AI arms race is a bad idea, and should be prevented by a ban on offensive 
autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control.”
Meanwhile, a range of commentators has argued in favor of regulating 
autonomous weapon systems, primarily through existing international 
law rules and provisions. In general, these voices focus on grounding the 
discourse in terms of the capability of existing legal norms—especially 
those laid down in IHL—to regulate the design, development, and use, or to 
prohibit the use, of emergent technologies. In doing so, these commentators 
often emphasize that states have already developed a relatively thick set of 
international law rules that guide decisions about life and death in war. 
Even if there is no specific treaty addressing a particular weapon, they 
argue, IHL regulates the use of all weapons through general rules and 
principles governing the conduct of hostilities that apply irrespective of 
the weapon used. A number of these voices also aver that—for political, 
military, commercial, or other reasons—states are unlikely to agree on a 
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preemptive ban on fully autonomous weapons, and therefore a better use of 
resources would be to focus on regulating the technologies and monitoring 
their use. In addition, these commentators often emphasize the modularity 
of the technology and raise concerns about foreclosing possible beneficial 
applications in the service of an (in their eyes, highly unlikely) prohibition 
on fully autonomous weapons.
Over all, the lack of consensus on the root classification of AWS and 
on the scope of the resulting discussion make it difficult to generalize. But 
the main contours of the ensuing “debate” often cast a purportedly unitary 
“ban” side versus a purportedly unitary “regulate” side. As with many 
shorthand accounts, this formulation is overly simplistic. An assortment 
of thoughtful contributors does not fit neatly into either general category. 
And, when scrutinized, those wholesale categories—of “ban” vs. “regulate”—
disclose fundamental flaws, not least because of the lack of agreement on 
what, exactly, is meant to be prohibited or regulated. Be that as it may, a 
large portion of the resulting discourse has been captured in these “ban”-
vs.-“regulate” terms.
Underpinning much of this debate are arguments about decision-making 
in war, and who is better situated to make life-and-death decisions—humans 
or machines. There is also a disagreement over the benefits and costs of 
distancing human combatants from the battlefield and whether the possible 
life-saving benefits of AWS are offset by the fact that war also becomes, in 
certain respects, easier to conduct. There are also different understandings 
of and predictions about what machines are and will be capable of doing.
With the rise of expert and popular interest in AWS, states have been 
paying more public attention to the issue of regulating autonomy in war. But 
the primary venue at which they are doing so functionally limits the discussion 
to weapons. Since 2014, informal expert meetings on “lethal autonomous 
weapons systems” have been convened on an annual basis at the United 
Nations Office in Geneva. These meetings take place within the structure of 
the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or 
to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW). That treaty is set up as a framework 
convention: through it, states may adopt additional instruments that pertain 
to the core concerns of the baseline agreement (five such protocols have been 
adopted). Alongside the CCW, other arms-control treaties address specific 
types of weapons, including chemical weapons, biological weapons, anti-
personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and others. The CCW is the only 
existing regime, however, that is ongoing and open-ended and is capable of 
being used as a framework to address additional types of weapons. 
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The original motivation to convene states as part of the CCW was 
to propel a protocol banning fully autonomous weapons. The most recent 
meeting (which was convened in April 2016) recommended that the Fifth 
Review Conference of states parties to the CCW (which is scheduled to take 
place in December 2016) “may decide to establish an open-ended Group 
of Governmental Experts (GGE)” on AWS. In the past, the establishment 
of a GGE has led to the adoption of a new CCW protocol (one banning 
permanently-blinding lasers). Whether states parties establish a GGE on 
AWS—and, if so, what its mandate will be—are open questions. In any 
event, at the most recent meetings, about two-dozen states endorsed the 
notion—the contours of which remain undefined so far—of “meaningful 
human control” over autonomous weapon systems.
Zooming out, we see that a pair of interlocking factors has obscured 
and hindered analysis of whether the relevant technologies can and 
should be regulated. 
One factor is the sheer technical complexity at issue. Lack of 
knowledge of technical intricacies has hindered efforts by non-experts to 
grasp how the core technologies may either fit within or frustrate existing 
legal frameworks.
This is not a challenge particular to AWS, of course. The majority of 
IHL professionals are not experts in the inner workings of the numerous 
technologies related to armed conflict. Most IHL lawyers could not detail 
the technical specifications, for instance, of various armaments, combat 
vehicles, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. 
But in general that lack of technical knowledge would not necessarily 
impede at least a provisional analysis of the lawfulness of the use of such 
a system. That is because an initial IHL analysis is often an exercise in 
identifying the relevant rule and beginning to apply it in relation to the 
applicable context. Yet the widely diverse conceptions of AWS and the varied 
technologies accompanying those conceptions pose an as-yet-unresolved 
set of classification challenges. Without a threshold classification, a general 
legal analysis cannot proceed.
The other, related factor is that states—as well as lawyers, technologists, 
and other commentators—disagree in key respects on what should be 
addressed. The headings so far include “lethal autonomous robots,” “lethal 
autonomous weapons systems,” “autonomous weapons systems” more 
broadly, and “intelligent partnerships” more broadly still. And the possible 
standards mentioned include “meaningful human control” (including 
in the “wider loop” of targeting operations), “meaningful state control,” 
and “appropriate levels of human judgment.” More basically, there is no 
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consensus on whether to include only weapons or, additionally, systems 
capable of involvement in other armed conflict-related functions, such as 
transporting and guarding detainees, providing medical care, and facilitating 
humanitarian assistance.
Against this backdrop, the AWS framing has largely precluded 
meaningful analysis of whether it (whatever “it” entails) can be regulated, 
let alone whether and how it should be regulated. In this briefing report, 
we recast the discussion by introducing the concept of “war algorithms.” 
We define “war algorithm” as any algorithm that is expressed in computer 
code, that is effectuated through a constructed system, and that is capable 
of operating in relation to armed conflict. Those algorithms seem to be 
a—and perhaps the—key ingredient of what most people and states discuss 
when they address AWS. We expand the purview beyond weapons alone 
(important as those are) because the technological capabilities are rarely, 
if ever, limited to use only as weapons and because other war functions 
involving algorithmically-derived autonomy should be considered for 
regulation as well. Moreover, given the modular nature of much of the 
technology, a focus on weapons alone might thwart attempts at regulation.
Algorithms are a conceptual and technical building block of many 
systems. Those systems include self-learning architectures that today present 
some of the sharpest questions about “replacing” human judgment with 
algorithmically-derived “choices.” Moreover, algorithms form a foundation 
of most of the systems and platforms—and even the “systems of systems”—
often discussed in relation to AWS. Absent an unforeseen development, 
algorithms are likely to remain a pillar of the technical architectures.
The constructed systems through which these algorithms are 
effectuated differ enormously. So do the nature, forms, and tiers of human 
control and governance over them. Existing constructed systems include, 
among many others, stationary turrets, missile systems, and manned or 
unmanned aerial, terrestrial, or marine vehicles.
All of the underlying algorithms are developed by programmers and 
are expressed in computer code. But some of these algorithms—especially 
those capable of “self-learning” and whose “choices” might be difficult 
for humans to anticipate or unpack—seem to challenge fundamental and 
interrelated concepts that underpin international law pertaining to armed 
conflict and related accountability frameworks. Those concepts include 
attribution, control, foreseeability, and reconstructability.
At their core, the design, development, and use of war algorithms raise 
profound questions. Most fundamentally, those inquiries concern who, or 
what, should decide—and what it means to decide—matters of life and 
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death in relation to war. But war algorithms also bring to the fore an array 
of more quotidian, though also important, questions about the benefits and 
costs of human judgment and “replacing” it with algorithmically-derived 
systems, including in such areas as logistics.
We ground our analysis by focusing on war-algorithm accountability. 
In short, we are primarily interested in the “duty to account … for the 
exercise of power” over—in other words, holding someone or some 
entity answerable for—the design, development, or use (or a combination 
thereof ) of a war algorithm. That power may be exercised by a diverse 
assortment of actors. Some are obvious, especially states and their armed 
forces. But myriad other individuals and entities may exercise power 
over war algorithms, too. Consider the broad classes of “developers” and 
“operators,” both within and outside of government, of such algorithms 
and their related systems. Also think of lawyers, industry bodies, political 
authorities, members of organized armed groups—and many, many others. 
Focusing on war algorithms encompasses them all. 
We draw on the extensive—and rapidly growing—amount of 
scholarship and other analytical analyses that have addressed related 
topics. To help illuminate the discussion, we outline what technologies 
and weapon systems already exist, what fields of international law might 
be relevant, and what regulatory avenues might be available. As noted 
above, because international law is the touchstone normative framework 
for accountability in relation to war, we focus on public international law 
sources and methodologies. But as we show, other norms and forms of 
governance might also merit attention.
Accountability is a broad term of art. We adapt—from the work of 
an International Law Association Committee in a different context (the 
accountability of international organizations)—a three-part accountability 
approach. Our framework outlines three axes on which to focus initially 
on war algorithms. 
The first axis is state responsibility. It concerns state responsibility 
arising out of acts or omissions involving a war algorithm where those 
acts or omissions constitute a breach of a rule of international law. State 
responsibility entails discerning the content of the rule, identifying a breach 
of the rule, assigning attribution for that breach to a state, determining 
available excuses (if any), and imposing measures of remedy. 
The second axis is a form of individual responsibility under 
international law. In particular, it concerns individual responsibility under 
international law for international crimes—such as war crimes—involving 
war algorithms. This form of individual responsibility entails establishing 
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the commission of a crime under the relevant jurisdiction, assessing 
the existence of a justification or excuse (if any), and, upon conviction, 
imposing a sentence. 
The third and final axis is scrutiny governance. Embracing a wider 
notion of accountability, it concerns the extent to which a person or entity 
is and should be subject to, or should exercise, forms of internal or external 
scrutiny, monitoring, or regulation (or a combination thereof ) concerning 
the design, development, or use of a war algorithm. Scrutiny governance 
does not hinge on—but might implicate—potential and subsequent 
liability or responsibility (or both). Forms of scrutiny governance include 
independent monitoring, norm (such as legal) development, adopting non-
binding resolutions and codes of conduct, normative design of technical 
architectures, and community self-regulation.
Following an introduction that highlights the stakes, we proceed 
with a section outlining pertinent considerations regarding algorithms 
and constructed systems. We highlight recent advancements in artificial 
intelligence related to learning algorithms and architectures. We also 
examine state approaches to technical autonomy in war, focusing on 
five such approaches—those of Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom. Finally, to ground the 
often-theoretical debate pertaining to autonomous weapon systems, we 
describe existing weapon systems that have been characterized by various 
commentators as AWS.
The next section outlines the main fields of international law that war 
algorithms might implicate. There is no single branch of international law 
dedicated solely to war algorithms. So we canvass how those algorithms 
might fit within or otherwise implicate various fields of international 
law. We ground the discussion by outlining the main ingredients of state 
responsibility. To help illustrate states’ positions concerning AWS, we 
examine whether an emerging norm of customary international law specific 
to AWS may be discerned. We find that one cannot (at least not yet). So 
we next highlight how the design, development, or use (or a combination 
thereof ) of a war algorithm might implicate more general principles and 
rules found in various fields of international law. Those fields include 
the jus ad bellum, IHL, international human rights law, international 
criminal law (ICL), and space law. Because states and commentators have 
largely focused on AWS to date, much of our discussion here relates to 
the AWS framing.
The subsequent section elaborates a (non-exhaustive) war-algorithm 
accountability approach. That approach focuses on state responsibility 
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for an internationally wrongful act, on individual responsibility under 
international law for international crimes, and on wider forms of scrutiny, 
monitoring, and regulation. We highlight existing accountability actors and 
architectures under international law that might regulate war algorithms. 
These include war reparations as well as international and domestic 
tribunals. We then turn to less conventional accountability avenues, such 
as those rooted in normative design of technical architectures (including 
maximizing the auditability of algorithms) and community self-regulation.
In the conclusion, we return to the deficiencies of current discussions 
of AWS and emphasize the importance of addressing the wide and serious 
concerns raised by AWS with technical proficiency, legal expertise, and 
non-ideological commitment to a genuine and inclusive inquiry. On the 
horizon, we see that two contradictory trends may be combining into a 
new global climate that is at once enterprising and anxious. Militaries see 
myriad technological triumphs that will transform warfighting. Yet the 
possibility of “replacing” human judgment with algorithmically-derived 
“decisions”—especially in war—threatens what many consider to define us 
as humans.   
To date, the lack of demonstrated technical knowledge by many 
states and commentators, the unwillingness of states to share closely-held 
national-security technologies, and an absence of a definitional consensus 
on what is meant by autonomous weapon systems have impeded regulatory 
efforts on AWS. Moreover, uncertainty about which actors would benefit 
most from advances in AWS and for how long such benefits would yield a 
meaningful qualitative edge over others seems likely to continue to inhibit 
efforts at negotiating binding international rules on the development 
and deployment of AWS. In this sense, efforts at reaching a dedicated 
international regime to address AWS may follow the same frustrations as 
analogous efforts to address cyber warfare. True, unlike with the early days 
of cyber warfare, there has been greater state engagement on regulation of 
AWS. In particular, the concept of “meaningful human control” over AWS 
has already been endorsed by over two-dozen states. But much remains up 
in the air as states decide whether to establish a Group of Governmental 
Experts on AWS at the upcoming Fifth Review Conference of the CCW.
The current crux, as we see it, is whether advances in technology—
especially those capable of “self-learning” and of operating in relation 
to war and whose “choices” may be difficult for humans to anticipate or 
unpack or whose “decisions” are seen as “replacing” human judgment—
are susceptible to regulation and, if so, whether and how they should be 
regulated. One way to think about the core concern which vaults over 
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at least some of the impediments to the discussion on AWS is the new 
concept we raise: war algorithms. War algorithms include not only those 
algorithms capable of being used in weapons but also in any other function 
related to war.
More war algorithms are on the horizon. Two months ago, the Defense 
Science Board, which is connected with the U.S. Department of Defense, 
identified five “stretch problems”—that is, goals that are “hard-but-not-
too-hard” and that have a purpose of accelerating the process of bringing a 
new algorithmically-derived capability into widespread application:
• Generating “future loop options” (that is, “using interpretation of 
massive data including social media and rapidly generated strategic 
options”); 
• Enabling autonomous swarms (that is, “deny[ing] the enemy’s ability 
to disrupt through quantity by launching overwhelming numbers of 
low‐cost assets that cooperate to defeat the threat”); 
• Intrusion detection on the Internet of Things (that is, “defeat[ing] 
adversary intrusions in the vast network of commercial sensors 
and devices by autonomously discovering subtle indicators of 
compromise hidden within a flood of ordinary traffic”); 
• Building autonomous cyber-resilient military vehicle systems (that 
is, “trust[ing] that … platforms are resilient to cyber‐attack through 
autonomous system integrity validation and recovery”); and 
• Planning autonomous air operations (that is, “operat[ing] inside 
adversary timelines by continuously planning and replanning 
tactical operations using autonomous ISR analysis, interpretation, 
option generation, and resource allocation”).
What this trajectory toward greater algorithmic autonomy in war—at least 
among more technologically-sophisticated armed forces and even some 
non-state armed groups—means for accountability purposes seems likely 
to stay a contested issue for the foreseeable future. 
In the meantime, it remains to be authoritatively determined whether 
war algorithms will be capable of making the evaluative decisions and 
value judgments that are incorporated into IHL. It is currently not clear, 
for instance, whether war algorithms will be capable of formulating and 
implementing the following IHL-based evaluative decisions and value 
judgments: 
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• The presumption of civilian status in case of “doubt”;
• The assessment of “excessiveness” of expected incidental harm in 
relation to anticipated military advantage;
• The betrayal of “confidence” in IHL in relation to the prohibition of 
perfidy; and
• The prohibition of destruction of civilian property except where 
“imperatively” demanded by the necessities of war.
*     *     *
Two factors may suggest that, at least for now, the most immediate ways 
to regulate war algorithms specifically and to pursue accountability 
over them might be to follow not only traditional paths but also less 
conventional ones. As illustrated above, the latter might include relatively 
formal avenues—such as states making, applying, and enforcing war-
algorithm rules of conduct within and beyond their territories—or less 
formal avenues—such as coding law into technical architectures and 
community self-regulation. First, even where the formal law may seem 
sufficient, concerns about practical enforcement abound. Second, the 
proliferation of increasingly advanced technical systems based on self-
learning and distributed control raises the question of whether the model 
of individual responsibility found in ICL might pose conceptual challenges 
to regulating AWS and war algorithms. 
In short, individual responsibility for international crimes under 
international law remains one of the vital accountability avenues in 
existence today, as do measures of remedy for state responsibility. Yet 
in practice responsibility along either avenue is unfortunately relatively 
rare. And thus neither path, on its own or in combination, seems to be 
sufficient to effectively address the myriad regulatory concerns pertaining 
to war algorithms—at least not until we better understand what is at issue. 
These concerns might lead those seeking to strengthen accountability of 
war algorithms to pursue not only traditional, formal avenues but also less 
formal, softer mechanisms.
In that connection, it seems likely that attempts to change governments’ 
approaches to technical autonomy in war through social pressure (at least 
for those governments that might be responsive to that pressure) will 
continue to be a vital avenue along which to pursue accountability. But 
here, too, there are concerns. Numerous initiatives already exist. Some of 
them are very well informed; others less so. Many of them are motivated 
by ideological, commercial, or other interests that—depending on one’s 
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viewpoint—might strengthen or thwart accountability efforts. And given 
the paucity of formal regulatory regimes, some of these initiatives may end 
up having considerable impact, despite their shortcomings.
Stepping back, we see that technologies of war, as with technologies 
in so many areas, produce an uneasy blend of promise and threat. With 
respect to war algorithms, understanding these conflicting pulls requires 
attention to a century-and-a-half-long history during which war came 
to be one of the most highly regulated areas of international law. But it 
also requires technical know-how. Thus those seeking accountability for 
war algorithms would do well not to forget the essentially political work 
of IHL’s designers—nor to obscure the fact that today’s technology is, at 
its core, designed, developed, and deployed by humans. Ultimately, war-
algorithm accountability seems unrealizable without sufficient competence 
in technical architectures and in legal frameworks, coupled with ethical, 
political, and economic awareness.
Finally, we also include a Bibliography and Appendices. The 
Bibliography contains over 400 analytical sources, in various languages, 
pertaining to technical autonomy in war. The Appendices contain detailed 
charts listing and categorizing states’ statements at the 2015 and 2016 
Informal Meetings of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 
convened within the framework of the CCW.
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1
INTRODUCTION
Across many areas of modern life, “authority is increasingly expressed 
algorithmically.”1 War is no exception.
Complex algorithms help determine a person’s creditworthiness.2 They 
suggest what movies to watch. They detect healthcare fraud. And they are used 
to trade stocks at speeds far faster than humans are capable of. (Sometimes, 
algorithms contribute to market crashes3 or form a basis for anti-trust 
prosecutions.4)
Warring parties express authority and power through algorithms, too. 
For decades, algorithms have helped weapons systems—first at sea and later 
on land—to identify and intercept inbound missiles.5 Today, military systems 
are increasingly capable of navigating novel environments and surveilling 
1.  Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control 
Money and Society 8 (2015), citing Clay Shirky, A Speculative Post on the Idea of 
Algorithmic Authority, Clay Shirky (November 15, 2009, 4:06 PM), http://www.shirky.com/
weblog/2009/11/a-speculative-post-on-the-idea-of-algorithmic-authority (referencing Shirky’s 
definition of “algorithmic authority” as “the decision to regard as authoritative an unmanaged 
process of extracting value from diverse, untrustworthy sources, without any human standing 
beside the result saying ‘Trust this because you trust me.’”).
2.  On the examples in this paragraph, see generally Pasquale, supra note 1.
3.  See generally U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission & U.S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission, Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010: Report 
of the Staffs of the CFTF and SEC to the Joint Advisory Committee on Emerging 
Regulatory Issues (2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf.
4.  See, e.g., Jill Prulick, When Bots Collude, New Yorker, April 25, 2015, http://www.
newyorker.com/business/currency/when-bots-collude. 
5.  The use of artificial intelligence and other forms of algorithmic systems in relation to war 
is far from new. For examples from nearly three decades ago, see Defense Applications of 
Artificial Intelligence (Stephen J. Andriole & Gerald W. Hopple eds., 1988).
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faraway populations, as well as identifying targets, estimating harm, and 
launching direct attacks—all with fewer humans at the switch.6 Indeed, in 
recent years, commercial and military developments in algorithmically-
derived autonomy7 have created diverse benefits for the armed forces in 
terms of “battlespace awareness,”8 protection,9 “force application,”10 and 
logistics.11 And those are by no means the exhaustive set of applications. 
Meanwhile, other algorithmically-derived war functions may not be far off—
and, indeed, might already exist. Consider the provision of medical care to 
the wounded and sick hors de combat (such as certain combatants rendered 
incapable of fighting and who are therefore “outside of the battle”12) or the 
capture, transfer, and detention of enemy fighters. 
6.  See generally, e.g., Paul J. Springer, Military Robots and Drones: A Reference 
Handbook (2013); see also infra Section 2: Examples of Purported Autonomous Weapon 
Systems.
7.  In a recent report, the Defense Science Board uses a definition of autonomy that implies 
the use of one or more algorithms: “To be autonomous, a system must have the capability 
to independently compose and select among different courses of action to accomplish goals 
based on its knowledge and understanding of the world, itself, and the situation.” Defense 
Science Board, Summer Study on Autonomy 4 (June 2016) (noting that “[d]efinitions for 
intelligent system, autonomy, automation, robots, and agents can be found in L.G. Shattuck, 
Transitioning to Autonomy: A human systems integration perspective, p. 5. Presentation at 
Transitioning to Autonomy: Changes in the role of humans in air transportation [March 11, 2015]. 
Available at http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/workshop/autonomy/download/presentations/
Shaddock%20.pdf.”). Id. at n.1. 
8.  E.g., autonomous agents to improve cyber-attack indicators and warnings; onboard 
autonomy for sensing; and time-critical intelligence from seized media. See Defense Science 
Board, supra note 7, at 46–53.
9.  E.g., dynamic spectrum management for protection missions; unmanned underwater 
vehicles (UUVs) to autonomously conduct sea-mine countermeasures missions; and automated 
cyber-response. See Defense Science Board, supra note 7, at 53–60.
10.  E.g., cascaded UUVs for offensive maritime mining, and organic tactical unmanned 
aircraft to support ground forces. See Defense Science Board, supra note 7, at 60–68. The term 
“force application” is defined in the report as “the ability to integrate the use of maneuver and 
engagement in all environments to create the effects necessary to achieve mission objectives.” 
Id. at 60.
11.  E.g., predictive logistics and adaptive planning, and adaptive logistics for rapid deployment. 
See Defense Science Board, supra note 7, at 69–75.
12.  Under international humanitarian law (IHL), a person is hors de combat if (i) she is in the 
power of an adverse party, (ii) she clearly expresses an intention to surrender, or (iii) she has 
been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapable of defending herself, provided that in any 
of these cases she abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape; shipwrecked 
persons cannot be excluded from the construct of hors de combat. This formulation is derived 
from the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 41(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; see also, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Non-International Armed 
Conflicts in International Law 164 (2014).
HLS PILAC • AUG. 2016
3
INTRODuCTION
Much of the underlying technology—often developed initially in 
commercial or academic contexts—is susceptible to both military and non-
military use. Most of it is thus characterized as “dual-use,” a shorthand for 
being capable of serving a wide array of functions. Costs of the technology 
are dropping, often precipitously. And, once the technology exists, the 
assumption is usually that it can be utilized by a broad range of actors.
Driven in no small part by commercial interests, developers are 
advancing relevant technologies and technical architectures at a rapid 
pace. The potential for those advancements—often in consumer-facing 
computer science and robotics fields—to be used to cross a moral Rubicon 
if unscrupulously adapted for belligerent purposes is being raised more 
frequently in international forums and among technical communities, as 
well as in the popular press. 
Some of the most relevant advancements involve constructed systems 
through which huge amounts of data are quickly gathered and ensuing 
algorithmically-derived “choices” are effectuated. “Self-driving” or 
“autonomous” cars are one example. Ford, for instance, mounts four laser-
based sensors on the roof of its self-driving research car, and collectively 
those sensors “can capture 2.5 million 3-D points per second within a 200-
foot range.”13 Legal, ethical, political, and social commentators are casting 
attention on—and vetting proposed standards and frameworks to govern—
the life-and-death “choices” made by autonomous cars.
Among the other relevant advancements is the potential for learning 
algorithms and architectures to achieve more and more human-level 
performance in previously-intractable artificial-intelligence (AI) domains. 
For instance, a computer program recently achieved a feat previously thought 
to be at least a decade away: defeating a human professional player in a 
full-sized game of Go.14 In March 2016, in a five-game match, AlphaGo—a 
computer program using an AI technique known as “deep learning,” which 
“allows computers to extract patterns from masses of data with little human 
13.  Ucilia Wang, Driverless Cars Are Data Guzzlers, Wall Street Journal, March 23, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304815004579417441475998338.
14.  David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks and Tree Search, 
529 Nature 484, 488 (2016). Go is a board game pitting two players in a contest to surround 
more territory than each other’s opponent; it is played on a grid of black lines, with game pieces 
played on the lines’ intersections. A full-sized board is 19 by 19. Part of the reason Go presents 
such a difficult computational challenge is because its search space is so large. “After the first 
two moves of a Chess game,” for instance, “there are 400 possible next moves. In Go, there are 
close to 130,000.” Danielle Muoio, Why Go is So Much Harder for AI to Beat Than Chess, Tech 
Insider, March 10, 2016, http://www.techinsider.io/why-google-ai-game-go-is-harder-than-
chess-2016-3.
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hand-holding”—won four games against Go expert Lee Sedol.15 Google, 
Amazon, and Baidu use the same AI technique or similar ones for such tasks 
as facial recognition and serving advertisements on websites. Following 
AlphaGo’s series of wins, computer programs have now outperformed 
humans at chess, backgammon, “Jeopardy!”, and Go.16
Yet even among leading scientists, uncertainty prevails as to the 
technological limits. That uncertainty repels a consensus on the current 
capabilities, to say nothing of predictions of what might be likely developments 
in the near- and long-term (with those horizons defined variously).
The stakes are particularly high in the context of political violence that 
reaches the level of “armed conflict.” That is because international law admits 
of far more lawful death, destruction, and disruption in war than in peace.17 
Even for responsible parties who are committed to the rule of law, the legal 
regime contemplates the deployment of lethal and destructive technologies 
on a wide scale. The use of advanced technologies—to say nothing of the 
failures, malfunctioning, hacking, or spoofing of those technologies—
might therefore entail far more significant consequences in relation to war 
than to peace.18 We focus here largely on international law because it is the 
only normative regime that purports—in key respects but with important 
caveats—to be both universal and uniform. In this way, international law 
is different from the myriad domestic legal systems, administrative rules, 
or industry codes that govern the development and use of technology in all 
other spheres.
Of course, the development and use of advanced technologies in relation 
to war have long generated ethical, political, and legal debates. There is nothing 
new about the general desire and the need to discern whether the use of an 
emerging technological capability would comport with or violate the law. 
Today, however, emergent technologies sharpen—and, to a certain extent, 
15.  A Game-Changing Result, The Economist, March 19, 2016, http://www.economist.
com/news/science-and-technology/21694883-alphagos-masters-taught-it-game-electrifying-
match-shows-what. 
16.  Id.
17.  In this report, while recognizing certain distinctions and overlaps between them, we use 
the terms “war” and “armed conflict” interchangeably to denote an armed conflict (whether 
of an international or a non-international character) as defined in international law and a 
state of war in the legal sense. See, e.g., Jann Kleffner, Scope of Application of International 
Humanitarian Law, in The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (Dieter Fleck 
ed., 3rd ed. 2013).
18.  See, e.g., Marten Zwanenburg et al., Humans, Agents and International Humanitarian 
Law: Dilemmas in Target Discrimination, BNAIC 408 (2005) (examining the destruction of a 
commercial airliner by the USS Vincennes to illustrate legal and ethical dilemmas involving the 
use of autonomous agents).
HLS PILAC • AUG. 2016
5
INTRODuCTION
recast—that enduring endeavor. A key reason is that those technologies are 
seen as presenting an inflection point at which human judgment might be 
“replaced” by algorithmically-derived “choices.” To unpack and understand 
the implications of that framing requires, among other things, technical 
comprehension, ethical awareness, and legal knowledge. Understandably 
if unfortunately, competence across those diverse domains has so far 
proven difficult to achieve for the vast majority of states, practitioners, and 
commentators.
Largely, the discourse to date has revolved around a concept that so 
far lacks a definitional consensus: “autonomous weapon systems” (AWS).19 
Current conceptions of AWS range enormously. On one end of the spectrum, 
an AWS is an automated component of an existing weapon. On the other, 
it is a platform that is itself capable of sensing, learning, and launching 
resulting attacks. Irrespective of how it is defined in a particular instance, 
the AWS framing narrows the discourse to weapons, excluding the myriad 
other functions, however benevolent, that the underlying technologies 
might be capable of.
What autonomous weapons mean for legal responsibility and for broader 
accountability has generated one of the most heated recent debates about the 
law of war. A constellation of factors has shaped the discussion.
Perceptions of evolving security threats, geopolitical strategy, and 
accompanying developments in military doctrine have led governments to 
prioritize the use of unmanned and increasingly autonomous systems (with 
“autonomous” defined variously) in order to gain and maintain a qualitative 
edge. The systems are said to present manifold military advantages—in short, 
a “seductive combination of distance, accuracy, and lethality.”20 By 2013, 
19. Among states and commentators, there is no agreement on whether to refer to “autonomous 
weapons,” “autonomous weapon systems,” or “autonomous weapons systems,” among many 
other formulations. Throughout this report, where referring to the views of a particular state(s) 
or commentator(s), we adopt that entity’s or person’s framing. Otherwise, for ease of reference, 
we adopt the “autonomous weapon system(s)” framing.
20.  Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons Systems, 164 U. Penn. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming June 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2657680 [hereinafter Crootof, War 
Torts]. In June 2016, the Defense Science Board highlighted six categories of how autonomy can 
benefit (Department of Defense) DoD missions:
• Required decision speed: more autonomy is valuable when decisions must be made 
quickly (e.g., cyber operations and missile defense); 
• Heterogeneity and volume of data: more autonomy is valuable with high volume data 
and variety of data types (e.g., imagery; intelligence data analysis; intelligence, surveil-
lance, reconnaissance (ISR) data integration); 
• Quality of data links: more autonomy is valuable when communication is intermittent 
(e.g., times of contested communications, unmanned undersea operations);
• Complexity of action: more autonomy is valuable when activity is multimodal (e.g., an 
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leadership in the U.S. Navy and Department of Defense (DoD) had identified 
autonomy in unmanned systems as a “high priority.”21 A few months ago, 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the Netherlands affirmed 
their belief that “if the Dutch armed forces are to remain technologically 
advanced, autonomous weapons will have a role to play, now and in the 
future.”22 A growing number of states hold similar views.
At the same time, human-rights advocates and certain technology experts 
have catalyzed initiatives to promote a ban on “fully autonomous weapons” 
(which those advocates and experts also call “killer robots”). The primary 
concerns are couched in terms of delegating decisions about lethal force away 
from humans—thereby “dehumanizing” war—and, in the process, of making 
wars easier to prosecute.23 Following the release in 2012 of a report by Human 
Rights Watch and the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law 
School,24 the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots was launched in April 2013 
with an explicit goal of fostering a “pre-emptive ban on fully autonomous 
weapons.”25 The rationale is that such weapons will, pursuant to this view, 
never be capable of comporting with international humanitarian law (IHL) 
and are therefore per se illegal. In July 2015, thousands of prominent AI and 
robotics experts, as well as other scientists, endorsed an “Open Letter” on 
autonomous weapons, arguing that “[t]he key question for humanity today is 
whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting.”26 Those 
air operations center, multi-mission operations); 
• Danger of mission: more autonomy can reduce the number of warfighters in harm’s 
way (e.g., in contested operations; chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack 
cleanup); and
• Persistence and endurance: more autonomy can increase mission duration (e.g., enabling 
unmanned vehicles, persistent surveillance).
See Defense Science Board, supra note 7, at 45 (June 2016).
21.  U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap: FY2013–2038, at 
67 (2013), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DOD-USRM-2013.pdf. 
22.  Gov’t (Neth.), Government Response to AIV/CAVV Advisory Report no. 97, 
Autonomous Weapon Systems: The Need for Meaningful Human Control (2016), 
http://aiv-advice.nl/8gr#government-responses [hereinafter Dutch Government, Response 
to AIV/CAVV Report]. At the same time, however, the Dutch government “reject[ed] outright 
the possibility of developing and deploying fully autonomous weapons.” Id.
23.  See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Banning Autonomous Killing, in The American Way of 
Bombing: Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from Flying Fortresses to Drones 
(Matthew Evangelista & Henry Shue eds., 1st ed. 2014).
24.  Human Rights Watch and the Harvard Law School International Human Rights 
Clinic, Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots (2012), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots.
25.  See, e.g., Act, Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/act 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2016).
26.  Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter from AI & Robotics Researchers, Future of Life 
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endorsing the letter “believe that AI has great potential to benefit humanity 
in many ways, and that the goal of the field should be to do so.” But, they 
cautioned, “[s]tarting a military AI arms race is a bad idea, and should be 
prevented by a ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful 
human control.”27 
Meanwhile, a range of commentators has argued in favor of regulating 
AWS, primarily through existing international law rules and provisions. In 
general, these voices focus on grounding the discourse in terms of the capability 
of existing legal norms—especially those laid down in IHL—to regulate the 
design, development, and use, or to prohibit the use, of emergent technologies. 
In doing so, these commentators often emphasize that states have already 
developed a relatively thick set of international law rules that guide decisions 
about life and death in war. Even if there is no specific treaty addressing a 
particular weapon, they argue, IHL regulates the use of all weapons through 
general rules and principles governing the conduct of hostilities that apply 
irrespective of the weapon used. A number of these voices also aver that—for 
political, military, commercial, or other reasons—states are unlikely to agree 
on a preemptive ban on fully autonomous weapons, and therefore a better use 
of resources would be to focus on regulating the technologies and monitoring 
their use. In addition, these commentators often emphasize the modularity 
of the technology and raise concerns about foreclosing possible beneficial 
applications in the service of an (in their eyes, highly unlikely) prohibition on 
fully autonomous weapons.
Over all, the lack of consensus on the root classification of AWS and on 
the scope of the resulting discussion make it difficult to generalize. But the 
main contours of the ensuing “debate” often cast a purportedly unitary “ban” 
side versus a purportedly unitary “regulate” side. As with many shorthand 
accounts, this formulation is overly simplistic. An assortment of thoughtful 
contributors does not fit neatly into either general category. And, when 
scrutinized, those wholesale categories—of “ban” vs. “regulate”—disclose 
fundamental flaws, not least because of the lack of agreement on what, exactly, 
is meant to be prohibited or regulated. Be that as it may, a large portion of 
the resulting discourse has been captured in these “ban”-vs.-“regulate” terms.
Underpinning much of this debate are arguments about decision-making 
in war, and who is better situated to make life-and-death decisions—humans 
or machines. There is also a disagreement over the benefits and costs of 
distancing human combatants from the battlefield and whether the possible 
life-saving benefits of AWS are offset by the fact that war also becomes, in 
Institute (July 28, 2015), http://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons.
27.  Id.
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certain respects, easier to conduct. There are also different understandings of 
and predictions about what machines are and will be capable of doing.
With the rise of expert and popular interest in AWS, states have been 
paying more public attention to the issue of regulating autonomy in war. But 
the primary venue at which they are doing so functionally limits the discussion 
to weapons.28 Since 2014, informal expert meetings on “lethal autonomous 
weapons systems” have been convened on an annual basis at the United 
Nations Office in Geneva. These meetings take place within the structure of 
the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or 
to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW). That treaty is set up as a framework 
convention: through it, states may adopt additional instruments that pertain 
to the core concerns of the baseline agreement (five such protocols have been 
adopted). Alongside the CCW, other arms-control treaties address specific 
types of weapons, including chemical weapons, biological weapons, anti-
personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and others. The CCW is the only 
existing regime, however, that is ongoing and open-ended and is capable of 
being used as a framework to address additional types of weapons. 
The original motivation to convene states as part of the CCW was to 
propel a protocol banning fully autonomous weapons. The most recent 
meeting (which was convened in April 2016) recommended that the Fifth 
Review Conference of states parties to the CCW (which is scheduled to take 
place in December 2016) “may decide to establish an open-ended Group 
of Governmental Experts (GGE)” on AWS. In the past, the establishment 
of a GGE has led to the adoption of a new CCW protocol (one banning 
permanently-blinding lasers). Whether states parties establish a GGE on 
AWS—and, if so, what its mandate will be—are open questions. In any event, 
at the most recent meetings, about two-dozen states endorsed the notion—the 
contours of which remain undefined so far—of “meaningful human control” 
over autonomous weapon systems.29
Zooming out, we see that a pair of interlocking factors has obscured 
and hindered analysis of whether the relevant technologies can and should 
be regulated. 
One factor is the sheer technical complexity at issue. Lack of knowledge 
of technical intricacies has hindered efforts by non-experts to grasp how the 
28.  AWS have also been raised at the U.N. Human Rights Council, though without the thematic 
focus given to them in the context of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
(CCW). See, e.g., Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions), Rep. to Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 142–45, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/36 (Apr. 1, 2014).
29.  See infra Section 3: International Law pertaining to Armed Conflict — Customary 
International Law concerning AWS.
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core technologies may either fit within or frustrate existing legal frameworks.
This is not a challenge particular to AWS, of course. The majority of 
IHL professionals are not experts in the inner workings of the numerous 
technologies related to armed conflict. Most IHL lawyers could not detail the 
technical specifications, for instance, of various armaments, combat vehicles, 
or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. But in general 
that lack of technical knowledge would not necessarily impede at least a 
provisional analysis of the lawfulness of the use of such a system. That is 
because an initial IHL analysis is often an exercise in identifying the relevant 
rule and beginning to apply it in relation to the applicable context. Yet the 
widely diverse conceptions of AWS and the varied technologies accompanying 
those conceptions pose an as-yet-unresolved set of classification challenges. 
And without a threshold classification, a general legal analysis cannot proceed.
The other, related factor is that states—as well as lawyers, technologists, 
and other commentators—disagree in key respects on what should be 
addressed. The headings so far include “lethal autonomous robots,” “lethal 
autonomous weapons systems,” “autonomous weapons systems” more broadly, 
and “intelligent partnerships” more broadly still. And the possible standards 
mentioned include “meaningful human control” (including in the “wider 
loop” of targeting operations), “meaningful state control,” and “appropriate 
levels of human judgment.”30 More basically, there is no consensus on whether 
to include only weapons or, additionally, systems capable of involvement in 
other armed conflict-related functions, such as transporting and guarding 
detainees, providing medical care, and facilitating humanitarian assistance.
Against this backdrop, the AWS framing has largely precluded meaningful 
analysis of whether it (whatever “it” entails) can be regulated, let alone 
whether and how it should be regulated.31 In this briefing report, we recast 
the discussion by introducing the concept of “war algorithms.”32 We define 
30.  See infra Appendices I and II.
31.  On various formal and informal models of regulating new technologies, see generally 
Benjamin Wittes & Gabriella Blum, The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, 
Hackers and Drones—Confronting A New Age of Threat (2015); with respect 
to autonomous military robots, see Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of 
Autonomous Military Robots, 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 272 (2011).
32.  Our concept of “war algorithms” should be distinguished from the “WAR algorithm” 
concept that has been developed in relation to evaluating environmental impacts. See 
Environmental Protection Agency, Waste Reduction Algorithm: Chemical Process Simulation 
for Waste Reduction, https://www.epa.gov/chemical-research/waste-reduction-algorithm-
chemical-process-simulation-waste-reduction (last visited Aug. 27, 2016) (explaining that 
“[t]raditionally chemical process designs, focus on minimizing cost, while the environmental 
impact of a process is often overlooked. This may in many instances lead to the production 
of large quantities of waste materials. It is possible to reduce the generation of these wastes 
and their environmental impact by modifying the design of the process. The WAste Reduction 
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“war algorithm” as any algorithm33 that is expressed in computer code, that 
is effectuated through a constructed system, and that is capable of operating 
in relation to armed conflict. Those algorithms seem to be a—and perhaps 
the—key ingredient of what most people and states discuss when they address 
AWS. We expand the purview beyond weapons alone (important as those are) 
because the technological capabilities are rarely, if ever, limited to use only as 
weapons and because other war functions involving algorithmically-derived 
autonomy should be considered for regulation as well. Moreover, given the 
modular nature of much of the technology, a focus on weapons alone might 
thwart attempts at regulation.
Algorithms are a conceptual and technical building block of many 
systems. Those systems include self-learning architectures that today 
present some of the sharpest questions about “replacing” human judgment 
with algorithmically-derived “choices.” Moreover, algorithms form a 
foundation of most of the systems and platforms—and even the “systems 
of systems”—often discussed in relation to AWS. Absent an unforeseen 
development, algorithms are likely to remain a pillar of the technical 
architectures.
The constructed systems through which these algorithms are 
effectuated differ enormously. So do the nature, forms, and tiers of human 
control and governance over them. Existing constructed systems include, 
among many others, stationary turrets, missile systems, and manned or 
unmanned aerial, terrestrial, or marine vehicles.34
All of the underlying algorithms are developed by programmers and 
are expressed in computer code. But some of these algorithms—especially 
those capable of “self-learning” and whose “choices” might be difficult 
for humans to anticipate or unpack—seem to challenge fundamental and 
interrelated concepts that underpin international law pertaining to armed 
conflict and related accountability frameworks. Those concepts include 
attribution, control, foreseeability, and reconstructability.
At their core, the design, development, and use of war algorithms raise 
profound questions. Most fundamentally, those inquiries concern who, or 
what, should decide—and what it means to decide—matters of life and 
death in relation to war. But war algorithms also bring to the fore an array 
of more quotidian, though also important, questions about the benefits and 
(WAR) algorithm was developed so that environmental impacts of designs could easily be 
evaluated. The goal of WAR is to reduce environmental and related human health impacts at 
the design stage.”)
33.  See infra Section 2: Technology Concepts and Developments (on general definitions of 
“algorithm”).
34.  See infra Section 2: Examples of Purported Autonomous Weapon Systems.
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costs of human judgment and “replacing” it with algorithmically-derived 
systems, including in such areas as logistics.
We ground our analysis by focusing on war-algorithm accountability. 
In doing so, we sketch a three-axis accountability approach for those 
algorithms: state responsibility for a breach of a rule of international law, 
individual responsibility under international law for international crimes, 
and a broad notion of scrutiny governance. This is not an exhaustive list 
of possible types of accountability. But the axes we outline offer a flavor of 
how accountability, in general, could be conceptualized in the context of 
war algorithms.
In short, we are primarily interested in the “duty to account … for 
the exercise of power”35 over—in other words, holding someone or some 
entity answerable for—the design, development, or use (or a combination 
thereof ) of a war algorithm.36 That power may be exercised by a diverse 
assortment of actors. Some are obvious, especially states and their armed 
forces. But myriad other individuals and entities may exercise power 
over war algorithms, too. Consider the broad classes of “developers” and 
“operators,” both within and outside of government, of such algorithms 
and their related systems. Also think of lawyers, industry bodies, political 
authorities, members of organized armed groups—and many, many others. 
Focusing on war algorithms encompasses them all. 
OBJECTIVE, APPROACH, AND 
METHODOLOGY
In this briefing report, our objective is not to argue whether international 
law, as it currently exists, sufficiently addresses the plethora of issues raised 
by autonomous weapon systems. Rather, we aim to shed light on and recast 
the discussion in terms of a new concept: war algorithms. Through that 
lens, we link international law and related accountability architectures to 
relevant technologies. We sketch a three-part (non-exhaustive) approach 
that highlights traditional and unconventional accountability avenues. By 
not limiting our inquiry only to weapon systems, we take an expansive view, 
showing how the broad category of war algorithms might be susceptible to 
35.  Drawn from the discussion of International Law Association, Committee on 
Accountability of International Organizations, Berlin Conference: Final Report 
5 (2004), http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/9 in James Crawford, State 
Responsibility: The General Part 85 (2013).
36.  In principle, the threat of use of a war algorithm may (also) give rise to legal implications; 
however, we focus on the design, development, and use of those algorithms. 
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regulation (and how those algorithms might already fit within the existing 
regulatory system established by international law).
We draw on the extensive—and rapidly growing—amount of scholarship 
and other analytical analyses that have addressed related topics.37 To help 
illuminate the discussion, we outline what technologies and weapon systems 
already exist, what fields of international law might be relevant, and what 
regulatory avenues might be available. As noted above, because international 
law is the touchstone normative framework for accountability in relation to 
war, we focus on public international law sources and methodologies. But as 
we show, other norms and forms of governance might also merit attention.
Accountability is a broad term of art. We adapt—from the work of 
an International Law Association Committee in a different context (the 
accountability of international organizations)—a three-part accountability 
approach.38 Our framework outlines three axes on which to focus initially on 
war algorithms. 
The first axis is state responsibility. It concerns state responsibility 
arising out of acts or omissions involving a war algorithm where those 
acts or omissions constitute a breach of a rule of international law. State 
responsibility entails discerning the content of the rule, identifying a breach 
of the rule, assigning attribution for that breach to a state, determining 
available excuses (if any), and imposing measures of remedy.
The second axis is a form of individual responsibility under international 
law. In particular, it concerns individual responsibility under international 
law for international crimes—such as war crimes—involving war algorithms. 
This form of individual responsibility entails establishing the commission 
of a crime under the relevant jurisdiction, assessing the existence of a 
justification or excuse (if any), and, upon conviction, imposing a sentence.
The third and final axis is scrutiny governance. Embracing a wider 
notion of accountability, it concerns the extent to which a person or entity 
is and should be subject to, or should exercise, forms of internal or external 
scrutiny, monitoring, or regulation (or a combination thereof) concerning 
the design, development, or use of a war algorithm. Scrutiny governance 
does not hinge on—but might implicate—potential and subsequent 
liability or responsibility (or both). Forms of scrutiny governance include 
independent monitoring, norm (such as legal) development, adopting non-
binding resolutions and codes of conduct, normative design of technical 
architectures, and community self-regulation.
37.  See infra Bibliography.
38.  Our approach is derived in part from International Law Association, supra note 
35, at 5.
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OUTLINE
In Section 2, we outline pertinent considerations regarding algorithms and 
constructed systems. We then highlight recent advancements in artificial 
intelligence related to learning algorithms and architectures. We next 
examine state approaches to technical autonomy in war, focusing on five such 
approaches. Finally, to ground the often-theoretical debate pertaining to 
autonomous weapon systems, we describe existing weapon systems that have 
been characterized by various commentators as AWS.
In Section 3, we outline the main fields of international law that war 
algorithms might implicate. There is no single branch of international law 
dedicated solely to war algorithms. So we canvass how those algorithms 
might fit within or otherwise implicate various fields of international 
law. We ground the discussion by outlining the main ingredients of state 
responsibility: attribution, breach, excuses, and consequences. Then, to help 
illustrate states’ positions concerning AWS, we examine whether an emerging 
norm of customary international law specific to AWS may be discerned. 
We find that one cannot (at least not yet). So we next highlight how the 
design, development, or use (or a combination thereof) of a war algorithm 
might implicate more general principles and rules found in various fields of 
international law. Those fields include the jus ad bellum, IHL, international 
human rights law, international criminal law, and space law. Because states and 
commentators have largely focused on AWS to date, much of our discussion 
here relates to the AWS framing.
In Section 4, we elaborate a (non-exhaustive) war-algorithm 
accountability approach. That approach focuses on state responsibility for an 
internationally wrongful act, on individual responsibility under international 
law for international crimes, and on wider forms of scrutiny, monitoring, 
and regulation. We highlight existing accountability actors and architectures 
under international law that might regulate war algorithms. These include 
war reparations as well as international and domestic tribunals. We then turn 
to less conventional accountability avenues, such as those rooted in normative 
design of technical architectures (including maximizing the auditability of 
algorithms) and community self-regulation. 
In the Conclusion, we return to the deficiencies of current discussions 
of AWS and emphasize the importance of addressing the wide and serious 
concerns raised by AWS with technical proficiency, legal expertise, and non-
ideological commitment to a genuine and inclusive inquiry. 
We also attach a Bibliography and Appendices. The Bibliography 
contains over 400 analytical sources, in various languages, pertaining to 
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technical autonomy in war. The Appendices contain detailed charts listing 
and categorizing states’ statements at the 2015 and 2016 Informal Meetings 
of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems convened within the 
framework of the CCW.
CAVEATS
The bulk of the secondary-source research was conducted in English. 
Moreover, none of us is an expert in computer science or robotics. We 
consulted specialists in these fields, but we alone are responsible for any 
remaining errors. In any event, given the rapid pace of development, the 
technologies discussed in this briefing report may soon be eclipsed—if they 
have not been already.
2
TECHNOLOGY 
CONCEPTS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS
This section sketches key technology concepts and developments, as well 
as certain states’ understandings of autonomy in relation to war. We set the 
stage by discussing algorithms and constructed systems. We then outline 
recent advancements in the AI field of deep learning. Next, we highlight five 
states’ approaches to technical autonomy in war. In doing so, we also note 
accompanying standards that states and commentators are actively vetting, 
such as “meaningful human control” over AWS. Finally, we describe some of 
the main technologies that various commentators have addressed in relation 
to autonomous weapon systems.
TWO KEY INGREDIENTS
In this briefing report, our foundational technological concern is the capability 
of a constructed system, without further human intervention, to help make 
and effectuate a “decision” or “choice” of a war algorithm. Distilled, the two 
core ingredients are an algorithm expressed in computer code and a suitably 
capable constructed system.
ALGORITHM
An algorithm has been defined informally as “any well-defined computational 
procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as input and produces 
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some value, or set of values, as output.”39 Accordingly, an algorithm is “a 
sequence of computational steps that transform the input into the output.”40 
Yet “[w]e can also view an algorithm as a tool for solving a well-specified 
computational problem.”41 In this second approach, “[t]he statement of the 
problem specifies in general terms the desired input/output relationship. The 
algorithm describes a specific computational procedure for achieving that 
input/output relationship.”42 Here, we are most concerned with algorithms 
that are expressed in computer code and that can be conceptualized as making 
“decisions” or “choices” along the computational pathway undertaken in light 
of the input and in accordance with programmed parameters. 
The relevant algorithms may vary enormously in terms of their 
sophistication and complexity. But, at base, they all are conceived and coded 
initially by humans to take some input and produce some output or to describe 
a specific computational procedure for achieving a defined desirable input/
output relationship. 
By limiting our inquiry to war algorithms, we narrow the types of 
algorithms at issue to those that fulfill three conditions: algorithms (1) that 
are expressed in computer code; (2) that are effectuated through a constructed 
system; and (3) that are capable of operating in relation to armed conflict. 
Not all weapons or systems that have been characterized as “AWS” meet these 
criteria. But most do. And, more to the point, we see these algorithms as a key 
ingredient in what most commentators and states mean when they address 
notions of autonomy.
We predicate our definition on the algorithm being capable of operating 
in relation to armed conflict, even if it is not initially designed for such use. 
We thus do not limit our classification to algorithms that are in fact used in 
armed conflict (though the broader category of capability would subsume 
those that are actually used). A critique of this approach might be that it is 
over-inclusive because it does not distinguish between algorithms and the 
relevant constructed systems that are intended for use in relation to war from 
the vast array of other such algorithms and systems that might be adapted 
for such use. Yet one reason to focus on capability—instead of intent—is that 
much of the underlying technology is modular and can therefore be adapted 
for use in relation to war even if it was not initially designed and developed to 
do so. Moreover, with respect to accountability, focusing on capability sweeps 
in not only those who are in a position to choose to deploy or to operate war 
39.  Thomas H. Cormen, Charles E. Leiserson, Ronald L. Rivest & Clifford Stein, 
Introduction to Algorithms 5 (3rd ed. 2009).
40.  Id.
41.  Id.
42.  Id.
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algorithms but also those involved in the design and development of those 
algorithms. The emphasis on capability thereby helps account for the diverse 
assortment of actors—whether in government, commercial, academic, or 
other contexts—who might exercise power over, and thus who might be held 
answerable for, the design, development, or use of war algorithms.
CONSTRUCTED SYSTEM
“Robot” is not a legal term of art under international law. One oft-cited, decades-
old definition comes from the Robot Institute of America, a trade association 
of robot manufacturers and users: “a reprogrammable, multifunctional 
manipulator designed to move material, parts, tools, or specialized devices 
through various programmed motions for the performance of a variety of 
tasks.”43 Others draw different definitional boundaries. Alan Winfield, for 
instance, defines a robot as “an artificial device that can sense its environment 
and purposefully act on or in that environment.”44 Neil Richards and William 
Smart argue that a robot is “a constructed system that displays both physical 
and mental agency but is not alive in the biological sense.”45 And the Oxford 
English Dictionary Online defines a robot in the modern sense46 as “[a]n 
intelligent artificial being typically made of metal and resembling in some 
way a human or other animal.”47
We sidestep some of the definitional quandaries attending “robot” by 
focusing instead on constructed systems. For our purposes, a constructed 
system is a manufactured machine, apparatus, plant, or platform that is 
capable both of being used to gather information and of effectuating a “choice” 
or “decision” which is, in whole or in part, derived through an algorithm 
expressed in computer code but that is not alive in the biological sense. By 
limiting our inquiry to systems that are not alive in the biological sense, we 
also circumvent the subject of biologically engineered agents.
43.  Robotics Today, RIA News, Spring 1980, at 7, cited in Robotics and the Economy: A 
Staff Study, Prepared for the Use of the Subcommittee on Monetary and Fiscal 
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States 4 n.3 (1982).
44.  Robohub Editors, Robohub Roundtable: Why Is It So Difficult to Define Robot?, Robohub, 
April 29, 2016, http://robohub.org/robohub-roundtable-why-is-it-so-difficult-to-define-robot.
45.  Neil Richards & William Smart, How Should the Law Think About Robots?, in Robot Law 
3, 6 (Ryan Calo, Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016).
46.  The now-historical sense of the term “robot” denotes “[a] central European system of 
serfdom, by which a tenant’s rent was paid in forced labour or service.” See Robot n.1, Oxford 
English Dictionary (online ed.) (2016).
47.  Robot n.2, Oxford English Dictionary (online ed.) (2016) (noting that, originally, this 
sense of the term was used “with reference to the mass-produced workers in Karel Čapek’s 
play R.U.R.: Rossum’s Universal Robots (1920) which are assembled from artificially synthesized 
organic material.”).
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Among the most common sensors used to gather information in 
“constructed systems” include methods to detect how far away objects are by 
transmitting certain waves and monitoring their reflections, such as radar 
(radio waves), sonar (sound waves), and lidar (light waves), as well as cameras. 
The system may be tele-operated (also known as remotely operated)—or not. 
It may have a manipulator (used loosely here to denote a component providing 
the capability to interact in the built environment)—or not. However, if it does 
not have a manipulator, the system needs, to meet our definition, another 
avenue to effectuate the algorithmically-derived “choice” or “decision.”
The constructed systems may come in a diverse array of forms,48 such 
as marine, terrestrial, aerial, or space vehicles; missile systems; or biped or 
quadruped robots.49 They may operate collaboratively—including as so-
called “swarms”50—or individually. They may use a range of power sources, 
such as batteries or internal combustion engines to generate electricity or to 
power hydraulic or pneumatic actuators. And their costs may run the gamut 
from the budget of a tinkerer to industrial or governmental-scale programs.
A.I. ADVANCEMENTS
Recently published advancements in AI—especially machine learning 
and a class of techniques called deep learning—underscore the rapid pace 
of technical development.51 Those advancements reach into many areas of 
modern digital life, underlying “web searches to content filtering on social 
networks to recommendations on e-commerce websites.”52
48.  See infra Section 2: Examples of Purported Autonomous Weapon Systems.
49.  See, e.g., Boston Dynamics, Introducing SpotMini, YouTube (June 23, 2016), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=tf7IEVTDjng [https://perma.cc/LNV5-3SCH] (video of Boston 
Dynamic’s SpotMini robot, which purports to “perform[] some tasks autonomously, but often 
uses a human for high-level guidance.”).
50.  See, e.g., Michael Rubenstein, Alejandro Cornejo & Radhika Nagpal, Programmable 
Self-Assembly in a Thousand-Robot Swarm, 345 Science 795, 796 (2014) (“We demonstrate a 
thousand-robot swarm capable of large-scale, flexible self-assembly of two-dimensional shapes 
entirely through programmable local interactions and local sensing, achieving highly complex 
collective behavior. The approach involves the design of a collective algorithm that relies on 
the composition of basic collective behaviors and cooperative monitoring for errors to achieve 
versatile and robust group behavior, combined with an unconventional physical robot design 
that enabled the creation of more than 1000 autonomous robots.”). In respect of this large-scale 
robotic swarm, the extent to which the robots “can be fully autonomous” is measured in terms 
of being “capable of computation, locomotion, sensing, and communication.” Id. at 796.
51.  For an excellent analysis of some of the key technologies in relation to AWS, see Peter 
Margulies, Making Autonomous Weapons Accountable: Command Responsibility for Computer-
Guided Lethal Force in Armed Conflicts, in Research Handbook on Remote Warfare (Jens 
David Ohlin ed., forthcoming 2016).
52.  Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, 521 Nature 436, 436 (2015).
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For many years, “[c]onventional machine-learning techniques were 
limited in their ability to process natural data in their raw form.”53 For decades, 
for instance, “constructing a pattern-recognition or machine-learning system 
required careful engineering and considerable domain expertise to design 
a feature extractor that transformed the raw data … into a suitable internal 
representation or feature vector from which the learning subsystem, often a 
classifier, could detect or classify patterns in the input.”54 An advance came with 
representational learning, which “is a set of methods that allows a machine to be 
fed with raw data and to automatically discover the representations needed for 
detection or classification.”55 
Deep learning—including deep neural networks—marked another advance. 
(A deep neural network can be thought of as “a network of hardware and software 
that mimics the web of neurons in the human brain.”56) Deep-learning methods 
have been explained as “representation-learning methods with multiple levels 
of representation, obtained by composing simple but non-linear modules that 
each transform the representation at one level (starting with the raw input) 
into a representation at a higher, slightly more abstract level.”57 As experts 
have explained, “[w]ith the composition of enough such transformations, very 
complex functions can be learned.”58 The gist is that, “[f]or classification tasks, 
higher layers of representation amplify aspects of the input that are important 
for discrimination and suppress irrelevant variations.”59 
Consider the example of a digital image. It 
comes in the form of an array of pixel values, and the learned features 
in the first layer of representation typically represent the presence or 
absence of edges at particular orientations and locations in the image. The 
second layer typically detects motifs by spotting particular arrangements 
of edges, regardless of small variations in the edge positions. The third 
layer may assemble motifs into larger combinations that correspond to 
parts of familiar objects, and subsequent layers would detect objects as 
combinations of these parts.60 
Through deep-learning techniques, “these layers of features are not designed 
53.  Id.
54.  Id.
55.  Id.
56.  Cade Metz, In Two Moves, AlphaGo and Lee Sedol Redefined the Future, Wired (March 16, 
2016, 7:00 A.M.), http://www.wired.com/2016/03/two-moves-alphago-lee-sedol-redefined-
future.
57.  LeCun et al., supra note 52, at 436.
58.  Id.
59.  Id.
60.  Id.
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by human engineers: they are learned from data using a general-purpose 
learning procedure.”61 
Already, “[d]eep learning is making major advances in solving problems 
that have resisted the best attempts of the artificial intelligence community 
for many years.”62 Those include beating records in image recognition and 
speech recognition, as well as beating other machine-learning techniques at, 
for example, predicting the activity of drug molecules.63 Writing in 2015, some 
experts “think that deep learning will have many more successes in the near 
future because it requires very little engineering by hand, so it can easily take 
advantage of increases in the amount of available computation and data.”64 
In line with this view, “[n]ew learning algorithms and architectures that are 
currently being developed for deep neural networks will only accelerate this 
progress.”65 
One mark of that progress came late last year when a computer program, 
AlphaGo, achieved a feat previously thought to be at least a decade away: 
defeating a human professional player in a full-sized game of Go.66 (A few 
months later, AlphaGo won four of five matches against Lee Sedol, who, 
as one of the top players in the world, had achieved the highest rank of 
nine dan.67) The system designers introduced a new approach based on 
deep convolutional neural networks that used “value networks” to evaluate 
board decisions and “policy networks” to select moves. (Convolutional 
neural networks—the typical architecture of which is structured as a series 
of stages—“are designed to process data that come in the form of multiple 
arrays.”68 In other words, these networks “use many layers of neurons, each 
arranged in overlapping tiles, to construct increasingly abstract, localized 
representations of an image.”69) For AlphaGo, those deep neural networks 
were “trained by a novel combination of supervised learning from human 
expert games, and reinforcement learning from games of self-play.”70 AlphaGo 
developers also introduced a new search algorithm—which was designed in 
part to encourage exploration on its own—that combines a sophisticated 
61.  Id.
62.  Id.
63.  Id. (citations omitted). 
64.  Id.
65.  Id.
66.  Silver et al., supra note 14, at 488.
67.  See Christof Koch, How the Computer Beat the Go Master, Scientific American (March 
19, 2016), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-computer-beat-the-go-master.
68.  LeCun et al., supra note 52, at 439.
69.  Silver et al., supra note 14, at 484.
70.  Silver et al., supra note 14, at 484; on supervised learning, see LeCun et al., supra note 52, 
at 436–38.
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simulation technique (called Monte Carlo tree search) with the value and 
policy networks.71
By grounding our discussion in algorithms expressed in computer 
code and effectuated through constructed systems, we sidestep some of the 
doctrinal debates on what constitutes “artificial intelligence” and “artificial 
general intelligence”—and on whether the latter may be realistically 
achievable or is more the stuff of science fiction. These questions are 
outside of the scope of this briefing report, but they are nonetheless vitally 
important. In any event, it merits emphasis that existing learning algorithms 
and architectures already have remarkable capabilities that, at least, seem to 
approach aspects of human “decision-making.”
For their part, creators of AlphaGo have characterized Go as “exemplary 
in many ways of the difficulties faced by artificial intelligence: a challenging 
decision-making task, an intractable search space, and an optimal solution 
so complex it appears infeasible to directly approximate using a policy or 
value function.”72 In the eyes of its designers, AlphaGo provides “hope that 
human-level performance can now be achieved in other seemingly intractable 
artificial intelligence domains.”73
APPROACHES TO TECHNICAL 
AUTONOMY IN WAR
As noted above, there is no agreement on what “autonomy” means in the 
context of the discussion to date on autonomous weapon systems. 
Commentators’ views on what constitutes “autonomy” in this context 
range enormously. Some, for instance, focus on whether the system navigates 
with a human on board (“manned”) or without one (“unmanned”). Others 
emphasize geography, such as whether the weapon is operated by a human 
remotely or proximately. Some hold that the “autonomy” in AWS should be 
reserved only for “critical functions” in the conduct-of-hostilities targeting 
cycle. Still others argue that it is the capability of a system, once launched, 
to sense, think, learn, and act all without further human intervention. A 
number of definitions combine various components of these notions. But 
depending on the definition and classification, it is beyond doubt that some 
existing military systems contain at least a degree of autonomy. (In the last 
sub-section of this section, we profile examples of weapons, weapon systems, 
and weapon platforms that some commentators have characterized as AWS.)
71.  Silver et al., supra note 14, at 486.
72.  Id. at 489 (citations omitted).
73.  Id.
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In this sub-section, we focus on the positions of states, because discerning 
states’ positions and practices is one of the key steps in illuminating the scope 
of international law as it currently stands (lex lata) and distinguishing that 
from nascent norms and from the law as it should be (lex ferenda). A handful 
of states have considered or formally adopted definitions relevant to AWS, 
whether while focusing on weapon systems or unmanned aerial systems. 
Below, we summarize five of the most elaborate sets of these considerations 
and definitions—those by Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom.
SWITZERLAND
In the lead-up to the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems, Switzerland published an “Informal Working Paper” titled 
“Towards a ‘compliance-based’ approach to LAWS.” The paper proposes “to 
initially describe autonomous weapons systems (AWS) simply as” follows:
[W]eapons systems that are capable of carrying out tasks governed by 
IHL in partial or full replacement of a human in the use of force, notably 
in the targeting cycle.74
According to the paper, “[s]uch a working definition is inclusive, accounts 
for a wide array of system configurations, and allows for a debate that is 
differentiated, compliance-based, and without prejudice to the question of 
appropriate regulatory response.”75 In the view of Switzerland, “the working 
definition proposed is not conceived in any way to single out only those 
systems which could be seen as legally objectionable.”76 The authors note 
that “[a]t one end of the spectrum of systems falling within that working 
definition, States may find some subcategories to be entirely unproblematic, 
while at the other end of the spectrum, States may find other subcategories 
unacceptable.”77 Finally, the paper notes, “[a]s discussions advance, this 
working definition could and probably should evolve to become more specific 
and purposeful.”78
74.  Gov’t of Switz., Towards a “Compliance-Based” Approach to LAWS [Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems] 1 (March 30, 2016) (informal working paper), http://www.
unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/D2D66A9C427958D6C1257F8700415473/$fi
le/2016_LAWS+MX_CountryPaper+Switzerland.pdf [hereinafter Swiss, “Compliance-Based” 
Approach].
75.  Id.
76.  Id. at 1–2. 
77.  Id. at 2.
78.  Id.
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THE NETHERLANDS
On April 7, 2015, the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Defense 
requested a report from the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) 
and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV) 
addressing five sets of questions concerning autonomous weapon systems: 
1. What role can autonomous weapons systems (and autonomous 
functions within weapons systems) fulfil in the context of military 
action now and in the future?
2. What changes might occur in the accountability mechanism for 
the use of fully or semi-autonomous weapons systems in the light of 
associated ethical issues? What role could the concept of ‘meaningful 
human control’ play in this regard, and what other concepts, if any, 
might be helpful here?
3. In its previous advisory report, the CAVV states that the deployment 
of any weapons system, whether or not it is wholly or partly autonomous, 
remains subject to the same legal framework. As far as the CAVV is 
concerned, there is no reason to assume that the existing international 
legal framework is inadequate to regulate the deployment of armed 
drones. Does the debate on fully or semi-autonomous weapons systems 
give cause to augment or amend this position?
4. How do the AIV and the CAVV view the UN Special Rapporteur’s call for 
a moratorium on the development of fully autonomous weapons systems?
5. How can the Netherlands best contribute to the international debate 
on this issue?
A joint committee of the AIV and the CAVV prepared a report, which the 
AIV adopted on October 2, 2015 and the CAVV adopted on October 12, 
2015.79 On March 2, 2016, the government responded to the report. (We use 
the term “government” in this context interchangeably with reference to the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Defense of the Netherlands.) The main 
conclusion of the report, in the words of the government’s response, “is that 
meaningful human control is required in the deployment of autonomous 
weapon systems”—a view with which the government concurs.80 
The government—while noting “[t]here is as yet no internationally 
agreed definition of an autonomous weapon system”—supports the working 
79.  Advisory Council on International Affairs, Autonomous Weapon Systems: The 
Need for Meaningful Human Control 7 (Advisory Report No. 97, 2015), http://aiv-advice.
nl/8gr [hereinafter AIV].
80.  Dutch Government, Response to AIV/CAVV Report, supra note 22.
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definition of AWS which the advisory committee adopted:81
A weapon that, without human intervention, selects and engages targets 
matching certain predetermined criteria, following a human decision to 
deploy the weapon on the understanding that an attack, once launched, 
cannot be stopped by human intervention.82
Underlying this definition is the notion of the “wider loop” of the decision-
making process, which plays a prominent role in the Dutch government’s 
understanding of accountability concerning AWS. In the view of the Dutch 
government, with respect to AWS humans are involved in that “wider loop” 
because humans “play a prominent role in programming the characteristics 
of the targets that are to be engaged and in the decision to deploy the 
weapon.”83 That means, in short, “that humans continue to play a crucial 
role in the wider targeting process. An autonomous weapon as defined 
above is therefore only deployed after human consideration of aspects 
such as target selection, weapon selection and implementation planning, 
including an assessment of potential collateral damage.”84 In addition, the 
government notes, “the autonomous weapon is programmed to perform 
specific functions within pre-programmed conditions and parameters. Its 
deployment is followed by a human assessment of the effects. Assessments 
of potential collateral damage (proportionality) and accountability under 
international humanitarian law are of key importance in this respect.”85 
As summarized by the Dutch government, “[t]he advisory committee 
states that if the deployment of an autonomous weapon system takes place 
in accordance with the process described above, there is meaningful human 
control. In such cases, humans make informed, conscious choices regarding 
the use of weapons, based on adequate information about the target, the 
weapon in question and the context in which it is to be deployed.”86 For 
its part, “[t]he advisory committee sees no immediate reason to draft new 
or additional legislation for the concept of meaningful human control.”87 
Instead, “[t]he concept should be regarded as a standard deriving from 
existing legislation and practices (such as the targeting process).”88 Over 
all, the government expressly affirms that it “supports the definition 
81.  Id.
82.  Id.
83.  Dutch Government, Response to AIV/CAVV Report, supra note 22.
84.  Id.
85.  Id.
86.  Id.
87.  Id.
88.  Id.
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given above of an autonomous weapon system, including the concept of 
meaningful human control, and agrees that no new legislation is required.”89
FRANCE
In a “non-paper” circulated in the context of the 2016 Informal Meeting of 
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, France articulated the 
following considerations with respect to such systems: 
France considers that LAWS [Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems] 
share the following characteristics: 
- Lethal autonomous weapons systems are fully autonomous systems. 
LAWS are future systems: they do not currently exist.
- Remotely operated weapons systems and supervised weapons 
systems should not be regarded as LAWS since a human operator 
remains involved, in particular during the targeting and firing phases. 
Existing automatic systems are not LAWS either[.]
- LAWS should be understood as implying a total absence of human 
supervision, meaning there is absolutely no link (communication or 
control) with the military chain of command.
- The delivery platform of a LAWS would be capable of moving, 
adapting to its land, marine or aerial environments and targeting and 
firing a lethal effector (bullet, missile, bomb, etc.) without any kind 
of human intervention or validation.”90
Compared to most other states that have put forward working definitions, 
France articulates a relatively narrow definition of what constitutes a lethal 
autonomous weapons system in the context of the CCW. Most striking, 
perhaps, is the condition that there be “a total absence of human supervision, 
meaning there is absolutely no link (communication or control) with the 
military chain of command.” Moreover, France clarifies that, in its view, the 
definition of a “lethal autonomous weapons system” includes only a delivery 
“platform” that “would be capable of moving, adapting to its land, marine 
or aerial environments and targeting and firing a lethal effector … without 
89.  Though the government agrees with the advisory committee “that definitions should be 
agreed on (in accordance with recommendation no. 4).” Dutch Government, Response to 
AIV/CAVV Report, supra note 22. As noted above, the Dutch government “reject[ed] outright 
the possibility of developing and deploying fully autonomous weapons.” Id.
90.  Gov’t of Fr., Characterization of a LAWS (April 11–15, 2016) (non-paper), http://
www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/5FD844883B46FEACC1257F8F00401FF6
/$file/2016_LAWSMX_CountryPaper_France+CharacterizationofaLAWS.pdf (bold in the 
original).
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any kind of human intervention or validation.” This formulation combines 
autonomy in navigation and maneuver with  autonomy in certain key elements 
of the targeting cycle.
UNITED STATES
In a series of directives and other documents, the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) has elaborated one of the most technically specific state approaches to 
autonomy in relation to weapon systems. 
A central document is DoD Directive 3000.09 (2012). It “[e]stablishes 
DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for the development and use of 
autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, including 
manned and unmanned platforms.”91 The directive is applicable to certain 
DoD actors and related organizational entities.92 It concerns “[t]he design, 
development, acquisition, testing, fielding, and employment of autonomous 
and semi-autonomous weapon systems, including guided munitions that can 
independently select and discriminate targets,” as well as “[t]he application 
of lethal or non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic, force by autonomous or semi-
autonomous weapon systems.”93 However, the directive expressly “does not 
apply to autonomous or semi-autonomous cyberspace systems for cyberspace 
operations; unarmed, unmanned platforms; unguided munitions; munitions 
manually guided by the operator (e.g., laser- or wire-guided munitions); 
mines; or unexploded explosive ordnance.”94 Among the relevant terms 
defined in the glossary of Directive 3000.09 are the following: 
Autonomous weapon system: “A weapon system that, once activated, 
can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human 
operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous weapon systems 
that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of 
the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further 
human input after activation.”95
Human-supervised autonomous weapon system: “An autonomous 
weapon system that is designed to provide human operators with the 
ability to intervene and terminate engagements, including in the event of 
a weapon system failure, before unacceptable levels of damage occur.”96
91.  U.S. Dep’t of Def., Dir. 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems ¶ 1 (Nov. 21, 2012) 
[hereinafter DOD AWS Dir.].
92.  Id. at ¶ 2.
93.  Id.
94.  Id.
95.  Id. at 13–14.
96.  Id.at 14.
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Semi-autonomous weapon system: “A weapon system that, once activated, 
is intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups 
that have been selected by a human operator. This includes: [s]emi-
autonomous weapon systems that employ autonomy for engagement-
related functions including, but not limited to, acquiring, tracking, 
and identifying potential targets; cueing potential targets to human 
operators; prioritizing selected targets; timing of when to fire; or 
providing terminal guidance to home in on selected targets, provided 
that human control is retained over the decision to select individual 
targets and specific target groups for engagement.”97 
Directive 3000.09 establishes that, as a matter of policy, “[a]utonomous and 
semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders 
and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of 
force.”98 More specifically, “[s]ystems will go through rigorous hardware and 
software verification and validation … and realistic system developmental and 
operational test and evaluation … in accordance with” certain guidelines.99 In 
addition, “[t]raining, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures … will 
be established.”100 In particular, those measures will ensure that autonomous 
and semi-autonomous weapon systems will, first, “[f ]unction as anticipated in 
realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries.” Second, they 
will ensure that those systems will “[c]omplete engagements in a timeframe 
consistent with commander and operator intentions and, if unable to do 
so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input before 
continuing the engagement.” And third, they will ensure that those systems 
“[a]re sufficiently robust to minimize failures that could lead to unintended 
engagements or to loss of control of the system to unauthorized parties.”101
The directive also establishes that “[c]onsistent with the potential 
consequences of an unintended engagement or loss of control of the system 
to unauthorized parties, physical hardware and software will be designed with 
appropriate: … Safeties, anti-tamper mechanisms, and information assurance in 
accordance with [another relevant DoD directive]. … Human-machine interfaces 
and controls.”102 Furthermore, “[i]n order for operators to make informed and 
appropriate decisions in engaging targets,” the directive establishes that “the 
interface between people and machines for autonomous and semi-autonomous 
weapon systems shall” have three characteristics. First, they shall “[b]e readily 
97.  Id.
98.  Id. at ¶ 4.
99.  Id.
100.  Id.
101.  Id.
102.  Id.
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understandable to trained operators.” Second, they shall “[p]rovide traceable 
feedback on system status.” And third, they shall “[p]rovide clear procedures for 
trained operators to activate and deactivate system functions.”103
Directive 3000.09 further lays down, also as a matter of policy, 
that “[p]ersons who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate 
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems must do so with 
appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, 
weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement (ROE).”104 
The directive establishes that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon 
systems intended to be used in a manner that falls within three certain sets 
of policies will be considered for approval in accordance with enumerated 
approval procedures and other applicable policies and issuances.105 The 
first such policy set establishes that “[s]emi-autonomous weapon systems 
(including manned or unmanned platforms, munitions, or sub-munitions 
that function as semi-autonomous weapon systems or as subcomponents 
of semi-autonomous weapon systems) may be used to apply lethal or non-
lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic force.” Further pursuant to that policy set, 
“[s]emi-autonomous weapon systems that are onboard or integrated with 
unmanned platforms must be designed such that, in the event of degraded or 
lost communications, the system does not autonomously select and engage 
individual targets or specific target groups that have not been previously 
selected by an authorized human operator.” The second policy set lays 
down that “[h]uman-supervised autonomous weapon systems may be used 
to select and engage targets, with the exception of selecting humans as 
targets, for local defense to intercept attempted time-critical or saturation 
attacks” for static defense of manned installations and for onboard defense 
of manned platforms. Finally in this connection, the third policy set 
establishes that autonomous weapon systems “may be used to apply non-
lethal, non-kinetic force, such as some forms of electronic attack, against 
materiel targets in accordance with” a separate DoD directive.106 
Directive 3000.09 further provides that “[a]utonomous or semi-
autonomous weapon systems intended to be used in a manner that falls 
outside” those three sets of policies must be approved by the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
“before formal development and again before fielding in accordance 
103.  Id.
104.  Id.
105.  Id.
106.  Id.
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with” enclosed guidelines and other applicable policies and issuances.107 
In addition, Directive 3000.09 lays down, also as a matter of policy, that 
“[i]nternational sales or transfers of autonomous and semi-autonomous 
weapon systems will be approved in accordance with existing technology 
security and foreign disclosure requirements and processes, in accordance 
with” an enumerated memorandum.108 Enclosures to the directive further 
explain certain references; further elaborate verification and validation 
as well as testing and evaluation of autonomous and semi-autonomous 
weapon systems; set down guidelines for review of certain such systems; 
elaborate responsibilities; and provide definitions in a glossary.109
For its part, the U.S. DoD Law of War Manual gives examples of 
two ways that some weapons may have autonomous functions. First, 
“mines may be regarded as rudimentary autonomous weapons because 
they are designed to explode by the presence, proximity, or contact of 
a person or vehicle, rather than by the decision of the operator.”110 And 
second, “[o]ther weapons may have more sophisticated autonomous 
functions and may be designed such that the weapon is able to select 
targets or to engage targets automatically after being activated by the 
user.”111 The Manual authors give the example that “the United States 
has used weapon systems for local defense with autonomous capabilities 
designed to counter time-critical or saturation attacks. These weapon 
systems have included the Aegis ship defense system and the Counter-
Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) system.”112
UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MoD) has addressed autonomy 
primarily in relation to unmanned aircraft systems. The MoD promulgated 
the key document—Joint Doctrine Note 2/11: The UK Approach to Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (Joint Doctrine Note)—on March 30, 2011.113 That 
document’s “purpose is to identify and discuss policy, conceptual, doctrinal 
and technology issues that will need to be addressed if such systems are to be 
107.  Id.
108.  Id.
109.  Id. at 5–15.
110.  U.S. Dep’t of Def., Law of War Manual § 6.5.9.1 (2016) (internal reference omitted) 
[hereinafter Law of War Manual]. 
111.  Id.
112.  Id.
113.  U.K. Ministry of Def., Joint Doctrine Note 2/11: The UK Approach to Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems, (2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/33711/20110505JDN_211_UAS_v2U.pdf.
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successfully developed and integrated into future operations.”114 
In the section on definitions, the authors discuss “automation” and 
“autonomy,” emphasizing that, confusingly, the two “terms are often used 
interchangeably even when referring to the same platform; consequently, 
companies may describe their systems to be autonomous even though they 
would not be considered as such under the military definition.”115 Noting that 
“[i]t would be impossible to produce definitions that every community would 
agree to,” the Joint Doctrine Note authors chose the following definitions in 
order to be “as simple as possible, while making clear the essential differences 
in meaning between them”:116
Automated system: “In the unmanned aircraft context, an automated or 
automatic system is one that, in response to inputs from one or more 
sensors, is programmed to logically follow a pre-defined set of rules in 
order to provide an outcome. Knowing the set of rules under which it is 
operating means that its output is predictable.”
Autonomous system: “An autonomous system is capable of understanding 
higher level intent and direction. From this understanding and its 
perception of its environment, such a system is able to take appropriate 
action to bring about a desired state. It is capable of deciding a course 
of action, from a number of alternatives, without depending on human 
oversight and control, although these may still be present. Although the 
overall activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be predictable, 
individual actions may not be.”117
Based on those definitions, the Joint Doctrine Note authors deduce four sets of 
points. The basic notion of the first set is that “[a]ny or none of the functions 
involved in the operation of an unmanned aircraft may be automated.”118 
In a related footnote, it is stated that “[f ]or major functions such as target 
detection, only some of the sub-functions may be automated, requiring 
human input to deliver the overall function.”119
The main idea guiding the second set of points is that “[a]utonomous 
systems will, in effect, be self-aware and their response to inputs 
indistinguishable from, or even superior to, that of a manned aircraft.”120 As 
114.  Id. at iii.
115.  Id. at 2-2.
116.  Id. at 2-2–2-3.
117.  Id. at 2-3.
118.  Id.
119.  Id. at 2-3 n.5 (giving examples of “take-off and landing; navigation/route following; 
pre-programmed response to events such as loss of a command and communication link; and 
automated target detection and recognition”).
120.  Id. at 2-3.
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such, according to the authors, those autonomous systems “must be capable 
of achieving the same level of situational understanding as a human.”121 At 
the time of publication (2011), the authors stated, “[t]his level of technology 
is not yet achievable and so, by the definition of autonomy in this JDN, none 
of the currently fielded or in-development unmanned aircraft platforms can 
be correctly described as autonomous.”122 
The third set of points concerns the importance of “[t]he distinction 
between autonomous and automated ... as there are moral, ethical and legal 
implications regarding the use of autonomous unmanned aircraft.”123 Those 
issues are discussed in another part of the Joint Doctrine Note.124 The fourth 
and final set of points deduced by the authors concerns “an over-arching 
principle that, whatever the degree of automation, an unmanned aircraft 
should provide at least the same, or better, safety standard as a manned 
platform carrying out the same task.”125
In addressing accountability, the Joint Doctrine Note states that “[l]egal 
responsibility for any military activity remains with the last person to issue the 
command authorising a specific activity.”126 The Joint Doctrine Note authors 
recognize, however, that “[t]his assumes that a system’s basic principles of 
operation have, as part of its release to service, already been shown to be 
lawful, but that the individual giving orders for use will ensure its continued 
lawful employment throughout any task.”127 An assumption underlying this 
process is “that a system will continue to behave in a predictable manner 
after commands are issued,” yet, the authors note, “clearly this becomes 
problematical as systems become more complex and operate for extended 
periods.”128 Indeed, according to the authors, “[i]n reality, predictability is 
likely to be inversely proportional to mission and environmental complexity. 
For long-endurance missions engaged in complex scenarios, the authorised 
entity that holds legal responsibility will be required to exercise some level of 
supervision throughout.”129 If that is the case, in the view of the authors, “this 
121.  Id.
122.  Id. at 2-3–2-4 (further stating in this connection that “[a]s computing and sensor 
capability increases, it is likely that many systems, using very complex sets of control rules, will 
appear and be described as autonomous systems, but as long as it can be shown that the system 
logically follows a set of rules or instructions and is not capable of human levels of situational 
understanding, then they should only be considered to be automated”).
123.  Id. at 2-4.
124.  Id. at 5-1–5-12. See also infra Section 3.
125.  Id. at 2-4 (citation omitted).
126.  Id. at 5-5.
127.  Id.
128.  Id.
129.  Id.
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implies that any fielded system employing weapons will have to maintain a 
2-way data link between the aircraft and its controlling authority.”130 
EXAMPLES OF PURPORTED 
AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS
This section profiles weapons, weapon systems, and weapon platforms 
that have been couched, by various commentators, as autonomous weapon 
systems—such as by exhibiting or reflecting varying levels, forms, or notions 
of autonomy or automation, in relation to navigation or maneuvering or 
the targeting cycle. The inclusion of a weapon here is not meant to indicate 
our evaluation that the weapon, system, or platform has or does not have 
autonomous capabilities or that it fits within a legally relevant definition of 
autonomy. Most, but not all, of the weapons, systems, and platforms described 
here operate based, at least in part, on a war algorithm.
MINES
Anti-Personnel Mines
Anti-personnel mines are designed to “reroute or push back foot soldiers from 
a given geographic area,” and can kill or injure foot soldiers131 (in contrast to, 
for example, naval mines, which are designed to destroy ships).132 They are 
typically activated “by direct pressure from above, by pressure put on a wire 
or filament attached to a pull switch, by a radio signal or other remote firing 
method, or even simply by the proximity of a person within a predetermined 
distance.”133 For these reasons, anti-personnel mines do not discriminate 
among potential targets, as they are not capable of independently tracking 
different targets and choosing among them.
Underwater Mines
Naval Mines — General
Naval mines are capable of being detonated by either seismic sensors that 
sense vibrations in the water as a ship approaches134 or acoustic sensors 
130.  Id. (noting, however, that this data “link may not need to be continuous”).
131.  Kevin Bonsor, How Landmines Work, How Stuff Works (June 19, 2001), http://science.
howstuffworks.com/landmine.htm.
132.  Mines, FAS Military Analysis Network (Dec. 12, 1998), http://fas.org/man/dod-101/
sys/ship/weaps/mines.htm. 
133.  Landmines, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (2014), http://www.the-
monitor.org/en-gb/the-issues/landmines.aspx.
134.  Sam LaGrone, A Terrible Thing That Waits (Under the Ocean), Popular Science (May 
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that detect sounds generated by passing ships.135 Some modern mines use 
a combination of seismic, acoustic, electric, and magnetic sensors to detect 
nearby ships.136 Naval mines explode when triggered, without a proximate 
human directing them to detonate. Naval mines do not discriminate among 
potential targets; if something triggers its detonation, a naval mine explodes 
without any independent decision-making process in which it might “choose” 
whether to detonate. 
MK-60 CAPTOR (united States)
The MK-60 EnCAPsulated TORpedo (CAPTOR), manufactured by Alliant 
Techsystems, is a sophisticated anti-submarine weapon. It is a deep-water 
mine that, when triggered, launches a torpedo at hostile targets. It is anchored 
to the ocean floor and uses a surveillance system known as Reliable Acoustic 
Path (RAP) sound propagation to track vessels above it.137 Vessels traveling on 
or very close to the surface are labeled as ships and are not attacked. Vessels 
traveling far enough below the surface are labeled as submarines. When it 
senses a submarine that does not have a “friendly” acoustic signature, the 
MK-60 launches a torpedo at the target.138 It therefore has autonomy in its 
functions in terms of not requiring human authorization to unleash a specific 
attack. Yet the MK-60 is not capable of “choosing” whether to attack an enemy 
submarine; if it detects an enemy submarine, it launches the torpedo with no 
(further) “decision-making” process involved.
UNMANNED VEHICLES AND SYSTEMS
Unmanned Vehicles — General 
unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also called drones, comprise a broad 
category and refer to any aircraft without a human pilot onboard. Their 
functions can span from surveillance and reconnaissance to military 
attacks. Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) are a subset of UAVs. 
Different models operate with varying degrees of autonomy across different 
functions. Traditionally, pilots have operated drones remotely, but drones 
19, 2014), http://www.popsci.com/blog-network/shipshape/terrible-thing-waits-under-ocean.
135.  Guillermo C. Gaunaurd, Acoustic Mine, Access Science (2014), http://www.
accessscience.com/content/006000.
136.  LaGrone, supra note 134.
137.  MK 60 Encapsulated Torpedo (CAPTOR), FAS Military Analysis Network (Dec. 13, 
1998), http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/mk60.htm.
138.  Id.
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are becoming increasingly capable of certain autonomous functions. Models 
such as the nEUROn (which has been referred to as a UCAV; see below) can 
in key respects fly autonomously,139 compensating for unexpected events like 
changing weather patterns, and the X-47B (see below) can even refuel itself 
in mid-air at its carrier.140 The technological capability of certain UAVs, once 
launched, to select and attack targets, without further human intervention, 
seems to exist, but most drones require human authorization or guidance 
before deploying lethal force. The Harpy (see below)—a “fire and forget, fully 
autonomous” so-called “loitering munition”—is one notable exception.141
unmanned Surface Vehicle
Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) broadly refer to any watercraft that 
operates on the surface of the water without an onboard crew. They have 
a wide range of commercial and military functions. The U.S. Navy often 
uses them for minesweeping, for surveillance and reconnaissance, and to 
detect submarines.142 Like UAVs, USVs might operate with various degrees 
of autonomy across different functions, spanning a range from remote-
controlled operation to autonomy in navigation and maneuver.143
unmanned Maritime Vehicles
Unmanned Maritime Vehicles include both USVs and Autonomous 
Underwater Vehicles (AUVs). Both USVs and AUVs generally perform 
similar functions like surveillance and minesweeping.144 Different models 
operate with various degrees of autonomy across different functions.145
Unmanned Vehicles and Systems — Specific 
Dominator (united States)
Currently under development by Boeing, the Dominator aims to incorporate 
139.  See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, Military Moves Closer to Truly Autonomous Drones, Slate (Jan. 
16, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/01/16/taranis_neuron_militaries_
moving_closer_to_truly_autonmoous_drones.html. 
140.  X-47B UCAS Makes Aviation History…Again!, Northrop Grumman, http://www.
northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/x47bucas/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
141.  Loitering with Intent, Jane’s Int’l Def. Rev. (Nov. 27, 2015).   
142.  See generally U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, The Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle Master 
Plan (2007), http://www.navy.mil/navydata/technology/usvmppr.pdf. 
143.  See, e.g., Autonomous Surface Vehicles Ltd., Unmanned Marine Systems, Unmanned 
Systems Technology, http://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/company/autonomous-
surface-vehicles-ltd (last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
144.  Denise Crimmins & Justin Manley, What Are AUVs and Why Do We Use Them?, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2008), http://oceanexplorer.noaa.
gov/explorations/08auvfest/background/auvs/auvs.html. 
145.  Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, http://
www.whoi.edu/main/auvs (last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
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a “long-endurance, autonomous UAV for intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance missions and potentially for strike capability.”146 According to 
Boeing, the Dominator will employ “autonomous flight using small-diameter 
bomb avionics,” and can be deployed from a variety of artillery and vehicles, 
including unmanned aircraft.147 Boeing will also examine the potential to 
incorporate “Textron Defense System’s Common Smart Submunition (CSS)” 
to differentiate and deploy against both fixed and moving targets.148
Guardium (Israel)
The Guardium system, developed by G-NIUS, Israel Aerospace Industries, 
and Elbit Systems, includes both manned and unmanned ground vehicles 
(UGVs) and is used by the Israel Defense Forces.149 According to the chief 
executive officer for G-NIUS, the latest design of Guardium displayed at a 
weapons exhibition in 2015 has the capability of serving a variety of purposes, 
including carrying missiles, loitering munitions, or UAV for reconnaissance 
missions.150 The Guardium vehicles have “varying degrees” of autonomy: 
for instance, the vehicles are capable of responding to various obstacles, 
“automatically deploy[ing] subsystems,” and patrolling Israel’s border with 
Gaza,151 yet human operators may override or intervene to control the vehicle’s 
functions.152
K-MAx Helicopter (united States)
Lockheed Martin designed the K-MAX helicopter, which is capable of 
deploying in a variety of environments, including cargo delivery in combat, 
firefighting, and humanitarian aid.153 While the K-MAX helicopter has the 
capability to seat a pilot onboard, it is capable of being operated remotely to 
allow the system to function in a variety of high-risk environments.154
146.  Bill Carey, Boeing Phantom Develops ‘Dominator’ UAV, AIN Online (Nov. 2, 2012), http://
www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2012-11-02/boeing-phantom-works-develops-
dominator-uav. 
147.  Id.
148.  London Huw Williams, Boeing to Evaluate CSS for Dominator, Jane’s Int’l Def. Rev., 
(Oct. 31, 2012). 
149.  London Huw Williams, IAI to Offer Broad UGV Portfolio, Jane’s Int’l Def. Rev. (July 8, 
2016). 
150.  Damian Kemp, AUSA 2015: G-NIUS Displays Loitering Munition-Equipped Guardium 
Concept, Jane’s Int’l Def. Rev. (Oct. 13, 2015). 
151.  London Huw Williams, G-NIUS Reveals Its Plans for Guardium Development, Jane’s 
Int’l Def. Rev. (June 25, 2008).
152.  Id.
153.  K-MAX, Lockheed Martin, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/kmax.html 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
154.  K-MAX Unmanned Aircraft System, Lockheed Martin, http://www.lockheedmartin.
com/content/dam/lockheed/data/ms2/documents/K-MAX-brochure.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 
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Knifefish (united States)
The Knifefish, designed as an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), is 
used to locate mines,155 including those buried in so-called “high clutter 
environments.”156 General Dynamics Mission Systems and Bluefin Robotics 
have been developing various models to be used by the U.S. Navy, possibly 
beginning in 2018 or 2019.157 The Knifefish operates with autonomy in its 
function to sweep for mines in various underwater environments.158
Lijian (China)
China launched a prototype of Lijian, meaning “sharp sword,” on November 
20, 2013.159 Shenyang Aircraft Company and the Hongdu Aircraft Industries 
Corporation reportedly designed and manufactured the unmanned combat 
aerial vehicle (UCAV).160 Other than its similar configuration to the X-47B, 
little is known about the UCAV or its capabilities.161 Notably, it did not 
appear at Airshow China in 2014; however, the China Aerospace Science and 
Technology Corporation has “insinuated” that the Lijian program is “alive 
and well.”162 Because little, if any, information about the Lijian’s capabilities is 
publicly known, it remains unclear whether the Lijian employs autonomy in 
its system. More generally, the release of information about China’s air forces 
indicates that China aims to develop an air force “capable of conducting 
both offensive and defensive operations,” to include “the enhancement of 
reconnaissance and strategic projection capabilities.”163
nEuROn (France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland)
The nEUROn is an unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) being developed by 
2016). 
155.  Knifefish Unmanned Undersea Vehicle, General Dynamics Mission Systems, https://
gdmissionsystems.com/maritime-strategic/submarine-systems/knifefish-unmanned-
undersea-vehicle (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
156.  John Reed, Meet the Navy’s Knifefish Mine-Hunting Robot, Defense Tech (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://www.defensetech.org/2012/04/16/meet-the-navys-knifefish-mine-hunting-robot/. 
157.  Mission Possible? Fledgling Ship-Based Autonomous Systems Taking Off at Sea, Jane’s 
Int’l Def. Rev., Oct. 12, 2015. See also Grace Jean, Bluefin Robotics to Deliver Knifefish Variant 
to NRL in 2014, Jane’s Int’l Def. Rev. (May 2, 2013). 
158.  Reed, supra note 156.
159.  James Hardy, China’s Sharp Sword UCAV Makes Maiden Flight, Jane’s Def. Wkly. (Nov. 
22, 2015).
160.  Id.
161.  Id.
162.  Kelvin Wong, CASC Showcases New Generation of UAV Weapons, Jane’s Int’l Def. Rev. 
(Nov. 20, 2014).
163.  Craig Caffrey, Closing the Gaps: Air Force Modernisation in China, Jane’s Def. Wkly. 
(Oct. 2, 2015). 
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Dassault Aviation and several European nations.164 The nEUROn is designed 
to perform reconnaissance and combat missions. The various countries 
involved in the nEUROn program have been testing its capabilities, assessing, 
among other things, the “detection, localization, and reconnaissance of ground 
targets in autonomous modes.”165 Testing of the nEUROn, which is designed 
as a demonstrator of current technologies, will also evaluate its capability to 
“drop…Precision Guided Munitions through the internal weapon bay.”166
Platform M (Russia)
According to Russian media, Platform M is a “remote-controlled robotic 
unit” developed by the Progress Scientific Research Technological Institute 
of Izhevsk.167 Reportedly, Platform M has the capability to “destroy targets 
in automatic or semiautomatic control systems.”168 Its “targeting mechanism 
works automatically without human assistance,” according to news reports.169
Pluto Plus (Italy)
The Pluto and Pluto Plus remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), also referred to 
as unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs),170 operate underwater to identify 
mines using features such as “sonar sensors for navigation, search, obstacle 
avoidance and identification,” as well as the capability to relay information, 
including video imagery, to the operator.171 The Italian company Gaymarine 
developed the Pluto and Pluto Plus models, which are used in conjunction 
with other mine-countermeasure vehicles (MCMVs) by various navies 
throughout the world, including Italy, Nigeria, Norway, South Korea, Spain, 
and Thailand.172 A pilot operates the Pluto Plus above the water, using a 
164.  Nicholas de Larrinaga, France Begins Naval Testing of Neuron UCAV, Jane’s Defence 
Wkly. (May 19, 2016).
165.  Berenice Baker, Taranis vs. nEUROn – Europe’s Combat Drone Revolution, Airforce-
Technology.com (May 6, 2014), http://www.airforce-technology.com/features/featuretaranis-
neuron-europe-combat-drone-revolution-4220502. 
166.  David Cenciotti, First European Experimental Stealth Combat Drone Rolled Out: The 
Neuron UCAV Almost Ready for Flight, The Aviationist (Jan. 20, 2012), https://theaviationist.
com/2012/01/20/neuron-roll-out. 
167.  Russia’s Platform-M Combat Robot on Display in Sevastopol, RT News (July 22, 2015, 8:20 
AM), https://www.rt.com/news/310291-russia-military-robot-sevastopol. 
168.  Id.
169.  Franz-Stefan Gady, Meet Russia’s New Killer Robot, The Diplomat (July 21, 2015), http://
thediplomat.com/2015/07/meet-russias-new-killer-robot. 
170.  Gary Martinic, Unmanned Maritime Surveillance and Weapons Systems, Australian 
Naval Institute (July 8, 2014), http://navalinstitute.com.au/unmanned-maritime-
surveillance-and-weapons-systems.
171.  Casandra Newell, Egypt Orders Pluto Plus ROVs, Jane’s Navy Int’l (June 19, 2009). 
172.  Briefing: Rolling in the Deep, Jane’s Def. Wkly. (March 6, 2011).
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“remote control console” to maneuver the vehicle.173 
Protector uSV (Israel)
Developed and manufactured by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, the 11m 
version of the Protector USV contains an “enhanced remotely controlled water 
can[n]on system for non-lethal and firefighting capabilities.”174 It includes an 
unmanned boat, a tactical control system, and mission modules.175 The 11m 
model includes features that will reportedly enable the USV to engage in 
“surveillance, reconnaissance, mine warfare, and anti-submarine warfare.”176 
The 11m model, as with earlier models of the Protector, employs two operators 
that work remotely from a dual-console station, controlling both the boat and 
the payload.177
Sea Hunter (united States)
In 2016, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a U.S. 
government agency, designed a prototype of an autonomous surface vessel 
named Sea Hunter, which was manufactured by Leidos.178 According to 
DARPA, the vessel can “robustly track quiet diesel electric submarines,”179 
with the ability to travel up to several months and for considerable distances; 
developers anticipate that it has the capability to perform other functions as 
well.180 Sea Hunter is capable of autonomy in certain functions in two ways. 
First, it is capable of navigating and maneuvering independently without 
colliding with other ships.181 Second, it is capable of locating and tracking 
diesel electric submarines, which can be extremely quiet and difficult to 
detect, within a range of two miles.182 A human can take control of the vessel 
173.  Columbia Group to Supply Pluto Plus UUVs to Egyptian Navy, Def. Industry Daily 
(June 21, 2009), http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Columbia-Group-to-Supply-Pluto-
Plus-UUVs-to-Egyptian-Navy-05530/. 
174.  Protector Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV), Israel, Naval-Technology.com, http://
www.naval-technology.com/projects/protector-unmanned-surface-vehicle/ (last visited Aug. 
24, 2016). 
175.  London Huw Williams, Rafael Looks to Extend Protector USV Control Range, Jane’s Int’l 
Def. Rev. (Aug. 8, 2013). 
176.  Id.
177.  Richard Scott, New Protector USV Variant Detailed, Jane’s Int’l Def. Rev., Nov. 12, 2012. 
178.  Rachel Courtland, DARPA’s Self-Driving Submarine Hunter Steers Like a Human, IEEE 
Spectrum (Apr. 7, 2016), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/military-robots/
darpa-actuv-self-driving-submarine-hunter-steers-like-a-human.
179.  Scott Littlefield, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel 
(ACTUV), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, http://www.darpa.mil/program/
anti-submarine-warfare-continuous-trail-unmanned-vessel (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
180.  Courtland, supra note 178.
181.  Littlefield, supra note 179.
182.  Rick Stella, Ghost Ship: Stepping aboard Sea Hunter, the Navy’s Unmanned Drone Ship, 
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if necessary, but it is designed to perform its functions without any proximate 
human direction.183
Skat (Russia)
In 2013, the developer MiG reportedly signed an agreement to develop an 
unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) called Skat.184 According to a Russian 
news agency, Skat would “carry out strike missions on stationary targets, 
especially air defense systems in high-threat areas, as well as mobile land and 
sea targets.”185Also according to a Russian news agency, Skat would “navigate 
in autonomous modes.”186 More recent reports, however, note it is “unclear” 
whether Russia has continued to develop this kind of technology, stating that 
Russia cancelled plans to develop Skat.187
Taranis (united Kingdom)
Taranis is an unmanned aerial combat stealth drone being developed by the 
British company BAE Systems to demonstrate current technologies.188 It is 
capable of performing surveillance and reconnaissance, and also serving in 
combat missions. According to BAE Systems, the company is attempting to 
determine whether the Taranis can “strike targets ‘with real precision at long 
range, even in another continent.’”189 Taranis is theoretically capable of flying 
autonomously (although during test flights, it has always been controlled 
remotely by a human operator).190 A remote human operator must give 
authorization before Taranis is capable of attacking any target, although the 
drone identifies potential targets and, once an attack has been authorized, it 
aims at those targets.191 
x-47B (united States)
The X-47B is an unmanned aerial combat stealth drone that was developed 
by the United States, built by Northrop Grumman, and designed as a “test 
Digital Trends (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/darpa-officially-
christens-the-actuv-in-portland.
183.  Id.
184.  John Reed, Meet Skat, Russia’s Stealthy Drone, Foreign Policy, June 3, 2013, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/03/meet-skat-russias-stealthy-drone.
185.  Id.
186.  Id.
187.  Andrew White, Unmanned Ambitions: European UAV Developments, Jane’s Def. Wkly., 
(Oct. 27, 2015). 
188.  Guia Marie Del Prado, This Drone Is One of the Most Secretive Weapons in the World, Tech 
Insider (Sep. 29, 2015), http://www.techinsider.io/british-taranis-drone-first-autonomous-
weapon-2015-9.
189.  Gallagher, supra note 139.
190.  Id.
191.  Id.
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and development vehicle for advancing control technologies and systems 
necessary for operating [UAVs] in and around aircraft carriers.”192 According 
to the U.S. Navy, it developed the X-47B as a “demonstrator” to showcase 
current capabilities; although the X-47B has not been armed, it is capable 
of carrying two 2,000-pound bombs.193 While the X-47B reportedly has 
autonomy in certain functions,194 an operator can take control of the X-47B 
via a Control Display Unit.195 The X-47B pioneered several autonomous flight 
maneuvers, including the “first autonomous landing on an aircraft carrier and 
the first mid-air refueling by a [UAV].”196 In principle, human authorization is 
required before the X-47B could be used to intentionally deploy deadly force, 
but the precise way in which the human operator fits into this equation is not 
publicly reported.197
MISSILE SYSTEMS
Missile Systems — General
“Fire and Forget” Missile Systems
“Fire and forget” missiles are capable, once launched, of reaching their target 
with no further human assistance. With older missile systems, the operator 
who fired the missile had to help guide the missile towards its target by, 
for example, continuing to track the target and transmitting “corrective 
commands” to the missile.198 Newer “fire and forget” missiles, such as the 
FMG-148 Javelin (discussed below), are capable, once fired, of independently 
tracking their targets without outside guidance or control.199 They are also 
capable of navigating certain difficult terrain on their own, and some, like the 
Brimstone and Brimstone 2 (discussed below), are capable of locating their 
target even when it was not initially in the line of sight of the launch location.
192.  Grace Jean, X-47B Catapults Into New Era of Naval Aviation, Jane’s Int’l Def. Rev. (May 
20, 2013). 
193.  Spencer Ackerman, Exclusive Pics: The Navy’s Unmanned, Autonomous “UFO,” Wired 
(July 31, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/07/x47b.
194.  Jean, supra note 192.
195.  Ackerman, supra note 193.
196.  Jerry Hendrix, Put the X-47B Back to Work - As a Tanker, Defense One (June 13, 2016), 
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/06/put-x-47b-back-work-tanker/129029.
197.  Ackerman, supra note 193.
198.  See, e.g., Andreas Parsch, McDonnell Douglas FGM-77 Dragon, Directory of U.S. 
Military Rockets and Missiles (June 7, 2002), http://www.designation-systems.net/
dusrm/m-77.html. 
199.  Raytheon/Lockheed Martin FGM-148 Javelin Anti-Tank (AT) Missile Launcher (1996), 
Military Factory (April 15, 2016), http://www.militaryfactory.com/smallarms/detail.
asp?smallarms_id=391 [hereinafter Raytheon]. 
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Missile Systems — Specific
Brimstone and Brimstone 2 (united Kingdom)
Brimstone is an anti-armor, “fire and forget” missile first used in 2005, and 
developed initially by GEC-Marconi Radar and Defense Systems (later MBDA 
UK).200 The Royal Air Force (RAF) began using the Brimstone in Iraq and 
Afghanistan during 2008 and 2009.201 Brimstone 2, which entered service in 
2016,202 incorporates a number of improvements from the initial Brimstone 
model.203 Brimstone included “embedded algorithms” and could strike 
both land and naval targets.204 Brimstone 2 introduced “an improved set of 
targeting algorithms,” as well as “autopilot and seeker enhancements.”205 It is 
a “fire and forget” missile that is capable of autonomy in navigating terrain as 
it travels toward its target and in certain respects of independently locating 
a particular target by discriminating among potential candidates.206 Once 
launched, Brimstone is capable of “sweeping” a large target area, searching 
for a specific type of target, the details of which can be pre-programmed into 
each individual missile prior to launch. For example, a Brimstone missile is 
capable of being programmed to target only an armored vehicle, ignoring 
other objects.207
FMG-148 Javelin (united States)
The Javelin is a “fire and forget” anti-tank missile developed by the United 
States with a range of 2,500 meters.208 Multiple countries have purchased the 
Javelin, including Australia, Bahrain, the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, 
Jordan, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States.209 The United States has also 
recently approved sales of the missile to other countries, including Qatar.210 
Both Raytheon and Lockheed Martin manufacture the Javelin.211 Two human 
200.  London Hughes, Reign of Fire: UK RAF Readies for Brimstone 2, Jane’s Int’l Def. Rev. 
(Sept. 4, 2014). 
201.  Id.
202.  Nicholas de Larrinaga, Farnborough 2016: Brimstone 2 Enters Service, Begins Apache 
Trials, Jane’s Def. Wkly (July 14, 2016). 
203.  Hughes, supra note 200.
204.  Id.
205.  Id.
206.  Brimstone Advanced Anti-Armour Missile, Army Technology.com, http://www.army-
technology.com/projects/brimstone (last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
207.  Id.
208.  Raytheon, supra note 199. 
209.  Id.
210.  Jeremy Binnie, U.S. Clears More Javelins for Qatar, Jane’s Def. Wkly (May 27, 2016).
211.  Raytheon, supra note 199.
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operators carry and launch the Javelin.212 A human operator must select the 
Javelin’s target; however, the missile guides itself to the target, allowing the 
human operators to leave the launch site before the missile strikes. Operators 
are capable of identifying targets “either directly [in] line-of-sight or with 
help from the missile’s guidance capability.”213
Harpy (Israel)
Developed by Israel Aerospace Industries and used principally by China, 
India, South Korea, Turkey, and Israel, the Harpy is a “transportable, canister-
launched, fire-and-forget, fully autonomous” system,214 which is also called a 
“loitering munition.”215 Harop, a variant of the Harpy developed in 2009, has 
the capability to “engage time-critical, high-value, relocatable targets,” and is 
also capable of being launched from both land and naval-based canisters.216
Joint Strike Missile (Norway)
The recently-developed Joint Strike Missile builds on the technology of the 
Naval Strike Missile.217 Norway has funded the development of the missile, 
which is manufactured by Kongsberg.218 It is designed to be integrated into 
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and to attack both naval and land targets.219 
In 2015, the Joint Strike Missile was deployed successfully in a test run, and 
further testing and developments are scheduled through 2017.220 The Joint 
Strike Missile is not capable of choosing an initial target. It is also incapable 
of locating a hidden target; however, it does include a Global Positioning 
System/Inertial Navigation System to help it autonomously navigate close to 
terrain towards a preselected target. It is also programmed to automatically 
fly in unpredictable patterns to make it harder to intercept.221
212.  Id.
213.  Id.
214.  Loitering with Intent, supra note 141.
215.  Id.   
216.  Id.
217.  Richard Scott, Joint Strike Missile Starts Flight Test Programme, Jane’s Missiles & 
Rockets (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.janes.com/article/55989/joint-strike-missile-starts-
flight-test-programme.
218.  Id.
219.  Kongsberg’s NSM/JSM Anti-Ship & Strike Missile Attempts to Fit in Small F-35 Stealth Bay, 
Defense Industry Daily (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/norwegian-
contract-launches-nsm-missile-03417 [hereinafter Kongsberg].
220.  Franz-Stefan Gady, F-35’s Joint Strike Missile Successfully Completes Flight Test in US, 
The Diplomat (Nov. 13, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/f-35s-joint-strike-missile-
successfully-completes-flight-test-in-us.
221.  Kongsberg, supra note 219.
HLS PILAC • AUG. 2016
43
TECHNOLOGy CONCEPTS AND DEVELOPMENTS
STATIONARY SYSTEMS, INCLUDING  
CLOSE-IN WEAPON SYSTEMS
Aegis Combat System (united States)
The Aegis Combat System, manufactured by Lockheed Martin,222 is a weapons 
control system capable of identifying, tracking, and attacking hostile targets.223 
Several countries use the system, including Australia, Japan, Norway, South 
Korea, Spain, and the United States.224 Aegis has many more capabilities 
than a standalone Phalanx CIWS (see below). Like the Phalanx, Aegis relies 
on radar to identify possibly hostile targets.225 Unlike the Phalanx, Aegis is 
capable of engaging over 100 targets simultaneously.226 The Aegis Combat 
System is capable of being operated autonomously227 in terms of the computer 
interface tracking various targets, determining their threat levels, and, in 
certain respects, independently determining whether to attack them.
AK-630 CIWS (Russia)
The AK-630 Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) gun turret is “designed to 
engage manned and unmanned aerial targets, small-size surface targets, soft-
skinned coastal targets, and floating mines.”228 Multiple countries have used 
the AK-630, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
and Ukraine.229 
Centurion (united States)
The Centurion Weapons System, manufactured by Raytheon, uses a “radar-
guided gun” against “incoming rocket and mortar fire.”230 The Centurion has 
been described as a “land-based version” of the Phalanx CIWS (see below).231 
In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom also uses the Centurion. 
222.  Aegis Combat System, Lockheed Martin, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/
products/aegis.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
223.  Aegis Weapon System, America’s Navy: United States Navy Fact File (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=200&ct=2.
224.  Paul Scharre & Michael C. Horowitz, An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapons Systems 
21 (Feb. 2015) (working paper), http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/
Ethical%20Autonomy%20Working%20Paper_021015_v02.pdf.
225.  Id.
226.  Id.
227.  Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 224, at 21. 
228.  Thales Targets AK-630 Users for Fire Control, Jane’s Navy Int’l (Apr. 13, 2005). 
229.  Id.
230.  Nathan Hodge, Raytheon Ramps Up Centurion Production, Jane’s Def. Wkly. (March 
20, 2008).
231.  Id.
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The Centurion uses the same capabilities as the Phalanx CIWS, including 
automatically tracking and destroying incoming fire.232
Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) (united States)
C-RAM, manufactured by Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, is a missile 
defense system designed to intercept hostile projectiles before they reach 
their intended targets. Its central component is a revised version of the U.S. 
Navy’s Phalanx CIWS (see below), as well as existing radar systems, adapted 
for on-land use.233 Australia and the United Kingdom have purchased the 
system from the United States.234 C-RAM reportedly has autonomy in its 
operations in terms of “intercept[ing] incoming munitions at speeds too 
quick for a human to react.”235
GDF (Switzerland)
The Oerlikon GDF is an anti-aircraft cannon initially developed in the late 
1950s and currently used by over 30 countries.236 Once activated, the GDF-
005 model is capable, without further human intervention, of operating 
using radar to identify targets, attacking them, and reloading.237
Goalkeeper CIWS (The Netherlands) 
The Goalkeeper CIWS, manufactured by the Thales Group, includes a gun 
with “missile-piercing ammunition” that enables the system to “destroy 
missile warheads.”238 The navies of Belgium, Chile, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and the United 
Kingdom use the system.239 According to information provided by Thales, 
232.  Centurion C-RAM Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Weapon System, Army 
Recognition, http://www.armyrecognition.com/united_states_us_army_artillery_vehicles_
system_uk/centurion_c-ram_land-based_weapon_system_phalanx_technical_data_sheet_
specifications_pictures_video.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
233.  Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM), GlobalSecurity.org (July 7, 2011), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/cram.htm.
234.  Kristin Horitski, Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM), Missile Defense 
Advocacy Alliance (March 2016), http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-
systems-2/missile-defense-systems/u-s-deployed-intercept-systems/counter-rocket-artillery-
mortar-c-ram. 
235.  Heather M. Roff, Killer Robots on the Battlefield, Slate (April 7, 2016), http://www.slate.
com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/04/the_danger_of_using_an_attrition_strategy_
with_autonomous_weapons.html. 
236.  GDF, Weapons Systems.net, http://weaponsystems.net/weaponsystem/EE02%20-%20
GDF.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
237.  Noah Shachtman, Robot Cannon Kills 9, Wounds 14, Wired (Oct. 18, 2007), https://www.
wired.com/2007/10/robot-cannon-ki.
238.  Goalkeeper – Close-In Weapon System, Thales, https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/
goalkeeper-close-weapon-system# (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
239.  Id.
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the Goalkeeper system “automatically performs the entire process from 
surveillance and detection to destruction, including selection of the next 
priority target.”240
Iron Dome (Israel)
The Iron Dome is manufactured by Raytheon and seeks to “detect, assess, 
and intercept incoming rockets, artillery, and mortars.”241 The Iron Dome 
has autonomy in some of its functions. It locates potential targets using radar 
and calculates their expected trajectory. If a rocket would hit a populated 
area, the Iron Dome is capable of launching a Tamir interceptor missile 
at the rocket. A human operator must authorize the launch, and she must 
often make the decision very quickly, sometimes in a matter of minutes.242 
Once a launch is authorized, the computer system will independently 
aim the Tamir and determine when to launch it. Once close enough to 
the hostile rocket, the Tamir explodes, destroying both projectiles. The 
computer algorithm, not the human operator, determines when to detonate 
the Tamir.
Kashtan CIWS (Russia)
Manufactured by KBP Instrument Design Bureau and used by China, India, 
and Russia,243 the Kashtan Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) “can engage up 
to six targets simultaneously,” and includes gun and missile armaments.244 
The Kashtan system has been described as a human-supervised system with 
certain autonomous functions.245 
MANTIS (Germany)
The Modular, Automatic, and Network-Capable Targeting and Interception 
System, or MANTIS, manufactured by Rheinmetall and used by German forces, 
is capable of quickly acquiring a target and firing 1,000 rounds a minute.246 
An operator must first activate the MANTIS, but, once activated, “the system 
is fully automated, although a man in the loop allows for engagement to be 
240.  Id.
241.  Iron Dome Weapon System, Raytheon, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/
irondome (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
242.  Raoul Heinrichs, How Israel’s Iron Dome Anti-Missile System Works, Business Insider, 
July 30, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/how-israels-iron-dome-anti-missile-system-
works-2014-7.
243.  Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 224, at 21.
244.  India – Kashtan Self-Defence System for Retrofit, Jane’s Int’l Def. Rev. (May 1, 2001). 
245.  Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 224, at 21.
246.  Nicholas Fiorenza, Luftwaffe Receives MANTIS C-RAM System, Jane’s Def. Wkly. (Nov. 
28, 2012).
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overruled if needed.”247
MK 15 Phalanx CIWS (united States)
Manufactured by Raytheon248 and used by at least 25 countries,249 MK 15 
Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) is a “fast-reaction, detect-through-
engage, radar guided, 20-millimeter gun weapon system” used to explode 
anti-ship missiles (ASMs) and other approaching threats, such as aircraft 
and unmanned aerial systems (UASs).250 The Phalanx CIWS can be operated 
manually or in an autonomous mode.251 The Phalanx CIWS uses radar to 
track nearby projectiles, and it is capable of independently determining 
whether they pose a threat based on their speed and direction.252 When it is 
programmed to operate autonomously, the Phalanx CIWS automatically fires 
at incoming missiles without further human direction.253 
MK-60 Griffin Missile System (united States) 
Used by the U.S. Navy and manufactured by Raytheon, the MK-60 Griffin 
Missile System enables ships to defend themselves against “small boat 
threats” by employing a “surface-to-surface missile system.”254 The MK-60 
Griffin Missile System includes at least two variants: Griffin A, an unmanned 
aircraft system (UAS), and Griffin B, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).255 
The Griffin B model uses GPS guidance to help identify a target, while the 
human operator is capable of controlling the type of detonation, as well as of 
changing the target location after the missile has been launched.256
Patriot Missile (united States)
The Patriot System, manufactured by Raytheon, is a surface-to-air missile 
defense system that uses radar to detect and identify hostile incoming 
247.  Id.
248.  Phalanx Close-In Weapon System, Raytheon, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/
products/phalanx/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
249. Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 224.
250.  MK 15 Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), America’s Navy: United States Navy Fact 
File (May 9, 2016), http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct=2.
251.  Phalanx CIWS: The Last Defense, On Ship and Ashore, Defense Industry Daily (Feb. 
16, 2016), https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/phalanx-ciws-the-last-defense-on-ship-and-
ashore-02620.
252.  MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), FAS Military Analysis Network 
(Jan. 9, 2003), http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mk-15.htm.
253.  Id.
254.  MK 60 Griffin Missile System, America’s Navy: United States Navy Fact File (Nov. 
25, 2013), http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=593&ct=2. 
255.  Strike Out: Unmanned Systems Set for Wider Attack Role, Jane’s Int’l Def. Rev., July 17, 
2015. 
256.  Id.
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missiles and fires missiles to intercept them.257 Multiple countries use the 
Patriot system, including Egypt, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, the 
Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, 
and the United States.258 The Patriot’s radar system is responsible for 
automatically detecting and tracing incoming projectiles. When operating 
semi-autonomously, the Patriot computer system requires a human operator 
to authorize a launch.259 When operating in a mode of heightened autonomy, 
the Patriot computer itself chooses whether or not to launch, based upon the 
speed and direction of the approaching projectile.260
SeaRAM (united States) 
The SeaRAM anti-ship missile defense system, used by the U.S. Navy, 
combines features of the Phalanx and rolling airframe missile (RAM) guided 
weapons systems.261 According to the manufacturer Raytheon, the SeaRAM 
can “identify and destroy approaching supersonic and subsonic threats, such 
as cruise missiles, drones, small boats, and helicopters.”262 The RAM “fire and 
forget” missile contains some autonomy in its features, including a “dual-
mode passive radio frequency system.”263
Sentry Robot (Russia)
In 2014, the Russian Strategic Missile Forces announced that they were 
planning to release armed sentry robots that could exhibit autonomy in 
identifying and attacking targets.264 Little else is publicly known about the 
specific features of these machines because the prototypes have not yet been 
released. Uralvagonzavod, a Russian defense firm, anticipates that it will be 
able to demonstrate prototypes by 2017.265 In December 2015, U.S. Defense 
257.  Andreas Parsch, Raytheon MIM-104 Patriot, Directory of Military US Rockets and 
Missiles (Dec. 3, 2002), http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-104.html.
258.  Scharre & Horowitz, supra note 224, at 21–22.
259.  Patriot Missiles (PAC-1, PAC-2, PAC-3), Missile Threat (Dec. 22, 2013), http://
missilethreat.com/defense-systems/patriot-pac-1-pac-2-pac-3.
260.  Marshall Brain, How Patriot Missiles Work, How Stuff Works (March 28, 2003), http://
science.howstuffworks.com/patriot-missile.htm.
261.  SeaRAM Anti-Ship Missile Defense System, Raytheon, http://www.raytheon.com/
capabilities/products/searam (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
262.  Id.
263.  SeaRAM Anti-Ship Missile Defence System, United States of America, Naval-Technology.
com, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/searam-anti-ship-missile-defence-system 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
264.  Patrick Tucker, The Pentagon Is Nervous about Russian and Chinese Killer Robots, Defense 
One (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/12/pentagon-nervous-about-
russian-and-chinese-killer-robots/124465.
265.  Producer of Russia’s Armata T-14 Plans to Create Army of AI Robots, RT International 
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Department officials expressed alarm at the development of the “highly 
capable autonomous combat robots” that would be “capable of independently 
carrying out military operations.”266
Sentry Tech (Israel)
Manufactured by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, the Sentry Tech system 
“consists of a lineup of remote-controlled weapon stations integrated with 
security and intelligence sensors…providing an infiltration alert via ground 
and airborne sensors” to provide operators with information on whether to 
fire weapons.267 The system is mainly used by Israel along the Gaza border.268 
Sentry Tech does not operate with autonomy in its features; rather, it is a 
remote-controlled weapon station. Once a potential target has been identified, 
an operator remotely controls the Sentry Tech to track the target and is capable 
of choosing to attack the target with the Sentry’s machine gun turret.269 
SGR A1 Sentry Gun (South Korea)
The SGR A1 is a stationary robot that operates a machine-gun turret, originally 
designed by the Korea University and the Samsung Techwin Company. The 
robot guards the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South 
Korea. It uses an infrared camera surveillance system to identify potential 
intruders. When an individual comes within ten meters of the robot, the 
SGR A1 demands the necessary access code and uses voice recognition to 
determine whether the intruder has provided the correct code. If the intruder 
fails to do so, the SGR A1 has three options: ring an alarm bell, fire rubber 
bullets, or fire its turreted machine gun.270 The SGR A1 normally operates 
with remote human authorization required to enable the SGR A1 to fire.271 
Central to this decision is whether the target has appeared to “surrender.” The 
(Oct. 20, 2015, 11:43 P.M.), https://www.rt.com/news/319229-russia-armata-tanks-robots.
266.  The Pentagon is Growing Concerned Over Development of Russian and Chinese Combat 
Robots, National Security News (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.nationalsecurity.news/2015-
12-22-the-pentagon-is-growing-concerned-over-development-of-russian-and-chinese-
combat-robots.html. 
267.  Sentry-Tech, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., http://www.rafael.co.il/
Marketing/396-1687-en/Marketing.aspx (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
268.  Robin Hughes & Alon Ben-David, IDF Deploys Sentry Tech on Gaza Border, Jane’s Def. 
Wkly. (June 6, 2007).
269.  Id.
270.  Samsung Techwin SGR-A1 Sentry Guard Robot, GlobalSecurity.org (July 7, 2011), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/sgr-a1.htm [hereinafter Sentry Guard].
271.  Keith Wagstaff, Future Tech? Autonomous Killer Robots Are Already Here, NBC News 
(May 15, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/future-tech-autonomous-killer-
robots-are-already-here-n105656.
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robot is programmed to recognize that a human with its arms held high in the 
air is attempting to surrender.272
Super aEgis II (South Korea)
The Super aEgis II is a robot sentry with certain automated features 
manufactured by DoDAAM. It incorporates a machine gun turret, which is 
used primarily by South Korea in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).273 It uses 
a combination of digital cameras and thermal imaging to identify potential 
targets, allowing it to operate in the dark.274 The Super aEgis II requires a 
human to authorize any use of lethal force. Before firing, it automatically 
emits a warning, advising potential targets to “turn back or we will shoot” 
(in Korean).275 If the target continues to advance, a remote human operator 
enters a password to enable the aEgis to shoot the target.276
CYBER CAPABILITIES
Stuxnet (united States and Israel)
Reportedly, Stuxnet is a cyberweapon that was used to attack Iran’s nuclear-
enrichment operations in 2009 and 2010. The specifics of the malware are 
uncertain, but it was reportedly developed by the United States and Israel in a 
mission codenamed “Olympic Games.”277 Allegedly, Stuxnet caused computers 
in Natanz (Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility) to malfunction, reprogramming 
the centrifuges to spin too fast and damaging delicate pieces of the machinery.278 
It is believed to have damaged 1,000 of Iran’s 6,000 centrifuges in 2010.279 
Since it was intended to operate in the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility, 
a computer system that is “air-gapped” (disconnected from the internet and 
other computer networks), Stuxnet was designed to operate, once launched, 
272.  Sentry Guard, supra note 270.
273.  Simon Parkin, Killer Robots: The Soldiers That Never Sleep, BBC Future (July 16, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150715-killer-robots-the-soldiers-that-never-sleep. Other 
countries, however, such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, also use the system.
274.  Id.
275.  Id.
276.  Id.
277.  Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, Stuxnet Was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, Officials 
Say, Wash. Post (June 2, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.
html.
278.  David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. Times 
(May 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-
wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html.
279.  Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon, Wired 
(Nov. 3, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet.
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without (further) external human direction or input.280 Stuxnet’s code was 
written to ensure that once connected to the nuclear facility’s computer 
network, it would begin sabotaging the centrifuge software immediately and 
to continue doing so without further outside guidance.
280.  See Dorothy E. Denning, Stuxnet: What Has Changed?, 4 Future Internet 672, 674 
(2012).
3
INTERNATIONAL 
LAW PERTAINING 
TO ARMED 
CONFLICT
In this section, we outline key fields, concepts, and rules relating to 
international law pertaining to armed conflict. We do so to identify some of 
the fundamental substantive norms that may be relevant to war algorithms 
in general and to our three-part accountability approach in particular.281 
State responsibility entails, among other things, identifying the content of 
the underlying obligation. Individual responsibility entails, among other 
things, identifying the elements of the crime and the mode of responsibility 
under international law. Finally, scrutiny governance entails detecting—
and potentially surpassing—a baseline of relevant normative regimes, 
and international law may provide a foundational normative framework 
concerning regulation of war algorithms.
This section is divided into two parts. We first set the stage with an 
introduction of state responsibility. Then, in the bulk of the section, we 
highlight relevant considerations in the substantive law of obligations. Part 
of the focus is on AWS, since that has been the main framing states have 
addressed to date. We examine whether a customary international law norm 
281.  See infra Section 4.
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pertaining to AWS in particular has crystallized. We find that one has not, 
at least not yet. So we then outline some of the main international law rules 
of a more general nature. We focus here primarily on rules that may relate 
to AWS, but we also note a number of rules that may (otherwise or also) 
implicate war algorithms.
With respect to AWS, most commentators and states focus primarily 
on international humanitarian law and international criminal law. In this 
section, we raise concerns not only in those fields but also in some of the 
other regimes of international law that might apply with respect to war 
algorithms. The section, however, is not meant to be exhaustive.282 We note 
that some states—including Switzerland, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom—have articulated much more detailed analyses of how AWS 
might relate to a particular rule or field of international law; in light of 
our interest in discerning state practice, we focus, in part, on those states’ 
positions and practices.
STATE RESPONSIBILITY
State responsibility underpins international law. To grasp the broader 
accountability architecture governing the design, development, or use (or a 
combination thereof) of war algorithms, therefore, it is necessary to have at 
least a basic understanding of the conceptual framework of state responsibility.
UNDERLYING CONCEPTS
The underlying concepts of state responsibility, which are general in character, 
are attribution, breach, excuses, and consequences.283 Attribution concerns 
the circumstances under which an act may be attributed to a state.284 Breach 
concerns the conditions under which an act (or omission) may qualify as 
an internationally wrongful act.285 Excuses concern the general defenses that 
282. One field of international law that we do not address but that might merit attention 
is international trade law, perhaps especially to the extent that it is used as a framework for 
developing technology-related standards and procedures at the national and international 
levels.  
283.  See James R. Crawford, State Responsibility, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law ¶ 3 (2006).
284.  See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with 
Commentaries arts. 4–11, Report of the International Law Commission, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-
June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, U.N. GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [hereinafter 
Draft Articles].
285.  Id. at arts. 12–15.
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may be available to a state in relation to an internationally wrongful act.286 
And consequences concern the forms of liability that may arise in relation to 
an internationally wrongful act. As James Crawford explains, “[i]ndividual 
treaties or rules may vary these underlying concepts in some respect; 
otherwise they are assumed and apply unless excluded.”287
Conduct may be attributed to a state under a variety of circumstances. 
These circumstances include the conduct of any state organ, such as 
the armed forces.288 They also include the conduct of a person or entity 
empowered by the law of the state to exercise elements of governmental 
authority (so long as the person or entity is acting in that capacity in a 
particular instance),289 and the conduct of an organ placed at the disposal 
of a state by another state so long as that “organ is acting in the exercise 
of elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose disposal 
it is placed.”290 The conduct of these organs, persons, and entities where 
acting in those capacities shall be considered an act of the state under 
international law even if that conduct exceeds its authority or contravenes 
instructions.291 Furthermore, “[t]he conduct of a person or group of 
persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the 
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under 
the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”292 And 
“[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act 
of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in 
fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or 
default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for 
the exercise of those elements of authority.”293 Also, “[t]he conduct of an 
insurrectional movement which becomes the new Government of a State 
shall be considered an act of that State under international law.”294 And, 
finally, “[c]onduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding 
[circumstances] shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under 
international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and 
adopts the conduct in question as its own.”295
286.  Id. at arts. 20–25.
287.  Crawford, supra note 283, at ¶ 3.
288.  Draft Articles, supra note 284, at art. 4(1).
289.  Id. at art. 5.
290.  Id. at art. 6.
291.  Id. at art. 7.
292.  Id. at art. 8.
293.  Id. at art. 9.
294.  Id. at art. 10(1); see also id. at art. 10(2)–(3).
295.  Id. at art. 11.
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In general, a consequence of state responsibility is the liability to make 
reparation.296 As noted by Pietro Sullo and Julian Wyatt, “[t]he principle 
that States have to provide reparations to other States to redress wrongful 
acts they have committed is undisputed under international law and is 
confirmed by other instruments of international law.”297 Those authors 
explain that “[t]he primary function of reparations in international law 
is the re-establishment of the situation that would have existed if an 
internationally wrongful act had not been committed and the forms that 
such reparation may take are various.”298
SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS
While state responsibility provides the basic framework, the substantive 
law of obligations fleshes out the relevant rules and procedures. The 
substantive law of obligations may be found in a relevant branch or 
branches of public international law. The operation of a specific branch 
may have implications for particular forms of attribution, breach, excuses, 
and consequences. IHL, for instance, contains specific provisions on what 
may constitute a “serious violation” and what consequences may arise with 
respect to certain rule breaches.
The two sources of the substantive law of obligations most relevant to 
war algorithms are treaties and customary international law. Treaties are 
often defined as international agreements between two or more states.299 And 
customary international law is often defined as being made up of the “rules 
of international law that derive from and reflect a general practice accepted 
as law.”300 Below, we first explore whether there is a specific customary rule 
296.  See Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use 
It 162 (1995).
297.  Pietro Sullo & Julian Wyatt, War Reparations, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law ¶ 5 (2015) (citing to the 2001 International Law Commission Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (art. 31 and arts. 34–37)).
298.  Sullo & Wyatt, supra note 297, at ¶ 5.
299.  See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 133; Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 301(1) (1987).
300.  Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n, Second Report on Identification 
of Customary International Law, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 (2014), http://daccess-ods.un.org/
access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/CN.4/672&Lang=E [hereinafter Wood, Second Report]. Though 
the International Law Commission (ILC) Drafting Committee ultimately did not include this 
definition in its subsequent report, this exclusion was related to concerns about redundancy, 
not objections to its content. See Gilberto Saboia (Chairman of the Drafting Committee), Int’l 
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pertaining to AWS in particular. (We focus on AWS here and not on war 
algorithms more broadly because, to date, the bulk of the state practice pertains 
to AWS.) Answering in the negative, we then highlight treaty provisions (and 
corresponding customary rules) of a more general character that may relate 
to AWS and war algorithms. These provisions stretch across an array of fields 
of international law—not only IHL and international criminal law, but also 
space law, telecommunications law, and others. 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
CONCERNING AWS301
Customary international law has two constituent elements: state practice and 
opinio juris sive necessitates (shorthand: opinio juris).302 State practice has 
recently been formulated as the “conduct of the State, whether in the exercise 
of executive, legislative, judicial or any other functions of the State.”303 And 
opinio juris has recently been formulated as “the belief that [a practice] is 
obligatory under a rule of law.”304 In other words, a state following a particular 
practice merely as a matter of policy or out of habit, not out of a sense of legal 
obligation, does not qualify as opinio juris.305
It seems fair to say that statements made by official state representatives 
at the 2015 and 2016 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Informal Meetings of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems could 
qualify as state practice or opinio juris. (Though those statements probably 
should not be counted as both.) Such gatherings are “informal implementation 
mechanism[s],”306 not formal gatherings of state parties. But these meetings 
Law Comm’n, Identification of Customary International Law, at 4 (2014), http://legal.un.org/
ilc/sessions/66/pdfs/english/dc_chairman_statement_identification_of_custom.pdf.
301.  Katie King and Joshua Kestin provided extensive research assistance for this section.
302.  See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Identification of Customary International Law: Text of the 
Draft Conclusions Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee, draft conclusion 2, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.869 (2015), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G15/156/93/
PDF/G1515693.pdf?OpenElement; Wood, Second Report, supra note 300, at 9, 21–27.
303.  Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 302, at draft conclusion 5.
304.  Wood, Second Report, supra note 302, at 24 (quoting the explanation of various states). 
See also Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n, Third Report on Identification 
of Customary International Law, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/682 (2015), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/088/91/PDF/N1508891.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter 
Wood, Third Report]; Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 302, at draft conclusion 9 (“The requirement, 
as a constituent element of customary international law, that the general practice be accepted as 
law (opinio juris) means that the practice in question must be undertaken with a sense of legal 
right or obligation”).
305.  See, e.g., id.
306.  U.N. Office at Geneva, 2010 Meeting of Experts, Disarmament, http://www.unog.
ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/701141247B6C85E7C12576F200587847?OpenDocument 
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nevertheless involved the sort of public pronouncements that, when 
conducted by state agents, are capable of comprising evidence of the elements 
of customary international law. In at least some cases, states’ presentations at 
meetings of experts have been considered as state practice for the purposes 
of assessing customary international law.307 Whether a particular statement is 
evidence depends in part on its content. For example, a state merely implying 
or expressing a desire that something become illegal would not be evidence 
of state practice.308
So far, it appears that there is not enough consensus among these 
statements for any clear customary international law to have emerged due 
to state practice or opinio juris. Be that as it may, the 2016 meeting revealed 
(last visited March 12, 2016).
307.  See, e.g., Customary International Humanitarian Law 1338, 3164 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
customary-international-humanitarian-law-ii-icrc-eng.pdf (citing remarks at a meeting of 
experts as evidence related to state practice on deception and a Colombian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs working paper presented at a meeting of experts as evidence of state practice). The 
same International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study also took statements at CCW 
conferences as evidence of state practice, both when at official States Parties conferences, see, 
e.g., id. at 1965 (citing China’s remarks about blinding lasers; however, since these remarks 
were made a year after China adopted the protocol banning blinding lasers and are generally 
an endorsement of that protocol, it is not clear what added value they have), and in preparatory 
or implementation gatherings, see, e.g., id. at 1966 (noting India’s statement at the Third 
Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the CCW that it 
“fully supported the idea of expanding the scope of the CCW to cover armed internal conflicts”). 
Even if one is not willing to accept the ICRC’s assessment of what qualifies as state practice, 
see, e.g., John Bellinger & William Haynes, A U.S. Government Response to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 Int’l. Rev. 
Red Cross 443, 444–46 (2007), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_866_bellinger.
pdf, international tribunals like the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have 
accepted states’ remarks before the United Nations General Assembly as state practice, see 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, para. 120 (Int’l Cri. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), as well as 
statements before national legislatures, see id. at para. 100. Statements at a meetings of experts 
are similarly public, recorded, and made by state representatives in an official capacity. Further, 
at least one International Court of Justice judge has also declared that “the positions taken up 
by the delegates of States in international organizations and conferences…naturally form part 
of State practice.” Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), 
Judgment, 3 I.C.J. Rep 286, para. 302 (Feb. 5, 1970) (Ammoun, J., separate opinion), http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=50&p3=4. Statements at the Meeting of 
the Experts would fulfill that description.
308.  See Henrik Meijers, On International Customary Law in the Netherlands, in On the 
Foundations and Sources of International Law 77, 85 (Ige F. Dekker & Harry H.G. Post 
eds., 2003) (A “declaration by a state which implies no more than that it is in favor of a proposed 
rule becoming law, does not contribute to the formation of…custom” because “[i]f one declares 
to be in favour of something happening in [the] future, that ‘something’ has not yet taken place 
in the present, and no present practice (relating to that something) can have been formed yet”).
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relatively wide agreement on some important points. First, nearly all states 
that explicitly addressed the issue concurred that “fully” autonomous weapon 
systems do not yet exist (although some maintained that such systems will 
never exist, whereas others seemed to assume that they inevitably will). Second, 
there was wide agreement on the need for further discussion or monitoring 
(or both). Nearly every state mentioned the importance of continuing the 
dialogue. Third, most states indicated their belief that the current definitions 
of “autonomous weapon systems” are inadequate, impeding the progress that 
international society can make in assessing legal concerns. 
In terms of taking a concrete position concerning the legality of “lethal 
autonomous weapons systems,” at the 2016 Meeting the greatest agreement 
was on the importance or relevance of the review process under Article 36 of 
the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (described in more 
detail below) and on the need for “meaningful human control” over AWS. 
In statements at the 2016 Meeting, thirteen states referenced the importance 
or relevance of Article 36—more than twice as many as at the 2015 Meeting. 
Also at the 2016 Meeting, thirteen states expressly referenced the need for 
“meaningful human control.” However, as in 2015, this agreement was undercut 
by the lack of clarity as to what “meaningful human control” means. (Some 
states seemed to think that something akin to a human override capability 
would be sufficient, while others disagreed.309) Given the disparities in how 
different states interpret the concept, some states expressed skepticism about 
the usefulness of the notion of “meaningful human control.”310
When comparing the 2015 and 2016 CCW Informal Meetings of 
Experts, it is important to bear in mind that the participating states are 
309.  See, e.g., Statement of Israel, Characteristics of LAWS (Part II), http://www.unog.
ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/AB30BF0E02AA39EAC1257E29004769F3/$file/2015_
LAWS_MX_Israel_characteristics.pdf (“During the discussions, delegations have made use 
of various phrases referring to the appropriate degree of human involvement in respect to 
LAWS. Several States mentioned the phrase ‘meaningful human control’. Several other States 
did not express support for this phrase. Some of them thought that it was too vague, and the 
alternative phrasing ‘appropriate levels of human judgment’ was suggested. We have also noted, 
that even those who did choose to use the phrase ‘meaningful human control’, had different 
understandings of its meaning. Some of its proponents had in mind human control or oversight 
of each targeting action in real-time, while others thought that, at least from a perspective 
of ensuring compliance with IHL, the preset by a human of certain limitations on the way a 
lethal autonomous system would operate, may also amount to meaningful human control. In 
our view, it is safe to assume that human judgment will be an integral part of any process to 
introduce LAWS, and will be applied throughout the various phases of research, development, 
programming, testing, review, approval, and decision to employ them. LAWS will not actually 
be making decisions or exercising judgment by themselves, but will operate as designed and 
programmed by humans”).
310.  See Appendices I and II.
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not identical. The differences between the meetings may simply reflect the 
altered composition of participating states, not necessarily a coherent shift in 
position among the same group of states. Nonetheless, the growing number of 
states that referenced Article 36 reviews might reflect a growing recognition 
that the category “autonomous weapon systems” involves a broad spectrum of 
weapons and may require review on a case-by-case basis.
Another consideration in the evaluation of customary international law 
that may be relevant to AWS concerns “specially affected” states. The basic 
idea is that the practice of “specially affected” states311—that is, states that are 
“affected or interested to a higher degree than other states with regard to the 
rule in question”—“should weigh heavily (to the extent that, in appropriate 
circumstances, it may prevent a rule from emerging).”312 For example, with 
respect to the rights associated with a state’s territorial sea, the practices of 
states with a coastline have been considered as more significant than those 
of landlocked states.313 There is some dispute over the determination and 
role of “specially affected” states in customary international humanitarian 
law.314 Yet the position of the majority of commentators seems to be that 
“[i]f an emerging rule in respect to the use of sophisticated weaponry is 
considered then the practice of only a few states technically capable of 
production may suffice.”315
311.  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Denmark; Germany v. Netherlands), 
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, para. 73 (Feb. 1969) (“State practice, including that of States 
whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform 
in the sense of the provision invoked;—and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to 
show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved”).
312.  Wood, Second Report, supra note 300, at 38–39 (internal citations omitted).
313.  See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction between Customary International 
Law and Treaties 288–89 (2007).
314.  See, e.g., Ward Ferdinandusse, Book Review, 53 Netherlands Int’l L. Rev. 502, 504 
(2006) (“it may be asked whether there are specially affected states in IHL at all. It is easy to 
see how the concept of specially affected states is useful when discussing delimitation of the 
continental shelf: some states have a continental shelf to delimit while other states do not and, 
one may assume, never will. There is an aspect of permanency there which is lacking in IHL. 
Belligerent states, one may hope, are the peace makers of tomorrow. Occupied states may be 
the occupiers of tomorrow. Customary rules develop slowly and should be stable enough to 
withstand such changing of positions. Moreover, one would think that it is irreconcilable with 
the very character of IHL to grant specially affected status to the manufacturers of certain 
dubious weapons, just as it would have been problematic at least to grant South-Africa specially 
affected status with regard to the question of apartheid”). See also Richard Price, Emerging 
Customary Norms and Anti-Personnel Landmines, in The Politics of International Law 
106, 120–21 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: Taking Stock of the ICRC Study, 78 Nordic J. Int’l L. 435, 446 (2010).
315.  Harry H.G. Post, The Role of State Practice in the Formation of Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, in On the Foundations and Sources of International Law 129, 
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If this view is accurate, then the practice of states that are more 
technologically advanced in the weapons arena—such as the United States, 
Israel, and South Korea, which are reportedly some of the states furthest 
along in the development of relevant technologies316—would be particularly 
important for any customary rules about AWS. So far, these and other similar 
states have largely favored continuing to monitor or discuss the development 
of such weapons. Indeed, these states mostly refrain from deciding on their 
per se legality while offering hints that they have apprehensions about bans 
that they view as potentially premature or restricting civilian technological 
development.317 
Yet another line of reasoning suggests that states in whose territory 
where autonomous weapons might be deployed (regardless of whether the 
territorial state grants consent) may also be considered “specially affected.” 
Along these lines, Pakistan’s statements about the illegality of lethal 
autonomous weapons systems would also receive a privileged status.318 
This claim might have some value as lex ferenda (the law as it should be). 
But, as mentioned above, existing scholarly commentary tends to focus on 
the weapons-possessors, not on the places where the weapons may be used, 
as the “specially affected” states.
142 (Ige F. Dekker & Harry H.G. Post eds., 2003). See also Dinstein, supra note 313, at 293; 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 307, at xliv–xlv (“Concerning 
the question of the legality of the use of blinding laser weapons, for example, ‘specially affected 
States’ include those identified as having been in the process of developing such weapons”). Cf. 
H.W.A. Thirlway, International Customary Law and Codification: An Examination 
of the Continuing Role of Custom in the Present Period of Codification of 
International Law 71–72 (stating that, in relation to laws for outer space, specially affected 
states would be those “actually or potentially in control of the economic and scientific assets 
necessary for the exploration of space,” and that it might even be unnecessary to look beyond 
those states to determine the relevant state practice).
316.  See Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon 
Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can, American University Washington 
College of Law Research Paper No. 2013-11, at 1 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2250126.
317.  At least in 2015, Germany did somewhat differentiate itself, drawing a “red line” about 
the need for meaningful human control and calling for states to “take care to closely monitor 
the development and introduction of any new weapon system to guarantee that there will be 
no transgression.”
318.  This sort of argument would not be too far removed from some states’ claims before 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the potentially world-affecting damage nuclear 
weapons could create should mean that all states qualify as specially affected, see Hugh Thirlway, 
The Sources of International Law, in International Law 91, 99 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2014). 
The ICJ did not weigh in on the validity of this claim. Still, if anything, the sort of argument 
outlined above would be less extreme than the nuclear-weapons claim, since, it seems, AWS 
might be capable of being more geographically limited than nuclear weapons. That argument 
would nevertheless rely on states believing that they could accurately predict where AWS would 
be used, if the customary law was to precede their development.
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Summary of States’ Positions as Reflected by Their 
Statements at the 2015 and 2016 CCW Meetings of Experts
Charts containing the relevant quotations, caveats, and explanations are in Appendices I and II.
Position:319 Currently unacceptable, unallowable, or unlawful
States reflecting this position: Austria,320 Chile,321 Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Germany,322 Mexico, Pakistan, Poland,323 and Zambia
Position: Need to monitor or continue to discuss
States reflecting this position: Algeria, Austria, Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Finland, 
France, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, and Zambia
319.  When states advocate the need to regulate AWS, the need for meaningful human control, 
or the need for an Article 36 review, they are not necessarily suggesting that any of these steps, 
on their own, would adequately address the issues presented by autonomous weapons. Rather, 
states often presented these actions as necessary but not sufficient steps to effectively dealing 
with AWS. Additionally, this table is not intended to and does not necessarily represent a 
comprehensive, accurate list of all states’ current positions on AWS. One reason for this fact is 
that it represents states’ positions as assessed through both the 2015 and 2016 meetings; a state’s 
position could have changed between 2015 and 2016, but both the 2015 and 2016 positions 
would be listed here. Also, the table generally excludes states’ remarks outside of the written 
statements they offered at these two meetings. There are several exceptions, which are noted 
through footnotes.
320.  In this context, Austria concludes only that the technology as it currently stands is 
unlawful; though concerned about future versions also being unlawful, Austria does not 
categorically state that lawfulness would be impossible.
321.  Chile’s position on this issue is slightly ambiguous. Some of its statements clearly indicate 
that it believes that fully autonomous weapons are unlawful, but some of its other statements 
seem to suggest that those weapons should simply be regulated. (This raises the question 
whether Chile believes that AWS would become lawful if we simply regulated their use.)
322.  In this context, Germany never explicitly uses the word “unlawful.” Nevertheless, Germany 
has given strong indications that it considers the use of lethal force by fully autonomous weapon 
systems to be illegitimate. Not only does Germany explicitly state that it is “not acceptable” for 
a weapon system to have control over life and death, but Germany portrays its current stance 
as a repetition of the stance that it took in last year’s meeting. (In last year’s meeting, Germany 
stated that it considered AWS to be unlawful.)
323.  In this context, Poland indicated only that a fully autonomous weapon system would 
not be allowed, but it was very careful to indicate that it believes that such weapon systems do 
not yet exist. Therefore, Poland does not believe that any autonomous weapon systems, as they 
currently exist, are unlawful. But its Human Rights and Ethical Issues Statement does suggest 
that if a fully autonomous weapon system were to be developed in the future, it would “not 
be allowed.” (As with Germany, however, Poland does not explicitly use the word “unlawful,” 
though Poland’s statement that fully autonomous weapon systems would “not be allowed” 
seems to suggest that such systems would indeed be illegal.)
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Position: Need to regulate324
States reflecting this position: Austria, Chile, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Netherlands, Poland, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and Zambia
Position: Need to ban (or favorably disposed towards the idea)325
States reflecting this position: Algeria, Bolivia,326 Chile, Costa Rica, 
Croatia,327 Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt,328 Ghana, Mexico,329 Nicaragua,330 
324.  Scholarly debates about AWS are often framed as a choice between regulation and a ban. 
However, when states at the 2015 and 2016 CCW Informal Meeting of Experts have discussed 
regulation, it is not clear that they were implying regulation was to be preferred over a ban; 
often, those endorsing regulation seemed to be conceiving of the act as distinguished from 
doing nothing, not in contrast to a ban.
325.  The Holy See has also spoken in favor of a ban (for example, in a written statement for 
the 2015 CCW Meeting of Experts). However, as it is not a state, see Gerd Westdickenberg, 
Holy See, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (James R. Crawford, 
ed., 2006) (“The Holy See is neither a State nor only an abstract entity like an international 
organization….The international personality the Holy See enjoys as a unique entity and the 
sovereignty it exercises are different from those of other subjects of international law, be it 
States, international organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
or [other] subject[s] of international law…[Its] international legal personality can best be 
defined as being ‘sui generis’”), the Holy See has not been included in this table or any of the 
ones that follow in Appendices I and II.
326.  Bolivia did not express its desire for a ban via a written statement at the 2015 or 2016 CCW 
Meeting of Experts, but it did reportedly offer an oral statement favoring a ban at the 2015 CCW 
Meeting of Experts. See Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, Report on Activities: Convention on 
Conventional Weapons Second Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems 25 (2015), http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/KRC_
CCWx2015_Report_4June2015_uploaded.pdf (“Bolivia made a late statement—its first on the 
matter—that called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons systems, citing concerns that the 
right to life should not be delegated and doubts that international humanitarian and human 
rights law is sufficient to deal with the challenges posed”). Bolivia’s position has been included 
here to more fully represent states’ attitudes on an important issue.
327.  In 2015, Croatia did not necessarily endorse a ban on all AWS but seemed to at least 
indicate it would be favorably inclined toward efforts to ban any AWS that did not involve 
“meaningful human control;” Croatia also repeatedly indicated that the option of a ban or 
moratorium should still be on the table. See Appendices I and II for more.
328.  At the 2015 or 2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, Egypt did not express its desire for a ban 
via a written statement. It has, however, orally indicated a preference for a moratorium on the 
development of AWS until more debate has occurred. See Appendices I and II for more. Egypt’s 
position has been included here to more fully represent states’ attitudes on an important issue.
329.  At the 2015 or 2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, Mexico did not express its desire for a ban 
via a written statement. It did, however, orally indicate a preference for a ban during the 2016 
meeting. See Appendices I and II for more. Mexico’s position has been included here to more 
fully represent states’ attitudes on an important issue.
330.  At the 2015 or 2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, Nicaragua did not express its desire for a 
ban via a written statement. It did, however, orally indicate a preference for a ban during the 
2016 meeting. See Appendices I and II for more. Nicaragua’s position has been included here to 
more fully represent states’ attitudes on an important issue.
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Pakistan, Sierra Leone,331 Palestine,332 Zambia,333 and Zimbabwe334
Position: Need for meaningful human control
States reflecting this position: Argentina, Austria, Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Korea, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, South 
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe
Position: AP I Article 36 weapons review (defined below) necessary335
States reflecting this position: Australia, Austria, Canada, Cuba, 
Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sierra Leone, South Africa,336 
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Zambia
Position: Refers to legal principles while remaining undecided on per se 
legality of AWS
States reflecting this position: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Zambia
331.  Sierra Leone did not explicitly call for a ban but is seemingly against any AWS not under 
human control. See Appendices I and II for more.
332.  At the 2015 or 2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, Palestine did not express its desire for a 
ban via a written statement (it did offer a written statement for the 2015 meeting, but it is not 
available online, and no press reports cite that 2015 statement as announcing Palestine favored 
a ban). Palestine did, however, orally indicate a preference for a ban during the 2015 CCW 
meeting (not the Meeting of Experts). See Appendices I and II for more. Palestine’s position has 
been included here to more fully represent states’ attitudes on an important issue.
333.  Zambia believes a prohibition on the use of AWS should be “on the CCW agenda.” See 
Appendices I and II for more.
334.  At the 2015 or 2016 CCW Meeting of Experts, Zimbabwe did not express its desire for 
a ban via a written statement. It did, however, orally indicate a preference for a ban during the 
2016 CCW meeting (not the Meeting of Experts). See Appendices I and II for more. Zimbabwe’s 
position has been included here to more fully represent states’ attitudes on an important issue.
335.  Other states spoke about the importance of proper national review but did not necessarily 
frame it in terms of an international legal obligation or, more specifically, an obligation derived 
from Article 36 of AP I.
336.  South Africa’s position on Article 36 is somewhat ambiguous. South Africa does not 
explicitly state that an Article 36 review is necessary, nor does South Africa discuss how it 
would plan to implement it. But South Africa’s General Statement directly quotes the language 
of Article 36 when discussing compliance with international law, strongly implying that an 
Article 36 review is important or relevant to assessing the legality of AWS.
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TREATY PROVISIONS AND CUSTOMARY 
RULES NOT SPECIFIC TO AWS
Having established that a rule of customary international law specific to 
AWS has not crystallized (at least not yet),337 we turn to treaty provisions and 
customary rules that might nonetheless govern the design, development, 
or use (or a combination thereof ) of an AWS or, more generally, a war 
algorithm. The following section is not meant to be exhaustive but rather 
to highlight some of the main rules that might be implicated by AWS or 
war algorithms.
Jus ad Bellum
The jus ad bellum (also known as the jus contra bellum) is the field of public 
international law governing the threat of force or the use of force by a state 
in its international relations. Current international law establishes a general 
prohibition on such threats of force and such uses of force unless undertaken 
pursuant to a lawful exception to that prohibition. Recognized exceptions 
include an enforcement action pursuant to a mandate of the U.N. Security 
Council, an exercise of lawful self-defense conforming to the principles of 
necessity and proportionality, and lawful consent.338 
At least two concerns arise with respect to war algorithms as a matter 
of the jus ad bellum. The first is whether the determination of a breach of a 
rule of the jus ad bellum is independent of the type of weapon used.339 For 
instance, some commentators have debated the use of so-called “predecessors 
of AWS,” such as UAVs, in the context of obviating threats of terrorism as a 
matter of the jus ad bellum.340 Others find those contributions “misguided,”341 
arguing instead that “[t]he use of AWS does not render an operation illegal 
under rules of ius ad bellum.”342 
337.  This conclusion aligns with the statement in the U.S. DoD Law of War Manual that “[t]he 
law of war does not prohibit the use of autonomy in weapon systems.” Law of War Manual, 
supra note 110, at § 6.5.9; see also id. at § 6.9.5.2 (“The law of war does not specifically prohibit 
or restrict the use of autonomy to aid in the operation of weapons”). 
338.  On Security Council authorizations and self-defense, see, e.g., Oliver Dörr, Use of Force, 
Prohibition of, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶¶ 38, 40–42 
(2015).
339.  See Markus Wagner, Autonomous Weapon Systems, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law ¶ 11 (2016) (arguing that “[w]hether a breach of a rule of ius ad 
bellum has occurred is a determination that is independent from the type of weapon that has 
been used….”).
340.  Id.
341.  Id.
342.  Id.
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The second concern is whether a particular use of a war algorithm in 
relation to the use of force in international relations falls under the category 
of prohibited “force.” The most pertinent analogue might be a computer 
network attack. Oliver Dörr notes that, so far, such attacks against the 
information systems of another state have not been treated in practice under 
the principle of the non-use of force.343 However, Dörr argues, “current and 
future State practice may, in this respect, lead to a different interpretation, 
given the weapon-like destructive potential which some attacks by means of 
information technology may develop: computer network attacks intended 
to directly cause physical damage to property or injury to human beings in 
another State may reasonably be considered armed force.”344 
International Humanitarian Law
IHL is the primary field of international law governing armed conflict. It applies 
only in relation to armed conflict. Under international law, armed conflicts 
may be either international or non-international in character. IHL binds all of 
the parties to the armed conflict (whether states or non-state organized armed 
groups), as well as individuals.345 And, where applicable, the law of neutrality 
also binds neutral states or other states not party to the armed conflict.346
The discussion on AWS and war algorithms enters into a number of 
preexisting debates in IHL. Those concern such issues as the contours of civilian 
“direct participation in hostilities,”347 the geographic and temporal scope of 
armed conflict, and the relationship of IHL to international human rights 
law. The AWS discourse to date has largely revolved around IHL provisions 
concerning the conduct of hostilities, given the focus on autonomous weapon 
systems. Here we highlight the major considerations concerning AWS as 
weapons, though we note some other areas of IHL that might be relevant for 
war algorithms more broadly. 
Suppression of Acts Contrary to the Geneva Conventions
As a framework matter, states parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
have a general obligation to “undertake to respect and to ensure respect for 
the ... Convention[s] in all circumstances.”348 More broadly, each state party 
343.  See, e.g., Dörr, supra note 338, at ¶ 12.
344.  Id. (citations omitted).
345.  See, e.g., Jann Kleffner, supra note 17.
346.  See, e.g., Michael Bothe, Law of Neutrality, in The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law (Dieter Fleck ed., 3rd ed. 2013).
347.  See generally the Forum in 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l Law & Pol. 3, 637 et seq. (2010).
348.  See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3362 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
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“shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the 
provisions of the” Geneva Conventions of 1949 other than grave breaches.349 
(States are required to take certain other, more exacting measures with respect 
to grave breaches, as noted below.) 
Classification: Weapons (or Weapon Systems) or Combatants? 
An initial issue is whether under IHL the relevant AWS (however defined) 
is considered a weapon (or a weapon system) or should be classified as 
something else, such as a combatant. The bulk of states and commentators 
focus on AWS in the sense of weapons.350 But others, such as Hin-Yan Liu, 
raise the prospect that an AWS may be considered a combatant where, for 
instance, the focus is on the system’s decision-making capability. Liu adopts 
the U.S. DoD Law of War Working Group’s approach to differentiating 
between the terms “weapon” and “weapon systems.”351 The former refers to 
“all arms, munitions, materiel, instruments, mechanisms, or devices that have 
an intended effect of injuring, damaging, destroying or disabling personnel 
or property,” while the latter is more broadly conceived to include “the 
weapon itself and those components required for its operation, including 
new, advanced or emerging technologies.”352 
For Liu, “the capacity for autonomous decision-making pushes these 
technologically advanced systems to the boundary of the notion of 
‘combatant’.”353 As an indicator of the “potential for the confusion between 
means and methods of warfare and combatants,” Liu points to the German 
military manual, which provides that “combatants are persons who may 
take a direct part in hostilities, i.e., participate in the use of a weapon 
or a weapon-system in an indispensable function.”354 Liu notes that “this 
characterization was used in the context of differentiating categories of 
non-combatants who are members of the armed forces,” yet his broader 
point is that “the circularity of this definition illustrates precisely the 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3363 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3364 
[hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3365 [hereinafter GC IV]. 
349.  GC I, supra note 348, at art. 59; GC II, supra note 348, at art. 50; GC III, supra note 348, 
at art. 129; GC IV, supra note 348, at art. 146.
350.  On the conflation between weapons and “means and methods of warfare,” at least in 
the context of Article 36 AP I weapons reviews, see generally Hin-Yan Liu, Categorization and 
Legality of Autonomous and Remote Weapons Systems, 94 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 627, 636 (2012).
351.  Id. at 635.
352.  Id. (citations omitted).
353.  Id. at 636 (italics added).
354.  Id. at 637.
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difficulties associated with defining ‘weapon’ and ‘weapons system’.”355
Weapons: Reviews
As noted relatively frequently at the 2016 CCW Informal Expert Meeting on 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Article 36 of Additional Protocol I 
imposes an obligation on states parties concerning “the study, development, 
acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare.” In 
particular, states parties are obliged to determine “whether [the] employment 
[of a new weapon, means or method of warfare] would, in some or all 
circumstances, be prohibited by” AP I or by any other rule of international 
law applicable to the state party. 
With respect to AWS, Christopher Ford argues that “[t]he complexity of 
the weapons review will be a function of the sophistication of the technology, 
the geographic and temporal scope of use, and the nature of the environment 
in which the system is expected to be used.”356 He puts forward four “best 
practices” to consider in all such reviews. First, “[t]he weapons review should 
either be a multi-disciplinary process or include attorneys who have the 
technical expertise to understand the nature and results of the testing process.” 
Second, “[r]eviews should delineate the planned and normal circumstances of 
use for which the weapon was reviewed.” Third, “[t]he review should provide 
a clear delineation between expected human and system roles.” And fourth, 
“optimally, the review should occur at three points in time.” Those points 
are: “when the proposal is made to transition a weapon from research to 
development”; before the weapon is fielded; and, after fielding, “based upon 
feedback on how the weapon is functioning.” The latter “would necessitate 
the establishment of a clear feedback loop which provides information from 
the developer to the reviewer to the user, and back again.”
Weapons: Grounds for unlawfulness
Under IHL, a weapon or its use may be considered unlawful under two sets 
of circumstances.357 First, the weapon may be considered unlawful per se (in 
and of itself ), either because the weapon has been expressly prohibited in 
applicable international law or because the weapon is not capable of being 
355.  Id.
356.  Lt. Col. Christopher M. Ford, Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, Remarks 
at the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts, at 4, UN Office in Geneva (April 2016), http://www.
unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/D4FCD1D20DB21431C1257F9B0050B318/$fi
le/2016_LAWS+MX_presentations_challengestoIHL_fordnotes.pdf; see also U.K. Ministry of 
Def., supra note 113, at 5-3 (discussing factors concerning legal review and situation awareness 
of manned vs. unmanned aircraft systems).
357.  This sub-section on weapons and IHL draws extensively on William H. Boothby, 
Prohibited Weapons, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2015).
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used in a manner that comports with IHL. Second, the weapon may be 
considered unlawful based on a particular use. In relation to this factor, only 
that unlawful use of the weapon, not the weapon itself, would be illegal. 
Weapons: unlawful Per Se Due to Applicable Prohibition
A number of IHL treaties prohibit or restrict the use of certain weapons. 
The prohibitions in IHL treaties concerning specific weapons that might be 
relevant to war algorithms or AWS (or both) include: 
• Pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Laying of Automatic 
Submarine Contact Mines (1907 Hague Convention VIII),358 it is 
prohibited to lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when 
they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after 
the person who laid them ceases to control them;359 it is also prohibited 
to lay anchored automatic contact mines that do not become harmless 
as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings and to use 
torpedoes that do not become harmless when they have missed their 
mark;360 finally, it is also forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off 
the coast and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting 
commercial shipping.361
• The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile 
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977)362 prohibits, 
among other things, military or other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques if these would have widespread, long-lasting, 
or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to 
another state party.363 
• The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (1980)364 “facilitates the 
negotiation of protocols which can address particular weapons or types 
358.  Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332.
359.  Id. at art. 1.
360.  Id.
361.  Id. at art. 2.
362.  Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 15.
363.  See id. at art. 1. See also AP I, supra note 12, at arts. 35(3) and 55. 
364.  Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 
1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523 [hereinafter CCW].
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of weapon technology.”365 Under the aegis of the CCW, the following 
weapons prohibitions, among others, have been adopted:
o Pursuant to the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments 
(Protocol I, 1980),366 it is prohibited to use any weapon “the 
primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the 
human body escape detection by x-rays”;367
o Pursuant to the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other Devices (Protocol 
II, as amended, 1996),368 it is prohibited to use booby-traps in 
the form of apparently harmless portable objects specifically 
designed and constructed to contain explosive material and to 
detonate when they are disturbed or approached369 (note that 
the U.S. DoD Law of War Manual states that “to the extent 
a weapon system with autonomous functions falls within the 
definition of a ‘mine’ in the CCW Amended Mines Protocol, it 
would be regulated as such.”370); 
o Pursuant to the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III, 1980),371 it is 
prohibited to make any military objective located within a 
concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered 
incendiary weapons;372 
o Pursuant to the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons 
(Protocol IV, 1995),373 it is prohibited to employ laser-weapons 
365.  Boothby, supra note 357, at ¶ 16.
366.  Protocol [I to the Convention on Prohibitions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects] 
on Non-Detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168.
367.  Id.
368.  Protocol [II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects] on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168.
369.  Id. at art. 2-3.
370.  Law of War Manual, supra note 110, at § 6.5.9.2 (internal reference omitted).
371.  Protocol [III to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects] on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons art. 
2(2), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171.
372.  Id. at art. 2.
373.  Protocol [IV to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
HLS PILAC • AUG. 2016
69
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERTAINING TO ARMED CONFLICT
specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one 
of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to 
unenhanced vision, that is, to the naked eye or to the eye with 
corrective eyesight devices.374 
• The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction 
(1997)375 prohibits the use, development, production, acquisition, 
stockpiling, retention, or transfer of anti-personnel landmines and 
provides for their destruction.376 
• The Biological Weapons Convention (1972)377 prohibits the 
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of 
microbial or other biological agents or toxins where the types or 
quantities are such that there is no justification for prophylactic, 
protective, or other peaceful purposes.
• The Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)378 prohibits the 
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, direct 
or indirect transfer, or use of chemical weapons, preparing for their 
use or assisting, encouraging, or inducing any person to do any of 
these things.
• The Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008)379 prohibits the use, 
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and 
direct or indirect transfer of cluster munitions and forbids assistance, 
encouragement, or inducement of any of these activities.380 
As noted above, whether AWS (however defined) should be the subject of a 
preemptive prohibition remains an area of discussion and debate. As of August 
2016, 16 states have stated that there is a need for a ban on fully autonomous 
Indiscriminate Effects] on Blinding Laser Weapons art. 1, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370.
374.  Id. at art. 1.
375.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, 242.
376.  Id. at art. 1.
377.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, art. 1, Apr. 10, 1972, 
1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
378.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction art. 1, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317.
379.  Convention on Cluster Munitions art. 1, May 30, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357.
380.  Id. at art. 1.
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weapons or have made statements indicating that they are favorably disposed 
toward the idea.381
Some advocates of a preemptive ban have pointed to the development of 
the Protocol on Blinding Lasers (CCW Protocol IV) as a relevant precedent. 
However, commentators have noted a number of distinguishing factors 
between permanently-blinding lasers and AWS. The combined analyses of 
two scholars suggest that, in general, a weapons ban is more likely to be 
successful where: 
• The weapon is ineffective;
• Other means exist for accomplishing a similar military objective;
• The weapon is not novel: it is easily analogized to other weapons, and 
its usages and effects are well understood;
• The weapon or similar weapons have been previously regulated;
• The weapon is unlikely to cause social or military disruption;
• The weapon has not already been integrated into a state’s armed forces;
• The weapon causes superfluous injury or suffering in relation to 
prevailing standards of medical care;
• The weapon is inherently indiscriminate;
• The weapon is or is perceived to be sufficiently notorious to galvanize 
public concern and spur civil society activism;
• There is sufficient state commitment in enacting regulations;
• The scope of the ban is clear and narrowly tailored; or
• Violations can be identified.382 
According to one of those scholars, “[o]f these, only a single factor – 
civil society engagement – supports the likelihood of a successful ban on 
autonomous weapon systems; the others are irrelevant, inconclusive, or 
imply that autonomous weapon systems will resist regulation.”383 The extent 
381.  See supra Section 3: International Law pertaining to Armed Conflict —  Customary 
International Law concerning AWS.
382.  Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 1837 (2014); Sean Watts, Regulation-Tolerant Weapons, Regulation-Resistant Weapons 
and the Law of War, 91 Int’l L. Stud. 541 (2015).
383.  Rebecca Crootof, Why the Prohibition on Permanently Blinding Lasers is Poor Precedent 
for a Ban on Autonomous Weapon Systems, Lawfare (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.
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to which states agree or disagree with these arguments seems likely to shape 
whether states will take more concrete steps towards a preemptive ban 
concerning AWS.
Weapons: unlawful Per Se — Of a Nature to Cause Superfluous 
Injury or unnecessary Suffering
Pursuant to Article 35(2) of AP I, “[i]t is prohibited to employ weapons, 
projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering.”384 According to Bill Boothby, “[t]his is now 
a customary rule of law that binds all States in all types of armed conflict.”385 
Accordingly, to not be unlawful, a war algorithm must not be of a nature to 
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 
Weapons: unlawful Per Se — Indiscriminate by Nature 
In addition to the customary superfluous-injury principle, “[t]he second, 
equally important, customary weapons law principle holds that weapons 
that are indiscriminate by nature are prohibited.”386 The principle is derived 
in part from Article 51(4) of AP I. That provision prohibits indiscriminate 
attacks that are defined as including attacks “which employ a method or 
means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or 
… which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be 
limited” as required by AP I and which consequently are of a nature to strike 
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.387 
Thus, according to Switzerland, “in order for an AWS to be lawful under this 
rule [prohibiting indiscriminate-by-nature weapons], it must be possible to 
ensure that its operation will not result in unlawful outcomes with respect to 
the principle of distinction.”388
com/why-prohibition-permanently-blinding-lasers-poor-precedent-ban-autonomous-
weapon-systems.
384.  AP I, supra note 12, at art. 35(2) (emphasis added). See also Regulations Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(e), annexed to Hague Convention (IV) Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, T.S. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Hague 
Regulations].
385.  Boothby, supra note 357, at ¶ 10; see also, e.g., Law of War Manual, supra note 110, at 
§ 6.5.9.2 (stating that “[i]n addition, the general rules applicable to all weapons would apply to 
weapons with autonomous functions. For example, autonomous weapon systems must not be 
calculated to cause superfluous injury ….”) (internal reference omitted).
386.  Boothby, supra note 357, at ¶ 11; see also, e.g., Law of War Manual, supra note 110, at 
§ 6.5.9.2 (stating that “[i]n addition, the general rules applicable to all weapons would apply to 
weapons with autonomous functions. For example, autonomous weapon systems must not … 
be inherently indiscriminate.”) (internal reference omitted).
387.  AP I, supra note 12, at art. 51 (emphasis added).
388.  Swiss, “Compliance-Based” Approach, supra note 74, at 3. 
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Weapons: unlawful by use — Failure to Conform to Principles 
Governing Conduct of Hostilities
As noted above, where a weapon is not unlawful per se it may nonetheless be 
considered unlawful based on a particular use. In relation to this factor, only 
that unlawful use of the weapon, not the weapon itself, would be illegal. To 
avoid contravening IHL, in an armed conflict a direct attack using a weapon 
that is not unlawful per se must comport with IHL principles governing the 
conduct of hostilities. 
The three such principles most frequently cited in discussions of AWS 
are distinction, proportionality, and precautionary measures. Each of these 
principles has IHL treaty roots and customary cognates. According to 
Switzerland, the basic guidelines in relation to AWS are as follows: 
Most notably, in order to lawfully use an AWS for the purpose of 
attack, belligerents must: (1 - Distinction) distinguish between military 
objectives and civilians or civilian objects and, in case of doubt, presume 
civilian status; (2 - Proportionality) evaluate whether the incidental harm 
likely to be inflicted on the civilian population or civilian objects would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated from that particular attack; (3 - Precaution) take all feasible 
precautions to avoid, and in any event minimize, incidental harm to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects; and cancel or suspend the 
attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not a military objective, or 
that the attack may be expected to result in excessive incidental harm.389
With respect to the principle of proportionality and AWS, the U.S. DoD Law 
of War Manual states that “in the situation in which a person is using a weapon 
that selects and engages targets autonomously, that person must refrain from 
using that weapon where it is expected to result in incidental harm that is 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected 
to be gained.”390
Regarding precautions in attack, the wording of Article 57(2) of AP 
I raises the question of whether some of the precautionary-measures 
obligations laid down therein may be carried out, as a matter of treaty law, 
only by humans (compared with other obligations therein, which are reposed 
in the party to the armed conflict). Consider how Article 57(2)(a) of AP I lays 
down obligations of “those who plan or decide upon an attack.”391 But Article 
57(2)(b)–(c) of AP I frames the obligations, respectively, as “an attack shall be 
389.  Id. 
390.  Law of War Manual, supra note 110, at § 6.5.9.3 (internal reference omitted).
391.  AP I, supra note 12, art. 57(2)(a).
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cancelled or suspended”392 and “effective advance warning shall be given.”393
For their part, the authors of the U.S. DoD Law of War Manual 
emphasize their view that “[t]he law of war rules on conducting attacks 
(such as the rules relating to discrimination and proportionality) impose 
obligations on persons. These rules do not impose obligations on the 
weapons themselves; of course, an inanimate object could not assume an 
‘obligation’ in any event.”394 According to this view, “the obligation on the 
person using the weapon to take feasible precautions in order to reduce 
the risk of civilian casualties may be more significant when the person 
uses weapon systems with more sophisticated autonomous functions.”395 
As an example, the Manual authors state that “such feasible precautions 
a person is obligated to take may include monitoring the operation of the 
weapon system or programming or building mechanisms for the weapon to 
deactivate automatically after a certain period of time.”396
The UK MoD Joint Doctrine Note on unmanned aircraft systems 
discusses the obligations laid down in Additional Protocol I on the 
constant care that must be “taken in the conduct of military operations 
to spare civilians and civilian objects. This means that any system, before 
an attack is made, must verify that targets are military entities, take all 
feasible precautions to minimise civilian losses and ensure that attacks 
do not cause disproportionate incidental losses.”397 The Joint Doctrine 
Note authors state that “[f ]or automated systems, operating in anything 
other than the simplest of scenarios, this process will provide a severe 
technological challenge for some years to come.”398 
While not focusing on AWS in particular, the UK MoD Joint Doctrine 
Note also addresses a situation where “a mission may require an unmanned 
aircraft to carry out surveillance or monitoring of a given area, looking for 
a particular target type, before reporting contacts to a supervisor when 
found.”399 According to the Joint Doctrine Note authors, “[a] human-
authorised subsequent attack would be no different to that by a manned 
aircraft and would be fully compliant with the LOAC [law of armed conflict], 
provided the human believed that, based on the information available, the 
392.  Id. at art. 57(2)(b).
393.  Id. at art. 57(2)(c).
394.  Law of War Manual, supra note 110, at § 6.5.9.3 (italics added). 
395.  Id.
396.  Id. 
397.  U.K. Ministry of Def., supra note 113, at 5-2.
398.  Id. 
399.  Id. at 5-4.
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attack met LOAC requirements and extant ROE [rules of engagement].”400 
The Joint Doctrine Note authors elaborate this line of reasoning, noting 
that, “[f ]rom this position, it would be only a small technical step to enable 
an unmanned aircraft to fire a weapon based solely on its own sensors, or 
shared information, and without recourse to higher, human authority.”401 This 
would be entirely legal, the Joint Doctrine Note concludes, “[p]rovided it 
could be shown that the controlling system appropriately assessed the LOAC 
principles (military necessity; humanity; distinction and proportionality) 
and that ROE were satisfied….”402 Yet the authors highlight a number of 
additional factors to consider: 
In practice, such operations would present a considerable technological 
challenge and the software testing and certification for such a system 
would be extremely expensive as well as time consuming. Meeting the 
requirement for proportionality and distinction would be particularly 
problematic, as both of these areas are likely to contain elements of 
ambiguity requiring sophisticated judgement. Such problems are 
particularly difficult for a machine to solve and would likely require 
some form of artificial intelligence to be successful.403
Finally in this connection, the Joint Doctrine Note notes that “the MOD 
currently has no intention to develop systems that operate without human 
intervention in the weapon command and control chain, but it is looking 
to increase levels of automation where this will make systems more 
effective.”404
According to the U.S. DoD Law of War Manual, “in many cases, the use 
of autonomy could enhance the way law of war principles are implemented 
in military operations. For example, some munitions have homing functions 
that enable the user to strike military objectives with greater discrimination 
and less risk of incidental harm.”405 The Manual authors also note that “some 
munitions have mechanisms to self-deactivate or to self-destruct, which 
helps reduce the risk they may pose generally to the civilian population or 
after the munitions have served their military purpose.”406
In a similar connection, the UK MoD Joint Doctrine Note on unmanned 
aircraft systems states that “[s]ome fully automated weapon systems have 
400.  Id.
401.  Id.
402.  Id.
403.  Id.
404.  Id.
405.  Law of War Manual, supra note 110, at § 6.5.9.2. 
406.  Id. (internal reference omitted). 
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already entered service, following legal review, and contributing factors – 
such as required timeliness of response – can make compliance with LOAC 
easier to demonstrate.”407 The authors give an example of “the Phalanx and 
Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) systems that are already 
employed in Afghanistan,” arguing that “it can be clearly shown that there 
is insufficient time for a human initiated response to counter incoming 
fire.”408 According to this view, “[t]he potential damage caused by not 
using C-RAM in its automatic mode justifies the level of any anticipated 
collateral damage.”409
Other potentially relevant conduct-of-hostilities considerations 
raised in relation to AWS include principles concerning prohibitions on 
the denial of quarter and on the protection of persons hors de combat (such 
as the wounded and sick hors de combat). For instance, in relation to denial 
of quarter, in the view of Switzerland, “[a]ny reliance on AWS would need 
to preserve a reasonable possibility for adversaries to surrender. A general 
denial of this possibility would violate the prohibition of ordering that 
there shall be no survivors or of conducting hostilities on this basis (denial 
of quarter).”410
Stepping back, we see that, where a war algorithm is capable of being 
used in relation to the conduct of hostilities in connection with an armed 
conflict, that possible use is already regulated by a number of IHL rules 
and principles. Few states, however, have offered detailed views on what 
implications may arise for such uses of war algorithms. 
Other Functions in relation to Armed Conflict
IHL governs far more than just weapons and the conduct of hostilities. As the 
primary normative framework regulating armed conflict, IHL also lays down 
rules concerning such activities as capture, detention, and transfer of enemies; 
medical care to the wounded and sick hors de combat; and humanitarian 
access and assistance to civilian populations in need. Switzerland has noted, 
for instance, that it is conceivable that AWS “could be used to perform 
other tasks governed by IHL, such as the guarding and transport of persons 
deprived of their liberty or tasks related to crowd control and public security 
in occupied territories.”411
407.  U.K. Ministry of Def., supra note 113, at 5-2.
408.  Id.
409.  Id.
410.  Swiss, “Compliance-Based” Approach, supra note 74, at 3 (citation omitted).
411.  Id. (citation omitted) (noting that “[a]dditional specific rules need to be taken into 
consideration if AWS were to be relied for such activities”).
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Martens Clause
With respect to AWS, the IHL “Martens clause” would, according to 
Switzerland, afford “an important fallback protection in as much as the 
‘laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience’ need to 
be referred to if IHL is not sufficiently precise or rigorous.”412 Pursuant to 
this line of reasoning, “not everything that is not explicitly prohibited can 
be said to be legal if it would run counter [to] the principles put forward in 
the Martens clause. Indeed, the Martens clause may be said to imply positive 
obligations where contemplated military action would result in untenable 
humanitarian consequences.”413 
Seizure of Private Property Susceptible of Direct Military use
In a situation of belligerent occupation (a type of international armed conflict), 
the Occupying Power may seize, among other things, “all kinds of munitions 
of war … even if they belong to private persons.”414 Items so seized “must be 
restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.”415 With respect to AWS, 
this provision may implicate, for example, the private property—including 
the software and hardware components involved in developing AWS—of 
individuals or commercial entities subject to a belligerent occupation.416
International Criminal Law
International criminal law (ICL) is a framework through which individual 
responsibility arises for international crimes. Under certain circumstances, 
the design, development, or use (or a combination thereof ) of a war 
algorithm may form part of the conduct underlying an international 
crime. Recognized categories of international crimes include war crimes, 
412.  See, e.g., id. at 4 (citing to CCW, supra note 364, at preamble and AP I, supra note 12, at 
art. 1(2), and noting that “[i]n its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice held that the clause ‘proved to be an 
effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology’ (§78)”).
413.  Id. at 3 (citing respectively, to AP I, supra note 12, at art. 57(2)(a) and to GCs I–IV, supra 
note 348, at arts. 49, 50, 129, 146 (respectively); AP I, supra note 12, at Section III.
414.  1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 384, at art. 53(2).
415.  Id.
416.  According to the U.S. DoD Law of War Manual, “[p]rivate property susceptible of 
direct military use includes cables, telephone and telegraph facilities, radio, television, 
telecommunications and computer networks and equipment, motor vehicles, railways, railway 
plants, port facilities, ships in port, barges and other watercraft, airfields, aircraft, depots of 
arms (whether military or sporting), documents connected with the conflict, all varieties of 
military equipment (including that in the hands of manufacturers), component parts of, or 
material suitable only for use in, the foregoing, and, in general, all kinds of war material.” Law 
of War Manual, supra note 110, at § 11.18.6.2, citing to U.S. Dep’t of the Army, The Law of 
Land Warfare, 1956 FM 27-10 ¶410a (Change No. 1 1976).
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genocide, and crimes against humanity. Each international crime is made 
up of a prohibited act or acts (the actus reus or actus reī) and the prohibited 
mental state (the mens rea). War crimes may arise only in relation to armed 
conflict. Genocide and crimes against humanity may arise outside of 
situations of armed conflict (though they often do in fact arise in relation to 
armed conflict). Here, we focus on the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC),417 though we note that other ICL rules—those derived from 
applicable treaties or customary international law—also may be relevant. 
Various states and commentators disagree on whether ICL, especially 
in relation to war crimes, sufficiently addresses the design, development, 
and use of AWS. The discussion is hampered by lack of agreement on 
the definition of AWS, on the technological capabilities of AWS, and 
on the nature of the relationship between the various actors involved in 
the development and operation of AWS. These disagreements implicate 
underlying legal concepts of attribution, control, foreseeability, and 
reconstructability.
Much of the debate on AWS in relation to ICL revolves around 
modes of responsibility for international crimes and the mental element 
of international crimes.418 Those arguing that ICL is sufficient to address 
AWS concerns typically emphasize that, ultimately, a single person—often, 
the commander or superior—may and should be held responsible where, 
in connection with an armed conflict, the design, development, or use of 
an AWS gives rise to an international crime.419 Those arguing that ICL may 
not be sufficient typically emphasize that the ICL modes of command and 
superior responsibility are predicated on relationships between humans, 
not on relationships between humans and machines or constructed systems. 
(The ICC Statute establishes jurisdiction for individual responsibility only 
over natural persons, thereby excluding legal entities such as corporations.) 
They also note that it might not be possible, due to a lack of a temporal 
nexus to an armed conflict, to prosecute a developer who, before the war 
began, coded an AWS to function in a way that later gives rise to a war 
crime.420 Critics also argue that due to the distributed nature of technical 
and physical control over an operation involving an AWS, it may not be 
possible to establish the relevant intent and knowledge of a particular 
perpetrator. Or, they assert, even if it is possible to establish the mental 
417.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter ICC Statute].
418.  Id. at arts. 25(3) and 28.
419.  See, e.g., Dutch Government, Response to AIV/CAVV Report, supra note 22.
420.  See Tim McFarland & Tim McCormack, Mind the Gap: Can Developers of Autonomous 
Weapons Systems Be Liable for War Crimes?, 90 Int’l L. Stud. 361 (2014).
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element, a perpetrator may argue to exclude criminal responsibility due to 
a mistake of fact, given how complex the operation of an AWS may be. 
Arms-Transfer Law
The Arms Trade Treaty of 2013 (ATT)421 may implicate war algorithms that 
form part of the conventional arms and certain other items covered by that 
instrument. It may do so not only with respect to exporting and importing 
states parties but also in connection with trans-shipment states parties. 
The ATT regulates certain activities of the international trade in arms—
in particular, “export, import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering,” all of 
which fall under the umbrella term of “transfer.”422 Many of the arms and 
related items covered by the treaty already use war algorithms. In relation 
to states parties, the treaty applies in respect of all conventional arms within 
eight categories: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery 
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile 
launchers, and small arms and light weapons.423 The ATT also regulates the 
export of “ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by”424 such 
conventional weapons, as well as of “parts and components where the export is 
in a form that provides the capability to assemble the [relevant] conventional 
arms.”425 (The ATT expressly does “not apply to the international movement 
of conventional arms by, or on behalf of, a State Party for its use provided that 
the conventional arms remain under that State Party’s ownership.”426)
As part of the regulatory system established by the ATT, a state party 
is prohibited from authorizing any transfer of conventional arms or other 
covered items in three situations. First, the state party may not authorize such 
a transfer if it “would violate its obligations under measures adopted by the 
United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, in particular arms embargoes.”427 Second, an authorization is 
prohibited if the transfer “would violate its relevant international obligations 
under international agreements to which it is a Party, in particular those 
relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.”428 And 
third, an authorization is prohibited if the state party “has knowledge at the 
421.  Arms Trade Treaty, Apr. 2, 2013, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/234B [hereinafter ATT].
422.  Id., at art. 2(2).
423.  Id. at art. 1.
424.  Id. at art. 3.
425.  Id. at art. 4.
426.  Id at art. 2(3).
427.  Id. at art. 6(a).
428.  Id. at art. 6(b).
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time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission 
of … grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed 
against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as 
defined by international agreements to which it is a Party.”429
Even if the export is not prohibited under one of those stipulations, 
the ATT imposes an obligation not to authorize the export where the state 
party determines “that there is an overriding risk of any of the negative 
consequences” identified in a provision of the treaty.430 Those consequences 
include the potential that the conventional arms or other covered items:
(a) would contribute to or undermine peace and security;
(b) could be used to:
(i) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law;
(ii) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human 
rights law;
(iii) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under 
international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism to which 
the exporting State is a Party; or 
(iv) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international 
conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to 
which the exporting State is a Party.431
Also, pursuant to the ATT, each export state party “shall make available 
appropriate information about the authorization in question, upon request, to 
the importing State Party and to the transit or trans-shipment States Parties, 
subject to its national laws, practices or policies.”432 Finally, each state party 
“involved in the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) [of 
the ATT] shall take measures to prevent their diversion.”433
The upshot is that, under the ATT, a detailed and somewhat expansive 
regime exists to regulate the transfer of war algorithms where those algorithms 
form part of certain conventional weapons and related items.
International Human Rights Law
While IHL traces its roots to the regulation of interstate wars, international 
human rights law (IHRL) arose out of an attempt to regulate, as a matter of 
429.  Id. at art. 6(c).
430.  Id. at art. 7(3).
431.  Id. at art. 7(1).
432.  Id. at art. 7(6).
433.  Id. at art. 11(1).
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international law and policy, the relationship between the state—through its 
governmental authority—and its population. Unlike the relatively narrow 
war-related field of IHL, IHRL spans a seemingly ever-growing range of 
dealings an individual, community, or nation may have with the state.
In recent decades, the connection between IHL and IHRL has been 
the subject of increased jurisprudential treatment and interpretation by 
states. The precise links between the two branches of public international 
law have also merited extensive academic commentary. The debate on 
this relationship is largely over three issues. First, whether IHRL applies 
extraterritorially such that states bring all, some, or none of their obligations 
with them when they fight wars under IHL outside of their territories. 
Second, whether organized armed groups have IHRL obligations (or, 
at least, responsibilities). And third, what is the apposite interpretive 
procedure or principle to use when discerning the content of a particular 
right under the relevant framework(s). 
With these considerations in mind, IHRL may impose substantive 
obligations on a state party to an armed conflict concerning the design, 
development, or use of a war algorithm. These obligations may range, 
for instance, from violations of the right to privacy to the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of life. That is, of course, not an exhaustive list, but 
it demonstrates the wide array of rights under IHRL that a war algorithm 
might implicate. IHRL might also implicate state obligations in relation to 
the design, development, and use of war algorithms during times of peace. 
Law of the Sea
As illustrated in section 2, many of the existing weapon systems with 
autonomous functions operate in the sea.434 A number of provisions of 
the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),435 “many 
of which are recognised as stating customary international law, … apply 
to ships with mounted autonomous weapon systems and possibly to 
independent seafaring autonomous weapon systems.”436 Among these are 
the UNCLOS articles outlining “state obligations to protect and preserve 
434.  The vast majority of scholars and states addressing AWS in relation to international law 
focus only on IHL and ICL; Rebecca Crootof has provided one of the most expansive analyses of 
various fields of public international law that might be implicated by AWS. Rebecca Crootof, The 
Varied Law of Autonomous Weapon Systems, in NATO Allied Command Transformation, 
Autonomous Systems: Issues for Defence Policy Makers 98, 109 (Andrew P. Williams 
& Paul D. Scharre eds., 2015) [hereinafter Crootof, Varied]. With respect to the law of the sea, 
space law, and international telecommunications law, we draw in part on her analysis.
435.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
436.  Crootof, Varied, supra note 434, at 109 (citation omitted). 
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both the marine environment generally and specific areas, such as the 
seabed and ocean floor,”437 as well as the general prohibition on the threat 
of force or the use of force.438 Furthermore, “[i]n addition to providing 
that the high seas ‘shall be reserved for peaceful purposes’, UNCLOS 
sets forth a number of prohibitions applicable to ships equipped with 
autonomous weapon systems that wish to exercise rights to innocent and 
transit passage.”439 Finally, “[w]hile automated and autonomous weapon 
systems have long been used on warships, future autonomous weapon 
systems may themselves be warships.” Accordingly, “[s]hould they be 
granted warship status, such systems would gain certain rights and 
associated obligations.”440
Space Law
Guidance concerning the design, use, and liability of war algorithms 
in outer space in relation to armed conflict may be found in the 1967 
Outer Space Treaty,441 other space-law treaties, and various U.N. General 
Assembly declarations.442 Yet “aside from a few plain prohibitions,” “the 
‘ceiling’ of space law regulation is sky high  … it allows for a wide range 
of potential extraterrestrial autonomous weapon systems”443 and of war 
algorithms more broadly. 
One such prohibition—laid down in the Outer Space Treaty, which may 
be binding as a codification of international law444—is on the use of space 
for destructive purposes. In particular, states parties to the Outer Space 
Treaty “undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying 
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install 
such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space 
in any other manner.”445 Among the other issues raised in this context 
include jurisdiction, control over objects launched into space, international 
responsibility for activities in space, and international liability for damage 
437.  Id. (citing to UNCLOS, supra note 435, at art. 192–196). 
438.  Id. (citing to UNCLOS, supra note 435, at art. 301) 
439.  Id. at 110 (citing to UNCLOS, supra note 435, at art. 88).
440.  Id. (referring to the definition of “warship” in UNCLOS, supra note 435, at art. 29). Id. 
at 110 n.41.
441.  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter OST].
442.  Crootof, Varied, supra note 434, at 111.
443.  Id.
444.  Id. (citation omitted).
445.  OST, supra note 441, at art. IV.
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caused by space-based objects.446
International Telecommunications Law
Constructed systems that use the electromagnetic spectrum or 
international telecommunications networks in effectuating war algorithms 
may be governed in part by telecommunications law. That law is regulated 
primarily by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).447 
Scholars have already raised AWS in relation to telecommunications law,448 
including with respect to obligations to legislate against certain “harmful 
interference,” preserving the secrecy of international correspondence and 
military radio installations, as well as exceptions concerning certain uses 
of military installations.449 
446.  Crootof, Varied, supra note 434, at 112 (citations omitted). 
447.  See Dietrich Westphal, International Telecommunication Union, in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2014).
448.  Crootof, Varied, supra note 434, at 113–114. 
449.  Id. at 114 (citation omitted).
4
ACCOUNTABILITY 
AXES
In this section, we outline three accountability axes that might be relevant to 
regulating war algorithms. We do not claim to be exhaustive but rather aim to 
provide examples of key accountability avenues. We adapt an accountability 
approach focusing on the regulation of war algorithms along three axes: state 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, individual responsibility 
under international law for international crimes, and a wider notion of 
scrutiny governance.450 
Below, for each axis, we highlight existing and possible accountability 
actors, forums, and mechanisms. Some of these axes utilize existing formal 
legal regimes; others depend more on “soft law” or less formal codes, standards, 
guidelines, and the like. Regulation may arise, for instance, through direct or 
intermediary modes, as well as by setting rules to allocate risk and by defining 
rules of private interaction.451 As noted above, we focus on international law 
in part because it is the only normative framework that purports, in key 
respects but with important caveats, to be universal and uniform.
STATE RESPONSIBILITY
Along this axis, accountability is a matter of state responsibility arising out 
of acts or omissions involving a war algorithm where those acts or omissions 
constitute a breach of a rule of international law. State responsibility entails 
450.  Derived in part from International Law Association, supra note 35, at 5.
451.  See Wittes & Blum, supra note 31, at 203–206.
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discerning the content of the rule, assigning attribution to a state, determining 
available excuses (if any), and imposing measures of remedy.
MEASURES OF REMEDY
A range of consequences may arise where a war algorithm involved in an 
internationally wrongful act, not otherwise excused, is attributable to a state. 
In this sub-section, we highlight a main form of liability: war reparations. 
But we also note some of the other existing mechanisms and avenues through 
which state responsibility may be pursued, such as diplomatic channels, 
arbitration, judicial proceedings, weapons-control regimes, and an IHL fact-
finding body. 
War Reparations to a State
As noted above, in general a consequence of state responsibility is the liability 
to make reparation. War reparations constitute one such form of liability. 
They “involve the transfer of legal rights, goods, property and, typically, 
money from one State to another in response to the injury caused by the use 
of armed force.”452 Historical practice favors, “[i]n the specific case of war 
reparations, … the use of restitution, monetary compensation, territorial 
guarantees, guarantees of non-repetition, and symbolic reparations.”453 
The Hague Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land (1907) and Additional Protocol I “establish an inter-State duty 
to pay compensation when a belligerent party violates the provisions of 
the Convention and ... Protocol I.”454 Thus, with respect to who can claim 
reparations, “a State’s duty to provide inter-State reparations after the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act is certain.”455
As a practical matter, war reparations are still the exception rather 
than the norm. When they do occur, the most common form of reparations, 
according to an assessment of practice up to 1995, was a lump sum at the 
end of the war.456 Nonetheless, pursuant to Security Council resolutions the 
United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) was established to 
address damages incurred in the course of the Iraq-Kuwait War (1990–91).457 
452.  Sullo & Wyatt, supra note 297, at ¶ 1.
453.  Id. at ¶ 4.
454.  Id. at ¶ 5 (referring to art. 3 Hague Peace Conferences [1899 and 1907]) and art. 91 AP I).
455.  Id. at ¶ 4.
456.  Id. (“Based on the analysis of practice until 1995, Lillich, Weston, and Bederman 
concluded that the settlement of international claims by lump sum agreements was by far the 
prevailing practice and the creation of arbitral tribunals such as the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal the exception.”). 
457.  Id. at ¶ 5.
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And the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia established a commission to 
deal with reparations claims concerning an armed conflict between those 
two states.458
Where a state party does not fulfill the obligation concerning 
suppression of acts contrary to the Geneva Conventions, another state 
party may also, for instance, pursue diplomatic channels to encourage 
the non-complying state to fulfill the obligation. That other state party 
may, where available, also pursue arbitration (if the transgressing state 
agrees) or institute judicial proceedings (if a relevant tribunal can assert 
its jurisdiction over the transgressing state).
Weapons Monitoring, Inspection, and  
Verification Regimes
Weapons regimes may establish consequences for certain violations. 
Arms-control instruments range, in general, “from mere reporting duties 
and routine inspections (monitoring) to more invasive ad hoc inspections, 
sometimes so-called ‘challenge inspections’ at the request of a Member 
State (verification), up to compulsive methods in case of a determined 
breach (enforcement).”459 Two of the main challenges of effective arms-
control law are weak verification and limited enforcement mechanisms. 
As noted above, the Arms Trade Treaty—which might cover various 
war algorithms—lays down a regulatory framework concerning the 
transfer of certain conventional weapons and related items. Through 
activities such as reporting and inspections, the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) supervises the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. That treaty also provides for a challenge inspection 
procedure, “which is considered one of the most extensive verification 
procedures in the law of arms control, but has never been used, mainly due 
to political constraints.”460 In comparison, the supervisory mechanism of 
the Biological Weapons Convention is weaker, consisting mainly of review 
conferences every five years.
International Fact-Finding Commission
Where certain rules of IHL are breached, the International Fact-Finding 
Commission (IFFC) established in Additional Protocol I may help provide 
458.  Id. (citing to Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the 
Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, U.N. Doc. A/55/686-S/2000/1183 
Annex).
459.  Adrian Loets, Arms Control, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law ¶ 21 (2013).
460.  Id. at ¶ 23 (citation omitted).
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measures of remedy. With respect to states parties to that treaty, the 
IFFC is competent, first, to enquire into any facts alleged to be a grave 
breach in or other serious violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and Additional Protocol I.461 Second, the IFFC is competent to “facilitate, 
through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude of respect for” the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I.462 Where relevant, 
the design, development, or use of a war algorithm might implicate either or 
both of these competences. However, as practical matter, it bears emphasis 
that the IFFC has never been utilized for either competence.
OTHER AVENUES
Certain other state accountability avenues may arise even where the design, 
development, or use of a war algorithm attributable to a state does not 
constitute an internationally wrongful act. Two such measures to consider 
are reparations to an individual pursuant to international human rights law, 
and a highly contentious form of domestic tort liability.
Reparations to an Individual
As noted above, it is clear that a state may be provided reparations after 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act, including an applicable 
violation of IHL. Yet it is far less clear whether an individual right to 
reparation for victims of gross human rights violations has crystallized.463 
The U.N. General Assembly has adopted a resolution on the matter.464 
But that resolution has been characterized as falling into a category often 
referred to as “soft law”: while “[t]hese documents do not have the formal 
status of legally binding instruments such as treaties, … they nonetheless 
reflect principles of justice and serve as tools for victim-oriented policies 
and practices at national and international levels.”465
Nonetheless, to the extent it is applicable in relation to the design, 
development, or use of a war algorithm, IHRL may provide grounds for an 
461.  AP I, supra note 12, at art. 90(2)(c)(i).
462.  Id. at art. 90(2)(c)(ii).
463.  See Sullo & Wyatt, supra note 297, at ¶ 4; see generally Christian Tomuschat, State 
Responsibility and the Individual Right to Compensation Before National Courts, in The Oxford 
Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & 
Tom Haeck eds., 2014).
464.  Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, adopted by UNGA Resolution 60/147, Dec. 16, 2005. 
465.  Theo van Boven, Victims’ Rights, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law ¶ 19 (2007).
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individual to seek redress and reparation. The relevant violation would not be 
an internationally wrongful act vis-à-vis another state (or states) but rather 
a violation of an applicable provision of IHRL vis-à-vis an individual. For 
instance, “[t]he case-law developed in the jurisprudence of the [European 
Court of Human Rights] and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
… demonstrates an increasing readiness of these international (regional) 
adjudicative bodies to afford substantial reparative justice to victims, in 
particular in cases of gross violations of human rights.”466
Tortious Liability
Another state accountability avenue might arise in relation to a highly 
disputed form of tortious liability:467 pecuniary compensation under 
domestic tort law for death or injury to the person, or damage to or loss 
of tangible property, caused by an act or omission which is alleged to be 
attributable under domestic law to a state other than the forum state and 
which involved a war algorithm. That compensation may be available only 
so long as the act or omission occurred in whole or in part in the territory 
of the forum state and so long as the author of the act or omission was 
present in the forum-state territory at the time of the act or omission.468 
This notion of tortious liability requires discerning the content 
of applicable domestic law (including the relevant standard of care), 
attributing responsibility for the resulting harm to a state other than the 
forum state, confirming the presence of the author of the act in the forum 
state, determining the availability of immunity claims (if any), and imposing 
pecuniary compensation. This contested form of liability is derived from a 
purported “territorial tort” restriction to the applicability of state immunity 
found in the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
466.  Id. at ¶¶ 10–13.
467.  Compare, e.g., Joanne Foakes & Roger O’Keefe, Article 12, in The United Nations 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property: A 
Commentary 209, 209–224 (Roger O’Keefe, Christian J. Tams & Antonios Tzanakopoulos 
eds., 2013) with Tomuschat, supra note 463. As noted above, another form of pecuniary 
compensation—though one not framed in terms of tortious liability—may arise under IHRL.
468.  Another form of tortious liability—one that, in principle, establishes jurisdiction for 
serious violations of IHL to national courts in accordance with the principle of universal 
jurisdiction—may be relevant, though perhaps more in theory than in practice, at least under 
current interpretations. See, e.g., Tomuschat, supra note 463. Under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA), federal judges “shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). Actions have been filed under the ATCA against foreign governments and 
foreign corporations, as well as against the U.S. government. Yet recent judicial interpretations 
have narrowed the statute’s scope of application. See, e.g., Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 601 (2013).  
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of States and Their Property (UNCSI), which is not yet in force, and its 
customary analogue (if any).469
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
As noted in section 3, a natural person may be held responsible under 
international law for committing an international crime connected 
with a war algorithm, including certain war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. To impose that liability, the judicial body would need to be able 
to understand the underlying war algorithm so as to adjudicate the legal 
parameters applicable in relation to it. Also as noted above, commentators 
have raised a number of concerns as to whether international law concerning 
individual responsibility for international crimes is suitable to address 
AWS, especially in relation to certain modes of responsibility, such as 
command and superior responsibility, and to mental elements (especially 
the requisite knowledge and intent). 
This axis describes international and domestic avenues through which 
an individual may be held responsible for committing an international crime. 
We also briefly highlight another avenue —extraterritorial jurisdiction not 
in respect of internationally defined crimes—through which an individual 
may be held responsible in relation to the design, development, or use of a 
war algorithm.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
International Criminal Tribunals
As noted in section 3, where it has jurisdiction, an international criminal 
court or tribunal may impose individual responsibility for the commission of 
469.  See generally Foakes & O’Keefe, supra note 467. The form of pecuniary compensation 
here, which is based on a municipal tort law of the forum state, is distinguishable from the 
innovative “war tort” idea articulated by Rebecca Crootof, which is based on serious violations 
of IHL; however, the two might interface where a municipal tort is linked to a serious violation 
of IHL. See Crootof, War Torts, supra note 20, at 2. Crootof argues that “just as the Industrial 
Revolution fostered the development of modern tort law, autonomous weapon systems 
highlight the need for ‘war torts’: serious violations of international humanitarian law that 
give rise to state responsibility.” Id. She believes that a “successful ban on autonomous weapon 
systems is unlikely (and possibly even detrimental).” Id. Instead, in her view, “what is needed 
is a complementary legal regime that holds states accountable for the injurious wrongs that 
are the side effects of employing these uniquely effective but inherently unpredictable and 
dangerous weapons.” Id. 
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international crimes. The ICC—which operates pursuant to the principle of 
complementarity to national jurisdictions—is the first such court established 
on a permanent basis. Numerous war crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction 
may in principle be committed through the design, development, or use of 
war algorithms.  
Suppression of Grave Breaches
Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, states parties are obliged “to enact 
any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons 
committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the” 
relevant instrument.470 In principle, a war algorithm may be involved in 
the commission of such a breach. Each state party is obliged “to search for 
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such 
grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, 
before its own courts.”471 And each state party “may also, if it prefers, and 
in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons 
over for trial to another” state party, so long as that party has “made out a 
prima facie case.”472 
Universal Jurisdiction
While “[s]tates generally do not have jurisdiction to define and punish crimes 
committed abroad by and against foreign nationals,” pursuant to universal 
jurisdiction “any State has the right to try a person with regard to certain 
internationally defined crimes.”473 Originally, this “jurisdiction was recognized 
only with respect to piracy on the high seas.”474 But “[a]s the human rights 
content of international law expanded, universal adjudicative jurisdiction also 
expanded to embrace universally condemned crimes and may now apply to 
slavery, genocide, torture, and war crimes.”475 Such “[u]niversal jurisdiction to 
try these offences is not limited to situations in which they are committed on 
the high seas or in other areas outside the territory of any State, but generally 
confers no enforcement power to enter foreign territory or board a foreign 
470.  GC I, supra note 348, at art. 49; GC II, supra note 348, at art. 50; GC III, supra note 348, 
at art. 129; GC IV, supra note 348, at art. 146. See also AP I, supra note 12, at art. 85.
471.  GC I, supra note 348, at art. 49; GC II, supra note 348, at art. 50; GC III, supra note 348, 
at art. 129; GC IV, supra note 348, at art. 146. See also AP I, supra note 12, at art. 85.
472.  GC I, supra note 348, at art. 49; GC II, supra note 348, at art. 50; GC III, supra note 348, 
at art. 129; GC IV, supra note 348, at art. 146. See also AP I, supra note 12, at art. 85.
473.  Bernard H. Oxman, Jurisdiction of States, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law ¶ 37 (2007).
474.  Id. at ¶ 38.
475.  Id. at ¶ 39.
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ship without consent.”476 Nonetheless, “[a]lthough the laws of each State define 
the offences over which its courts may exercise universal jurisdiction, the 
scope of legislative jurisdiction is limited by the fact that the offences subject 
to universal jurisdiction are determined by treaty and international law.”477 
As a practical matter, to date the exercise of domestic universal jurisdiction 
has arguably been the strongest form (even if not very strong over all) of 
enforcement of accountability for war crimes.
OTHER AVENUES
Certain other individual accountability avenues might arise even where 
the design, development, or use of a war algorithm attributable to a natural 
person does not give rise to individual responsibility under international law 
for an international crime. One such avenue to consider is extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, which more and more states are turning to in order to protect 
their perceived interests.
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Extraterritorial jurisdiction refers “to the competence of a State to make, apply 
and enforce rules of conduct in respect of persons, property or events beyond 
its territory.”478 Traditionally, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was 
viewed as available only in exceptional circumstances.479 But today, more and 
more states are creating such regimes. 
The background idea is that, with respect to conduct occurring beyond 
a state’s territory, the state perceives the need to protect not only its own 
interests but also the interests of international society.480 States have perceived 
those interests in such areas as anti-trust and competition law, anti-terrorism 
law, and anti-bribery law. 
Certain characteristics of war algorithms—including that some of the 
underlying technologies are developed by transnational corporations and the 
modularity of the technology—might lead states to perceive strong interests 
in making, applying, and enforcing war-algorithm rules of conduct beyond 
their territories. Where states do so, it may be important to be attentive to the 
distinctions between the different ways that states may exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. That is because some of those methods “are more likely to 
476.  Id.
477.  Id.
478. Menno T. Kamminga, Extraterritoriality, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law ¶ 1 (2012).
479. See id. at ¶ 3.
480. See id. at ¶ 4.
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conflict with the competence of other States and therefore more likely to raise 
questions as to their compatibility with international law.”481 
SCRUTINY GOVERNANCE 
Along this axis, accountability is framed in terms of the extent to which a 
person or entity is and should be subject to, or should exercise, forms of 
internal or external scrutiny, monitoring, or regulation concerning a war 
algorithm.482 Notably, scrutiny governance does not hinge on—but might 
implicate—potential and subsequent liability or responsibility.483 The basic 
notion is that there are a number of avenues—other than or alongside of legal 
responsibility—to hold oneself or others answerable for the exercise of war-
algorithm power and authority. We highlight only a few of the various possible 
approaches: independent monitoring, norm (including legal) development, 
non-binding resolutions and codes of conduct, normative design of technical 
architectures, and community self-regulation.
INDEPENDENT MONITORING
A vast array of institutions independently monitor compliance with law 
and regulations that may be relevant to war algorithms. Those institutions 
include bodies within international organizations, treaty-based weapons-
control regimes, and non-governmental organizations. Note, however, that 
the existence of all of these institutions does not absolve any state from its 
independent duty to ensure its own compliance with international law in 
general and with IHL in particular. While the competence of these institutions 
is not explicitly stated in war-algorithm terms, their general purviews would 
encompass monitoring of at least certain elements of the development and 
operation of those algorithms. Included among those institutions are: 
• The U.N. Security Council;484 
• The U.N. General Assembly;485
481. Id. at ¶ 1.
482.  Derived in part from International Law Association, supra note 35, at 5. 
483.  The obligation to review weapons, means, and methods of warfare laid down in Article 36 
of AP I and the customary law cognate (if any), discussed above, constitutes a form of required 
scrutiny that directly implicates legal responsibility. 
484.  See U.N. Charter art. 25, 39–42.
485.  Under the U.N. Charter, “[t]he General Assembly may discuss any questions or any 
matters within the scope of the … Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any 
organs provided for in the … Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make 
recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both 
on any such questions or matters.” U.N. Charter art. 10. Among its explicit competences laid 
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• The U.N. Secretariat, including the Secretary-General,486 the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
and the U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA);
• The Human Rights Council, including Special Procedures (Special 
Rapporteurs);487
• Treaty-based human-rights and weapons-monitoring bodies and 
mechanisms;488 and
• Non-governmental organizations.489
NORM DEVELOPMENT (INCLUDING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW)
Norms may be developed through formal or informal mechanisms. 
With respect to international law, for instance, the U.N. “General 
Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the 
down in the U.N. Charter, “[t]he General Assembly may consider the general principles of 
co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles 
governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations 
with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.” U.N. 
Charter art. 11 (emphasis added). And “[t]he General Assembly may call the attention of the 
Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.” Id.
486.  Pursuant to the U.N. Charter, “[t]he Secretary-General may bring to the attention 
of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 99. An inherent right to investigate in 
connection with this power has been invoked by several Secretaries-General. Katja Göcke & 
Hubertus von Mohr, United Nations, Secretary-General, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law ¶ 18 (2013). The rationale is that “[s]ince it is necessary for 
the Secretary-General to have comprehensive knowledge of the situation in the conflict area 
before taking action, his authority [to bring any relevant matter to the attention of the Security 
Council] must encompass the right to conduct investigations and to implement preparatory 
fact-finding missions.” Id. at ¶ 20. According to Katja Göcke and Hubertus von Mohr, this 
power has proven its value especially “since States may for various reasons be reluctant to bring 
certain matters before the Security Council….” Id. at ¶ 19.
487.  See, e.g., Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions), Rep. to Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013).
488.  See, e.g., Human Rights Committee; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR); Committee against Torture (CAT); Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
489.  See, e.g., the Steering Committee of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (Human Rights 
Watch, Article 36, Association for Aid and Relief Japan, International Committee for Robot 
Arms Control, Mines Action Canada, Nobel Women’s Initiative, PAX, Pugwash Conferences 
on Science & World Affairs, Seguridad Humana en América Latina y el Caribe, and Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom). About Us, Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/about-us/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2016).
HLS PILAC • AUG. 2016
93
ACCOuNTABILITy AxES
purpose of … encouraging the progressive development of international 
law and its codification.”490 The U.N. General Assembly established its 
Legal Committee (Sixth Committee), which “is responsible for the UN 
General Assembly’s role in encouraging the codification and progressive 
development of international law.”491 The workings of the Sixth Committee 
led to the establishment of the International Law Commission (ILC).492 
According to its Statute, the ILC is expected to bring onto its agenda only 
topics that are “necessary and desirable”493—or, “[i]n other words, only 
topics ‘ripe’ for codification and progressive development of international 
law are to be the subject of its work.”494 This criterion leaves some room 
for the ILC to consider various topics as possible candidates for its 
work. Broadly speaking, “a topic may be considered ripe if the subject-
matter regulates the essential necessities of States or the wider needs and/
or contemporary realities of the international community or is one held 
central to the authority of international law, notwithstanding any existing 
disagreements among States on the topic.”495 In principle, war algorithms 
could arguably fit that definition.
Norms and accompanying standards relevant to war algorithms may 
also be developed at levels other than international law. Pursuant to their 
legislative jurisdiction, states may promulgate municipal laws.496 Moreover, 
whether pursuant to domestic law or regulations or to less formal bases, 
agencies, regulatory bodies, and other standards-setting entities—
governmental or non-governmental—may articulate guidelines, standards, 
and the like.497 
490.  U.N. Charter art. 13.
491.  Huw Llewellyn, United Nations, Sixth Committee, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law ¶ 1 (2012).
492.  Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, International Law Commission (ILC), in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶ 3 (2013) (citing to G.A. Res. 174 (II) 
(November 1947)).
493.  Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 18(2), GA Res. 174(II), UN Doc. A/519 
(1947). 
494.  Rao, supra note 492, at ¶ 6.
495.  Id. (emphasis added).
496.  See, e.g., Public Law 100-180, § 224 (“No agency of the Federal Government may plan 
for, fund, or otherwise support the development of command and control systems for strategic 
defense in the boost or post-boost phase against ballistic missile threats that would permit 
such strategic defenses to initiate the directing of damaging or lethal fire except by affirmative 
human decision at an appropriate level of authority.”). But see Law of War Manual, supra 
note 110, at § 6.9.5.4 n.111 (“This statute may, however, be an unconstitutional intrusion on 
the President’s authority, as Commander in Chief, to determine how weapons are to be used in 
military operations.”).
497.  See, e.g., DOD AWS Dir., supra note 91; Hui-Min Huang et al., Autonomy Levels for 
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NON-BINDING RESOLUTIONS  
AND DECLARATIONS, AND  
INTERPRETATIVE GUIDES
While not laying down legal obligations, non-binding resolutions and 
declarations, as well as codes of conduct or informal manuals, may also 
contribute to the development of the normative framework concerning war 
algorithms. This has already occurred in relation to AWS: a 2014 resolution 
of the European Parliament “[c]alls on the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States and the Council to ... ban 
the development, production and use of fully autonomous weapons which 
enable strikes to be carried out without human intervention.”498 
Moreover, at the 2016 CCW Informal Meeting of Experts, the 
Netherlands called “for the formulation of an interpretative guide that 
clarifies the current legal landscape with regard to the deployment of 
autonomous weapons.”499 In recent years, a number of “Manuals”500 as 
well as an “Interpretive Guide”501 on international law pertaining to 
armed conflict in relation to certain thematic areas have been drafted. It 
is unclear whether the initiative called for by the Netherlands will align 
with these approaches or might take another form. But based on the initial 
Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Framework, Volume II: Framework Models, NIST Special 
Publication 1011-II-1.0, Version 1.0 (2007), http://www.nist.gov/el/isd/ks/upload/ALFUS-
BG.pdf; Jessie Y.C. Chen; Ellen C. Haas, Krishna Pillalamarri & Catherine N. Jacobson, 
“Human-Robot Interface: Issues in Operator Performance, Interface Design, and Technologies,” 
U.S. Army Research Laboratory, ARL-TR-3834 (July 2006).
498. European Parliament Resolution on the Use of Armed Drones ¶ H.2(d) (2014/2567(RSP)) 
(Feb. 25, 2014),
499.  Henk Cor van der Kwast, Perm. Rep. of Neth. to the Conference on Disarmament, 
Opening Statement at the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts, at 4, UN Office in Geneva (April 
11, 2016), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/FC2E59B32F14D791C1
257F920057CAE6/$file/2016_LAWS+MX_GeneralExchange_Statements_Netherlands.pdf. 
See also Steven Groves, A Manual Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems (Heritage Foundation, Special Report No. 183, 2016), http://www.heritage.
org/research/reports/2016/04/a-manual-adapting-the-law-of-armed-conflict-to-lethal-
autonomous-weapons-systems.
500.  E.g., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 
(Michael Schmitt ed., 2013); Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 
Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (2009); 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo Manual on International 
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1995). See also Project on a Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS), https://www.mcgill.
ca/milamos/home (last visited Aug. 27, 2016).
501.  Nils Melzer (ICRC), Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law (2009).
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articulation, it appears that the focus of the called-for “interpretative guide” 
will be on clarifying currently applicable law concerning the deployment of 
autonomous weapons.
NORMATIVE DESIGN OF TECHNICAL 
ARCHITECTURES 
Programmers, engineers, and others involved in the design, development, 
and use of war algorithms might take diverse measures to embed normative 
principles into those systems. The background idea is that code and 
technical architectures can function like a kind of law. Maximizing the 
auditability of that code—especially in light of legally-relevant concepts 
such as attribution and reconstructability—might help strengthen external 
and internal scrutiny mechanisms. 
To increase the likelihood of being adopted, such normative-design 
approaches would likely need to be devised in a manner that takes due 
consideration of the tension between, on one side, external transparency, 
and, on the other, a state’s interest in protecting classified technologies 
as well as the intellectual-property interests associated with those 
technologies. In addition, those thinking through ways to pursue war-
algorithm accountability along this avenue should critically assess the 
experience of attempting to regulate cyber operations and cyber “warfare.” 
So far, those areas have eluded a universal normative regime. Like war 
algorithms, cyber operations and cyber “warfare” raise concerns regarding 
intellectual-property interests, the modularity and dual-use nature of 
the technologies, transparency with external actors due to classification 
regimes, and maintaining a qualitative edge.
Designing “Morally Responsible Engineering” and a 
“Partnership Architecture” 
Some governments have recognized the importance of incorporating moral 
and ethical considerations into the engineering of systems that might be 
relevant to war algorithms. 
In an October 2015 report on AWS, a Dutch “advisory committee 
advocates taking the interaction between humans and machines into 
account sufficiently in the design phase of autonomous weapon systems.”502 
Furthermore, “[i]n light of the importance of attributing responsibility and 
accountability, the [advisory committee] believes that, when procuring 
autonomous weapons, the government should ensure that the concept of 
502.  Dutch Government, Response to AIV/CAVV Report, supra note 22.
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morally responsible engineering is applied during the design stage.” For 
their part, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense consider that 
“recommendation to be an affirmation of existing policy,”503 and emphasize 
that “the government and several of its knowledge partners are studying 
this theme.”504 
Among the research programs funded by the Dutch government was a 
project entitled “Military Human Enhancement: Design for Responsibility 
and Combat Systems,” which was carried out by Delft University of 
Technology. One of the articles published as part of that project put forward 
the idea of a “partnership architecture.”505 Two components undergird this 
idea. First, a mechanism is put forward through which both parties—the 
human and the machine—“do their job concurrently. In this way, each 
actor arrives at an own interpretation of the world thereby constructing 
a human representation of the world and a machine representation of the 
world at the same time.”506 Second, work agreements—“explicit contracts 
between the human and the machine about the division of work”—are used 
to “minimize[] the automation-human coordination asymmetry because 
working agreements define an a priori explicit contract [regarding] what 
[to] and what not to delegate[] to the automation.”507 
The main idea is that the resulting “partnership architecture can protect 
a commitment to responsibility within the armed forces.”508 On one hand, 
“operators will be responsible for the terms of their working agreements with 
their machine.”509 And on the other, working agreements may help “ensure 
503.  This approach aligns in certain respects with the focus on systems engineering discussed 
in the UK MoD Joint Doctrine Note on unmanned aircraft systems. The authors of that 
document state that “[i]n order to ensure that new unmanned aircraft systems adhere to present 
and future legal requirements, it is likely that a systems engineering approach will be the best 
model for developing the requirement and specification.” U.K. Ministry of Def., supra note 
113, at 5-2. Using such an approach, according to the Joint Doctrine Note authors, “the legal 
framework for operating the platform would simply form a list of capability requirements 
that would sit alongside the usual technical and operational requirements.” Id. In turn, “[t]his 
would then inform the specification and design of various sub-systems, as well as informing 
the concept of employment.” Id. 
504.  Dutch Government, Response to AIV/CAVV Report, supra note 22.
505.  See Tjerk de Greef & Alex Leveringhaus, Design for Responsibility: Safeguarding Moral 
Perception via a Partnership Architecture, 17 Cognition, Technology & Work 319 (2015).
506.  Id. at 326 (emphasis original).
507.  Id. (citations omitted).
508.  Id. at 327.
509.  Id. The authors note that “[t]his raises issues about foresight, negligence and so on that 
we cannot tackle here.” Rather, “[f]or now, it suffices to note that the operator remains firmly 
control of his machine—even if there is a physical distance between them or that the machines 
operates at increased levels of automation.” Id.
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that operators receive the morally relevant facts needed to make decisions 
that comply with IHL, as well as key moral principles.”510
Coding Law
Software and hardware engineers, roboticists, and others involved in the 
development of war algorithms may consider taking a page from the internet 
playbook. The internet protocol suite (also known as TCP/IP) is a core set of 
protocols that define the way in which the internet functions. A fundamental 
choice at the heart of the internet’s architecture concerned defining the flow 
of information by allowing ordinary computers connected to the internet to 
not only receive but also to send information. This was neither a necessary 
nor inevitable feature of the internet. (And whether one sees it today as a 
feature or a bug depends on one’s vantage point.) The suite of protocols 
could have been designed in other ways—for instance, the system could have 
distributed packets from a centralized hub, precluding individual computers 
to communicate directly with each other.
Lawrence Lessig argues that, through that structuring, TCP/IP embeds 
some regulatory—perhaps normative—principles in the design of the 
system.511 Put another way, in defining the way in which computers could share 
data and communicate with one another, TCP/IP also forecloses alternative 
methods of communication, thereby imposing, if implicitly, regulations on 
the way in which the internet functions. In this way, code is a kind of law 
because it enables computers to do certain things (such as exchange packets of 
information) but, in doing so, also indirectly defines and narrows the specific 
way in which that exchange is accomplished. (It merits mention that code 
functions as a type of law in this conception irrespective of whether that was 
the intention of the system’s designers.) 
At the 2016 CCW Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems, Danièle Bourcier imported Lessig’s general idea into 
the specific discussion on AWS where she raised the notion of designing 
“humanitarian law” into the relevant technical system.512 What this might 
mean in practice is unclear. But in principle it might concern the design of 
the underlying algorithms as well as the constructed systems through which 
those algorithms are effectuated. 
510.  Id.
511.  See generally Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999). 
512.  Danièle Bourcier, Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Artificial Intelligence & 
Autonomous Decisions: From Judgelike Robot to Soldier Robot, Address at the 2016 Informal 
Meeting of Experts, UN Office in Geneva (April 2016), available at
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/338ABCC8C57BB09CC1257F9A0045
197A/$file/2016_LAWS+MX+Presentations_HRandEthicalIssues_Daniele+Vourcier.pdf.
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Auditable Algorithms
Making war algorithms more auditable may help foster accountability 
over them. “Audit logs,” for instance, record activity that takes place in 
an information architecture. In the U.S., national-security fusion centers 
“are supposed to employ audit logs that record the activity taking place 
in the information-sharing network, including ‘queries made by users, 
the information accessed, information flows between systems, and date- 
and time-markers for those activities.’”513 (A fusion center is designed to 
promote information-sharing and to streamline intelligence-gathering, 
not only at the federal level between various agencies but also among the 
U.S. military and state- and local-level government.) In addition to the 
national-security realm, audit logs or similar mechanisms are mandated 
with respect to certain credit-rating agencies, financial transactions, and 
healthcare software. To be effective, audit logs need to be immutable.514 
While not specifically addressing AWS, the UK MoD Joint Doctrine Note 
on unmanned aircraft systems states that “[a] complex weapon system is 
also likely to require an authorisation and decisions log, to provide an audit 
trail for any subsequent legal enquiry.”515
COMMUNITY SELF-REGULATION
A recent call for self-imposed regulation by a group of expert scientists 
in the domain of genetic engineering may provide a regulatory model for 
those involved in the development of war algorithms. The basic idea is 
that, even where there is no or little formal regulation, a community can 
choose, on its own initiative, to delineate what is and is not acceptable and 
to self-police the resulting boundaries.
The plea by some leading scientists partly concerned a relatively 
easy-to-use gene-editing technique called CRISPR/Cas9. (Gene-editing 
techniques, in short, “use enzymes called nucleases to snip DNA at 
specific points and then delete or rewrite the genetic information at those 
locations.”516) CRISPR/Cas9 had “suddenly made it possible to cross [a] 
513.  Pasquale, supra note 1, at 157 (citing to Markle Task Force on National Security in 
the Information Age, Implementing a Trusted Information Sharing Environment: Using 
Immutable Audit Logs to Increase Security, Trust, and Accountability, at I (2006), http://
research.policyarchive.org/15551.pdf). 
514.  See Pasquale, supra note 1, at 157; see also id. at 159 (stating that “[i]f immutable audit 
logs of fusion centers are regularly reviewed, misconduct might be discovered, wrongdoers 
might be held responsible, and similar misuses might be deterred”) (citation omitted). 
515.  U.K. Ministry of Def., supra note 113, at 5-6. See also DOD AWS Dir., supra note 91 
(establishing audit-like requirements in DoD policy).
516.  David Cyranoski, Ethics of Embryo Editing Divides Scientists, 519 Nature 272, 272 (2015).
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Rubicon”: “[f ]or decades, the ability to make changes that could be inherited 
in the human genome has been viewed as a fateful decision — but one that 
could be postponed because there was no safe and efficient way to edit the 
genome.”517 With CRISPR/Cas9, it has been said, “the long theoretical issue 
now requires practical decisions.”518 
In December 2015, the Organizing Committee for the International 
Summit on Human Gene Editing came to an agreement on “a recommendation 
not to stop human-gene-editing research outright, but to refrain from 
research and applications that use modified human embryos to establish 
a pregnancy.”519 More specifically, intensive basic and preclinical research 
should proceed, the Committee said, but that research should be “subject 
to appropriate legal and ethical rules and oversight, on (i) technologies for 
editing genetic sequences in human cells, (ii) the potential benefits and risks 
of proposed clinical uses, and (iii) understanding the biology of human 
embryos and germline cells.”520 And “[i]f, in the process of research, early 
human embryos or germline cells undergo gene editing,” the Committee 
entreated, “the modified cells should not be used to establish a pregnancy.”521
The Committee also called for an ongoing forum to address these 
issues. The push should be for “[t]he international community … [to] 
strive to establish norms concerning acceptable uses of human germline 
editing and to harmonize regulations, in order to discourage unacceptable 
activities while advancing human health and welfare.”522 Against this 
backdrop, the Committee called upon the national academies that co-hosted 
the summit “to take the lead in creating an ongoing international forum 
to discuss potential clinical uses of gene editing; help inform decisions 
by national policymakers and others; formulate recommendations and 
guidelines; and promote coordination among nations.”523 This forum, the 
Committee stated, “should be inclusive among nations and engage a wide 
range of perspectives and expertise,” such as “biomedical scientists, social 
scientists, ethicists, health care providers, patients and their families, 
517.  Nicholas Wade, Scientists Seek Moratorium on Edits to Human Genome That Could Be 
Inherited, N.Y. Times (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/science/crispr-cas9-
human-genome-editing-moratorium.html. 
518.  Id.; see, e.g., George Church, Perspective: Encourage the Innovators, 528 Nature S7, S7 
(2015).
519.  Sara Reardon, Global Summit Reveals Divergent Views on Human Gene Editing, 528 
Nature 173, 173 (2015).
520.  David Baltimore et al., International Summit Statement, On Human Gene Editing, (Dec. 
3, 2015), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12032015a.
521.  Id.
522.  Id. 
523.  Id.
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people with disabilities, policymakers, regulators, research funders, faith 
leaders, public interest advocates, industry representatives, and members 
of the general public.”524
Zooming out, the call for various forms of self-regulation by these 
scientists might be relevant for those involved in the design and development 
of war algorithms—another area where some are concerned about crossing 
a moral Rubicon. In addition to the broader point (that, alongside forms 
of legal responsibility, a community can raise the normative bar for 
itself ), specific possible regulatory avenues emerge: setting boundaries on 
possible research and imposing moratoriums (where deemed necessary); 
defining legal and ethical rules and oversight mechanisms; committing to 
review existing regulations on an ongoing basis; and establishing forums to 
address enduring and emergent concerns. 
  
524.  Id. 
5
CONCLUSION
Two contradictory trends may be combining into a new global climate that 
is at once enterprising and anxious. Militaries see myriad technological 
triumphs that will transform warfighting. Yet the possibility of “replacing” 
human judgment with algorithmically-derived “decisions”—especially in 
war—threatens what many consider to define us as humans.   
To date, the lack of demonstrated technical knowledge by many 
states and commentators, the unwillingness of states to share closely-held 
national-security technologies, and an absence of a definitional consensus 
on what is meant by autonomous weapon systems have impeded regulatory 
efforts on AWS. Moreover, uncertainty about which actors would benefit 
most from advances in AWS and for how long such benefits would yield a 
meaningful qualitative edge over others seems likely to continue to inhibit 
efforts at negotiating binding international rules on the development 
and deployment of AWS. In this sense, efforts at reaching a dedicated 
international regime to address AWS may follow the same frustrations as 
analogous efforts to address cyber warfare. True, unlike with the early days 
of cyber warfare, there has been greater state engagement on regulation of 
AWS. In particular, the concept of “meaningful human control” over AWS 
has already been endorsed by over two-dozen states. But much remains up 
in the air as states decide whether to establish a Group of Governmental 
Experts on AWS at the upcoming Fifth Review Conference of the CCW.
We have shown that, with respect to armed conflict, the primary 
formal regulatory avenues under international law are state responsibility 
for internationally wrongful acts and individual criminal responsibility for 
international crimes. These fields are well established and offer many more 
avenues than are often considered in the relatively narrow AWS discourse 
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to date. In sum, ICL and, especially, IHL already address many of the 
concerns raised in relation to AWS—but ICL and IHL may not be sufficient 
to address all of those concerns.
The current crux, as we see it, is whether advances in technology—
especially those capable of “self-learning” and of operating in relation 
to war and whose “choices” may be difficult for humans to anticipate or 
unpack or whose “decisions” are seen as “replacing” human judgment—
are susceptible to regulation and, if so, whether and how they should be 
regulated. One way to think about the core concern which vaults over 
at least some of the impediments to the discussion on AWS is the new 
concept we raise: war algorithms. War algorithms include not only those 
algorithms capable of being used in weapons but also in any other function 
related to war.
More war algorithms are on the horizon. Two months ago, the Defense 
Science Board, which is connected with the U.S. Department of Defense, 
identified five “stretch problems”—that is, goals that are “hard-but-not-
too-hard” and that have a purpose of accelerating the process of bringing a 
new algorithmically-derived capability into widespread application:
• Generating “future loop options” (that is, “using interpretation of 
massive data including social media and rapidly generated strategic 
options”); 
• Enabling autonomous swarms (that is, “deny[ing] the enemy’s ability 
to disrupt through quantity by launching overwhelming numbers of 
low‐cost assets that cooperate to defeat the threat”); 
• Intrusion detection on the Internet of Things (that is, “defeat[ing] 
adversary intrusions in the vast network of commercial sensors and 
devices by autonomously discovering subtle indicators of compromise 
hidden within a flood of ordinary traffic”); 
• Building autonomous cyber-resilient military vehicle systems (that 
is, “trust[ing] that … platforms are resilient to cyber‐attack through 
autonomous system integrity validation and recovery”); and 
• Planning autonomous air operations (that is, “operat[ing] inside 
adversary timelines by continuously planning and replanning tactical 
operations using autonomous ISR analysis, interpretation, option 
generation, and resource allocation”).525
525.  Defense Science Board, supra note 7, at 76–97.
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What this trajectory toward greater algorithmic autonomy in war—at least 
among more technologically-sophisticated armed forces and even some non-
state armed groups—means for accountability purposes seems likely to 
remain a contested issue for the foreseeable future. 
In the meantime, it remains to be authoritatively determined whether 
war algorithms will be capable of making the evaluative decisions and 
value judgments that are incorporated into IHL. It is currently not clear, 
for instance, whether war algorithms will be capable of formulating and 
implementing the following IHL-based evaluative decisions and value 
judgments:526 
• The presumption of civilian status in case of “doubt”;527
• The assessment of “excessiveness” of expected incidental harm in 
relation to anticipated military advantage;
• The betrayal of “confidence” in IHL in relation to the prohibition of 
perfidy; and
• The prohibition of destruction of civilian property except where 
“imperatively” demanded by the necessities of war.528
*     *     *
Two factors may suggest that, at least for now, the most immediate ways 
to regulate war algorithms more broadly and to pursue accountability 
over them might be to follow not only traditional paths but also less 
conventional ones. As illustrated above, the latter might include relatively 
formal avenues—such as states making, applying, and enforcing war-
algorithm rules of conduct within and beyond their territories—or less 
formal avenues—such as coding law into technical architectures and 
community self-regulation.
First, even where the formal law may seem sufficient, concerns about 
practical enforcement abound. Recently, for instance, states parties to the 
Geneva Conventions failed to muster the political support to establish a 
new IHL compliance forum.529 There are a number of ways to interpret 
526.  These concerns were raised in relation to autonomous weapon systems, but they are also 
implicated by war algorithms.
527.  Swiss, “Compliance-Based” Approach, supra note 74, citing art. 50(3) and art. 52(3) of 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. See AP I, supra note 12, at art. 50(3), 52(3).
528.  Id., citing art. 23(g) of Hague Regulation IV, see Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(g), Oct. 18, 1907, T.S. 539, and art. 53 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, see GC IV, supra note 349, at art. 53.
529.  Compare 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Draft “0” 
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this refusal. But, at a minimum, it seems to point to a lack of political will 
among states to cast more light on IHL compliance. This suggests that even 
where existing IHL seems adequate as a regulatory regime for some aspects 
of the design, development, and use of AWS or war algorithms, it still lacks 
dependable enforcement as far as state conduct is concerned. 
Second, the proliferation of increasingly advanced technical systems 
based on self-learning and distributed control raises the question of 
whether the model of individual responsibility found in ICL might pose 
conceptual challenges to regulating AWS and war algorithms. At a general 
level, this is not a wholly new concern, as distributed systems have been 
used in relation to war for a long time. But the design, development, and 
operation of those systems might be increasingly difficult to square with 
the foundational tenet of ICL—that “[c]rimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities”530—as learning algorithms and 
architectures advance.531 
In short, individual responsibility for international crimes under 
international law remains one of the vital accountability avenues in 
existence today, as do measures of remedy for state responsibility. Yet 
in practice responsibility along either avenue is unfortunately relatively 
Resolution on “Strengthening compliance with international humanitarian law” (undated), https://
www.icrc.org/en/download/file/13244/32ic-draft-0-resolution-on-ihl-compliance-20150915-
en.pdf with 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Resolution 2 
(Dec. 10, 2015), http://rcrcconference.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/04/32IC-AR-
Compliance_EN.pdf.
530.  1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military 
Tribunal 223 (1947).
531.  In a related context, M.C. Elish has noted a dilemma in which “control has become 
distributed across multiple actors (human and nonhuman),” and yet “our social and legal 
conceptions of responsibility have remained generally about an individual.” She thus 
“developed the term moral crumple zone to describe the result of this ambiguity within systems 
of distributed control, particularly automated and autonomous systems.” The basic idea is 
that “[j]ust as the crumple zone in a car is designed to absorb the force of impact in a crash, 
the human in a highly complex and automated system may become simply a component—
accidentally or intentionally—that bears the brunt of the moral and legal responsibilities 
when the overall system malfunctions.” M.C. Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales 
in Human-Robot Interaction 3–4 (We Robot 2016 Working Paper) (March 20, 2016), http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2757236 (using “the terms autonomous, automation, machine and 
robot as related technologies on a spectrum of computational technologies that perform tasks 
previously done by humans” and discussing a framework for categorizing types of automation 
proposed by Parasuraman, Sheridan and Wickens, who “define automation specifically in the 
context of human-machine comparison and as ‘a device or system that accomplishes (partially 
or fully) a function that was previously, or conceivably could be, carried out (partially or fully) 
by a human operator.’”). Id. at n.5 (citing to Parasuraman et al.,  “A Model for Types and Levels 
of Human Interaction with Automation,” 30 IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and 
Cybernetics 3 (2000). Elish notes that the term arose in her work with Tim Hwang. Id. at 3.
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rare. And thus neither path, on its own or in combination, seems to be 
sufficient to effectively address the myriad regulatory concerns pertaining 
to war algorithms—at least not until we better understand what is at issue. 
These concerns might lead those seeking to strengthen accountability of 
war algorithms to pursue not only traditional, formal avenues but also less 
formal, softer mechanisms.
In that connection, it seems likely that attempts to change governments’ 
approaches to technical autonomy in war through social pressure (at least 
for those governments that might be responsive to that pressure) will 
continue to be a vital avenue along which to pursue accountability. But 
here, too, there are concerns. Numerous initiatives already exist. Some of 
them are very well informed; others less so. Many of them are motivated 
by ideological, commercial, or other interests that—depending on one’s 
viewpoint—might strengthen or thwart accountability efforts. And given 
the paucity of formal regulatory regimes, some of these initiatives may end 
up having considerable impact, despite their shortcomings.
Stepping back, we see that technologies of war, as with technologies 
in so many areas, produce an uneasy blend of promise and threat.532 With 
respect to war algorithms, understanding these conflicting pulls requires 
attention to a century-and-a-half-long history during which war came to 
be one of the most highly regulated areas of international law. But it also 
requires technical know-how. Thus those seeking accountability for war 
algorithms would do well not to forget the essentially political work of IHL’s 
designers—nor to obscure the fact that today’s technology is, at its core, 
designed, developed, and deployed by humans. Ultimately, war-algorithm 
accountability seems unrealizable without competence in technical 
architectures and in legal frameworks, coupled with ethical, political, and 
economic awareness.
532.  On broader historical, social, and political forces that shape notions and experiences 
of technology, at least in the American context, see, e.g., John M. Staudenmaier, Technology, 
in A Companion to American Thought 667–669 (Richard Wrightman Fox & James T. 
Kloppenberg eds., 1995).
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